



INTEGRA

**O.2 Addressing Radicalisation in Prison and Probation:
Needs and Risk Assessment**
Integrated Report



INTEGRA

Integrated community, probation and prison
services radicalisation prevention approach

O.2 Addressing Radicalisation in Prison and Probation: Needs and Risk Assessment

Integrated Report

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List of abbreviations

APCARS	Association de Politique Criminelle Appliquée et de Réinsertion Sociale (Association for Applied Criminal Policy and Social Reintegration)
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BCRP	Bureau Central du Renseignement Pénitentiaire (Central Office for Prison Intelligence)
BNU	Bulgarian National Union
CAM	Compulsory Administrative Measure
CASA	Antiterrorism Strategic Analysis Committee
CC	Criminal Code
CCCJD	Central Commission for Combating Juvenile Delinquency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CoE CPT	Council of Europe Committee against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment
CT	Counter-terrorism
DAP	Dipartimento per l'amministrazione penitenziaria (Department of Prison Administration)
DGSI	Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (General Directorate for Interior Security)
EA	Epanastatikos Agonas (Revolutionary Struggle)
ELA	Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas (Revolutionary Popular Struggle)
ENCT	Estratégia Nacional de Combate ao Terrorisimo (National Counter-Terrorism Strategy)
EU	European Union
FAI	Federazione Anarchica Informale (Informal Anarchist Federation)
FIJAIT	Fichier Judiciaire National Automatisé des Auteurs d'Infractions Terroriste (Judicial Database for Terrorist Offenders)
FPR	Fichier des Personnes Recherchées (Wanted Persons File)
FRI	Frente Revolucionario Internacional (International Revolutionary Front)
FTF	Foreign terrorist fighter
GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences
GNR	Guarda Nacional Republicana (National Republican Guard)
HLCEG-R	High-Level Commission's Expert Group Radicalisation

IS	Islamic State
JAPAT	Juges d'Application des Peines spécialisés dans l'Anti-Terrorisme (Judges Specialised in Anti-Terrorism)
KEMEA	Kentro Meleton Asfaleias (Center for Security Studies)
LEPSCD	Law on Execution of Penal Sanctions and Detention in Custody
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
NCHR	National Commission for Human Rights
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIC	Nucleo Investigativo Centrale (Central Investigative Unit)
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PF	Patriotic Front
PJ	Polícia Judiciária (Judiciary Police)
PJJ	Protection Judiciaire de la Jeunesse (Youth Judicial Protection)
PM	Prime Minister
PPR	Programme de Prévention de la Récidive (Recidivism Prevention Programme)
PPSMJ	Personne Placée Sous Main de Justice (Person Under Criminal Justice Control)
PREVA	Programme d'évaluation des personnes placées sous main de justice fondé sur les principes du risque, des besoins et de la réceptivité (Assessment programme for people under criminal justice control based on the principles of risk)
PSP	Public Security Police
QER	Quartiers d'Evaluation de la Radicalisation (Radicalisation Assessment Quarters)
QPR	Quartier de Prise en charge de la Radicalisation (Quarter for Radicalisation Supervision)
RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
RIVE	Recherches et Intervention sur les Violences Extrémistes (Research and Intervention for Violent Extremism)
RVRN	Racist Violence Recording Network
SANS	State Agency for National Security
SCS	Second-Chance Schools
SE	Sechta ton Epanastaton (Sect of Revolutionaries)
SEF	Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (Foreign and Borders Service)

SJC	Supreme Judicial Council
SIED	Serviço de Informações Estratégicas de Defesa (Strategic Defence Information Service)
SIRP	Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa (Portuguese Republic Information System)
SIS	Serviço de Informações de Segurança (Security Information Service)
SOPHP	Strategic and Operational Programme of the Hellenic Police
SPF	Synomosía ton Pyrínon tis Fotiás (Conspiracy of Fire Cells)
SPIP	Service pénitentiaire d'Insertion et de Probation (Prison Rehabilitation and Probation Service)
SSI	Sistema de Segurança Interna (Internal Security System)
UCAT	Unidade de Coordenação Anti-Terrorismo (Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit)
UCOII	Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of the Muslims in Italy)
UNHCR	U.N. High Commission for Refugees in Greece
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPRA	Unités de Prévention de la Radicalisation (Radicalisation Prevention Units)
WPB	World Prison Brief
17N	November 17

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Radicalisation Risks in Prisons and Probation and Institutional Needs - a comparative review

Introduction

The INTEGRA project (“Integrated approach to the prevention of radicalisation by the community, probation and prison services”) aims to improve the transition between prison and/or probation and community services for individuals regarded as being at risk of radicalisation or who have already been radicalised. To achieve this it promotes a holistic prevention of radicalisation and focusing on the development of the skills of radicalised individuals’, but also of the organisations and staff at the forefront.

The present integrated report contributes to a better understanding of the contextual radicalisation dynamics, institutional environments and the challenges faced by frontline practitioners when dealing with radicalisation risks in the prison and probation settings in five Member States: Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal. The report summarises the findings from Task O.2 of the Integra project, namely Needs and Risk Assessment conducted in the five project partner countries.

The project partners produced country reports that highlight the main risks of radicalisation in prison and probation settings as well as institutional needs in responding effectively to these risks. The analysis is embedded in the context of general trends of radicalisation in each country, the response undertaken to counter this problem as well as the state of the penitentiary system. The specific objectives of the country reports were to:

- **Identify and assess the needs of different stakeholders** (prison and probation staff, agencies and community partners working with inmates) involved in the process of tackling radicalisation leading to violent extremism both inside and outside prisons, taking into account the local specificities (e.g., national legal systems);
- Diagnosis of the situation in the prison and probation services that participate in the project regarding the **risk of radicalisation and extremism**.

The integrated report draws out commonalities, but also specific contextual challenges to addressing radicalisation in prison and probation, discussing differences in institutional settings and existing threats in each of the countries studied. It provides awareness and overview of needs, gaps in available strategies, potential venues and modalities for risk assessment, multi-agency cooperation and corresponding interventions, impact on the target group and the potential demand for future programmes and products.

The report therefore serves as a base for common understanding and knowledge on the challenges and needs of practitioners and should guide and inform the development of INTEGRA project future deliverables, such as the Mentoring Model and Programme and the prevention trainings programme for prison, probation and community.

This report is structured as follows: a discussion of common trends and differences related to the overall radicalisation dynamics in each country is first presented, followed by an overview

of the main radicalisation trends in the prison systems of the selected countries. The different institutional responses, gaps and needs of stakeholders and practitioners involved in the process of radicalisation prevention within the partner countries are then outlined, followed by conclusions and policy recommendations.

The five country reports are presented in the Appendix (Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal)

- Bulgaria (Center for the Study of Democracy)
- France, (Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès)
- Greece (KEMEA)
- Italy (Luisa Ravagnani, Università Degli Studi di Brescia)
- Portugal (IPS – International Prison Systems)

The country reports are based on the following data sources:

- **Focus groups interviews** with representatives of the different stakeholders (prison and probation services, agencies and community partners working with inmates and probationers) in each country; These aimed at taking stock of radicalisation dynamics and manifestations, the extent to which the respective professionals consider the phenomenon as a (potential) problem among prisoners and probationers, the measures undertaken to tackle this problem and related phenomena and the institutional needs.
- A **radicalisation risk assessment questionnaire** sent to prison and probation services; The Risk Assessment questionnaires aimed to assess radicalisation risks in prison and probation services along several dimensions – supply of extremist narratives, the availability of counter and de-radicalisation measures, as well as environmental and vulnerability factors.
- **Desktop research** and analysis of available data and studies

For the purposes of this report, the following definitions of key terms by the Council of Europe are used:

Radicalisation is understood to “represent a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.”¹

Violent extremism “consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy or opposing core democratic principles and values.”²

When references are made to terrorist or extremist offenders, the respective national criminal provisions for terrorism and related offences apply. Each chapter provides an overview of the legislative framework concerning acts of terrorism or extremist offences such as hate or bias crimes.

¹ Council of Europe. (2016) *Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism: Terminology used for the purpose of the Guidelines*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

² Ibid.

Radicalisation risks in prison and probation

The partner countries face very different overall threat environments associated with radicalisation, extremism and terrorism, which is reflected in the way authorities have responded to these threats, including in the prison and probation domain in particular. Radicalisation and violent extremism for some countries have been a long-standing issue such as in **Greece**, where radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism has been mainly politically driven (left-wing) and dating back to the 1970s.

In **France** the main challenge over the past several years stems from **jihadi radicalisation** that leads to terrorism, mainly due to the rise of ISIS and the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Consequently, substantial government efforts and resources have been devoted to different CT or preventive measures and programs across various public policy domains dealing exclusively with religiously inspired terrorism and radicalisation. With nearly 200 sentences and some 350 detained terrorist offenders, France faces the most pressing challenge with tackling the threat of Islamist radicalisation among the countries studied.

In **Italy** jihadist networks have developed since the 1990s, although currently the most widespread model in the country is autochthonous Jihadism. However, Italy has a long past experience with left- and right-wing terrorism which has inevitably influenced its approach towards international terrorism.

In contrast, in **Bulgaria** and **Portugal**, the threat stemming from the activities of Jihadist networks and home-grown religiously inspired radicalisation is considered low. Bulgaria and Portugal have been largely spared from terrorist attacks and home-grown terrorism is not considered a major threat, although some concerns regarding radicalisation, mostly stemming from external factors (such as the penetration of jihadist ideology, as well as the transnational character of jihadist networks, but also recent migration waves), have been raised. Islamist radicalisation is not the main local concern for Greece, Bulgaria or Portugal, but the geographical location of these countries at EU's external borders make them vulnerable entry and exit points for transnationally operating jihadist networks. At present, there is no extensive mobilisation of the highly heterogeneous Muslim populations in Greece, Bulgaria (the two countries have indigenous Muslim minorities) or Portugal, but there are a number of potential risks that deserve government attention. These include, for example in the case of **Greece**, integration of second and third generation migrants, the absence of a legitimate and credible representative body for the Muslim community, unofficial mosques, the possible reactions to far-right and racist violence, links between youngsters and foreign radicals using Greece as a transit point, logistics hub, and an escape route to the EU for foreign fighters, and local polarization in hot spots such as refugee center. In **Bulgaria**, a country with nearly 12% indigenous Muslim population, risk factors include marginalization and discrimination among some Muslim communities, unstable religious identities among some segments of these (e.g. the Roma), lack of opportunities for high education in Islamic studies and foreign funding for religious education, contacts of Bulgarian Muslims with radical preachers and mosques in Western Europe (e.g. Germany and France) while in labour migration, the global reach of jihadist propaganda online, the transit of FTFs through the country, among others.

Other forms of extremism and radicalisation based on **political (far-left) and anarchist ideologies** constitute the main threat in **Greece**. The ranks of such

organisation are numerous and they are successful in radicalisation and recruitment. In Greece an important factor is links between organized crime and terrorists, which are sometimes formed in prisons by first and second phase prisoners. Anarchist terrorist organizations in particular seem to have close connections with criminals, at least for the supply of weaponry and explosives.

Furthermore, in most countries studied there are **right-wing movements** that fuel anti-minorities sentiments and polarisation in society. In Greece, for example, there have been a number of incidents, most notably attacks targeting immigrants, leftists and anarchists, and new groups have been formed. Furthermore, political extremist movements and organisations are often well interconnected across Europe and are very active in online propaganda.

Considering this complex and diverse picture of the different forms and sources of threats in the countries studied, the prison and probation domain is faced with particular challenges for preventing and countering radicalisation, to which the country reports have dedicated special attention.

Radicalisation risks in prison and probation

The different context-specific threats and dynamics in terms of forms, sources and magnitude of the terrorism threat and underlying radicalisation risks in the countries studied are also reflected in their respective prison and probation settings. Developing tailored and holistic approaches to the prevention of radicalisation by community, probation and prison services requires an in-depth understanding of radicalisation risks, manifestations and drivers in local correctional and probation institutions, although detailed studies and assessments of this matter are often lacking.

Existing risk assessment tools predominantly focus on examining the individual. However, not all countries warrant the use or are prepared for the application of risk assessment tools on the individual level. A risk assessment on the prison level, on the other hand, can be applied regardless of the number of convicted extremist/terrorist prisoners in the respective facility, and can be an important preliminary step to identify risk factors, guide intervention needs and priorities and prepare the ground for introducing subsequent more targeted measures, such as individual risk assessment tools. Correctional settings have often been pointed out as environments which are especially conducive to radicalisation and inmates as a particularly vulnerable population³. Measuring the risk of radicalisation thus necessitates the consideration of factors and dynamics which are specific to this type of environment.

A number of factors have been assessed in order to evaluate the radicalisation risk environments in the prison and probation in the selected countries, based on literature review. Three main categories of risk and vulnerability factors have been reviewed in

³ E.g. Dunleavy, P. (2011). *The Fertile Soil of Jihad: Terrorism's Prison Connection*. Washington DC: Potomac Books; Mulcahy, E. et al. (2013). The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability. *Journal of Human Security* 9 (1): 4-14; Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). (n.d.). Dealing with Radicalisation in a Prison and Probation Context. RAN Practitioners' Working Paper. Brussels: RAN

the country studies⁴: the **supply of extremist narratives and potential recruitment** at the prison level (number of extremist offenders, management of extremist offenders (risk assessment, specific prison regimes), outside penetration of extremist propaganda, organisation of religion and places of worship, among others), the **institutional preparedness to deal with radicalisation** (existence and nature of counter- and de-radicalisation programs) and the **overall prison environment** (situational factors with indirect impact on flagging and dealing with radicalisation such as prison living conditions, understaffing, prison staff training, general rehabilitation measures, among others).

The assessment was done by the project partners based on the distribution of a tailored questionnaire to prison and probation authorities, or where this was not feasible, on desktop research and secondary data available.

Extremist/terrorist offenders⁵ and inmates considered at risk of radicalisation

The most important indicator to be considered when assessing the level of radicalisation risks faced by prison and probation services, but also the main factor that shapes institutional responses in the selected countries is the number of extremist/terrorist offenders and the way they are managed and supervised by the correctional authorities. An important component of radicalisation dynamics is the contact of non-radical prisoners with extremist narratives and ideologies,⁶ mainly in their communication with extremist convicts.

France faces by far the most significant challenge among the countries analysed when it comes to handling radicalisation in detention and probation facilities. It deals with a total population of over 1,500 inmates or detainees considered high-risk for radicalisation, including 349 persons detained for terrorism, 196 sentenced for terrorism and another 1,336 inmates convicted for other crimes that are considered radicalised. The radicalisation risks are almost exclusively stemming from Islamist extremism. Such large numbers of at-risk population presents unique challenges and requires the highest level of mobilisation of the correctional authorities at several levels (risk assessment, supervision, intelligence, mentoring and support). Post-release monitoring and mentoring is also a major area requiring intervention, since a large share of the terrorism convicts are due to be released in the next three years. A large share of the at-risk population detained in France are not perpetrators of terrorist attacks, but members of jihadist networks prosecuted from 2013 onwards. Their upcoming release has prompted the Ministry of Interior to create a special supervision

⁴ These are explained in more detail in the project working document *Appendix IV: Risk Assessment Questionnaire for Prison and Probation Authorities*.

⁵ The country reports refer to data on offenders convicted for or charged with terrorist offences as per the specific provisions of the national criminal codes, but may include: committing a terrorist act; planning or preparing for a terrorist act, financing of terrorism, providing or receiving training connected with terrorist acts; international travel with the aim to commit terrorism, terrorist propaganda, glorification of terrorism (e.g. in France). In addition, in the case of Bulgaria and Greece, other extremism-related crimes have also been included in the analysis such as hate or bias crimes.

⁶ Hannah, G., Clutterbuck, L. and Rubin, J. (2008). *Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners*. London: RAND Europe.

committee exclusively for ex-prisoners. Currently, some 600 persons are monitored in the post-release phase for radicalisation reasons.

In **Greece**, not only the number of convicted anarchist and far-left extremist offenders, but also the length of prison sentences is a factor to be considered when assessing the challenges of radicalisation to the prison and probation systems. Left-wing offences bear the highest average prison sentences (10 years) in Europe in 2017, followed by jihadist terrorist offences (five years), and separatist and right-wing terrorist offences (both four years). A comparison across EU Member States shows that Greece handed out exceptionally high prison sentences for terrorism-related charges. With an average sentence of 17 years, Greece greatly exceeds all European countries that penalize terrorists with six or less years of imprisonment on average. This poses specific challenges. The Greek report presents a case in point of how imprisoned members of a more recent anarchist terrorist organisation aided the escape of a long-term convict for from an “old” far-left terror group. It demonstrates the risk posed by the contact and influences among not only old and new terrorists but also between terrorism and organised crime.

In **Italy**, the risk from dissemination of jihadist ideologies and radicalisation in prisons is well recognised and a number of measures have been introduced for their monitoring and rehabilitation. In 2018 there were 66 detainees (62 in 2017) who were either awaiting trial or already sentenced for crimes related to “international Islamic terrorism”.⁷ These are placed in special high security sections (“circuit”) across 4 prisons, separated from the rest of the inmates.⁸ In addition, total of 478 individuals flagged for radicalisation in Italian prisons (233 high-risk, 103 medium-risk and 142 low-risk).⁹ Radicalisation risks in the Italian prison system seem to stem not so much from the recruitment activities of members of jihadist networks, but from self-appointed Imams, as well as conversions to Islam while in prison. In 2017 there were only 25 Imams in Italian prisons formally authorised by the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time 97 prisoners “had a role of *imam*, and thus lead the prayers, 88 had proposed themselves as the representatives of other detainees to the prison administration, and 44 had converted to Islam while in prison”.¹⁰

The prison population in **Portugal** only counts one inmate convicted for terrorism amongst almost 13,000 other inmates, and radicalisation in prison and probation is not considered a major risk.

Similarly, the risk of radicalisation in **Bulgarian** prisons is considered not acute due to the low number of convicted extremist or terrorist offenders (4 out of 6349 total prison population in 2017), especially radical Islamist leaders, the lack of established ideology-driven gangs and the generally limited possibilities for the activities of outside extremist actors and entry of

⁷ Italian Ministry of Justice - Department of Penitentiary Administration. “[Relazione del Ministero sull'amministrazione della giustizia anno 2018](#)”. January 2019.

⁸ Marone, F. and Olimpico, M. (2019) *Jihadist Radicalization in Italian Prisons: A Primer*. ISPI, 4 March 2019. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/jihadist-radicalization-italian-prisons-primer-22401#nota29>

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

extremist content. Radicalisation risks in probation seem to be likewise limited at the moment. However, the analysis presented here demonstrates that even in countries with limited number of extremist/terrorist offenders, there are potential risks and vulnerabilities, although insufficiently understood and studied, that need to be addressed to prevent such processes from developing in the future.

For example, in Bulgaria, the presence of extremist ideologues who, even if few in number, can potentially find fertile ground among particularly marginalised prisoners and use different tactics to entice and draw them in their remit of influence. Extremist propaganda has also reportedly found its way into prison facilities probably due to gaps in monitoring. Risks are associated with the possibility for already radicalised inmates to access extremist content or to communicate with extremist actors, which can hinder any efforts for de-radicalisation, as well as compromise prison and wider security. On the other hand, no instances of previously non-radical inmates accessing extremist content online have been observed and therefore the extent to which this represents a risk is unknown. The number of far-right extremist offenders who enter prison, although not known with certainty due to the imprecise *Criminal Code* provisions, is higher in comparison.

In the meantime some new terrorism-related trials have been initiated in the past few years, mainly concerning foreign nationals arrested in Bulgaria on foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) charges, some of which have recently resulted in convictions. Hence the number of terrorist offenders sentenced to prison is likely to increase, albeit at a very slow pace, and may pose future challenges to addressing radicalisation.

Environmental and situational drivers and risk factors

Regarding the organisation of religion inside prison, the legal framework in all countries grants the presence of a spiritual guide inside prison. However, the availability of Imams is considered highly insufficient taking into account the share of Muslim inmates across the countries studied, while professionalism of the available Muslim chaplains has also been reported to present a challenge. Conversions to Islam and self-appointed Imams inside prison have been reported, for example in Italy, which is perceived as a factor that can contribute to radicalisation risks. Language barriers have also been pointed out as a challenge with respect to foreign inmates.

Other factors such as prison overpopulation, staff shortages and insufficient staff training and knowledge are issues that came up in several of the contexts examined.

The overpopulation of Greek prisons is a main issue which affects the living conditions of the inmates. It creates distress, riots and may have consequences in fueling radicalisation and extremist ideologies. Prison overcrowding and

Institutional responses, needs and challenges

The country chapters presented in this report provide a comprehensive overview of the main legislative and policy measures undertaken in recent years to address radicalisation and terrorism in each country, as well the main institutions responsible for their implementation. The organisation of the penitentiary and probation systems are also discussed, with particular focus on how radicalisation is perceived as a risk and

addressed. Topics reviewed include: number of extremist offenders and inmates perceived to be at risk of radicalisation; application of radicalisation risk assessment tools; prison regimes and management of extremist offenders (monitoring, supervision, provision of services), existence and quality of rehabilitation programs for extremist offenders, post-release support, stakeholders involved.

General legislative and policy measures in the CT and P/CVE domain

All of the countries studied have in recent years strengthened their CT legislation and have established or enhanced the mandates of CT coordination units to respond to potential terrorist threats. All countries studied have added provisions to their criminal codes pertaining to foreign terrorist fighters, training and aiding terrorist activity, financing of terrorism, among others. Italy and France have also strengthened their legal framework allowing for stricter monitoring, taking down and prosecuting propaganda via the Internet or glorification of terrorism. While all the countries studied have in recent years developed national strategies and action plans to tackle radicalisation and terrorism and have transposed international CT provisions in their national body of legislation, only **France** seems to have developed and implemented a variety of specific, tailor-made counter-radicalisation programs and interventions across various public policy domains, including in the prison and probation field, in response to the increased threat level and the high number of terrorist offenders.

Italy has developed its own system for addressing radicalisation in prison and probation, based on systematic observation and monitoring activities of at-risk inmates, on one side, and a voluntary rehabilitation element, on the other.¹¹ This approach has been informed by the country's past experience not only with left- and right-wing terrorism, but also mafia-style organised crime, resulting in the separation of convicted terrorists and members of organised crime groups in prisons. The Italian approach is also firmly based on principles for protection of the civil liberties of inmates and ensuring equality and rule of law within prisons.¹²

In the other countries radicalisation- and terrorism-related issues are addressed under the broader policy and legislative framework dealing with security, crime prevention, criminal justice, social policy and education, prison and probation, rehabilitation, among others.

Since 2015 all countries have developed strategic documents on countering terrorism, which include prevention of radicalisation and terrorist recruitment as a separate strategic policy pillar. However, in countries where terrorism and radicalisation are not considered a major issue, few actual prevention measures and programs have been implemented so far (e.g. in Bulgaria and Portugal) and government responses so far have been predominantly security-focused, with intelligence services having the main responsibility to responding to terrorist and extremist threats. Training programs that cover radicalisation as a topic have been implemented, but these are mainly targeted at law enforcement personnel and are focused

¹¹ RAN P&P Study visit of the RAN Prison and Probation Working Group, Venice and Padua 26-27 October 2016, Ex-post Paper. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_study_visit_26_27102016_en.pdf

¹² Ibid.

mainly on awareness raising, as well as monitoring and detection of extremism and radicalisation phenomena.

Similarly, addressing radicalisation in prison and probation is also insufficiently covered in these strategies. There are no specific or tailored policy measures or programs in Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal to address radicalisation per se, due to the low number of extremist or terrorist offenders. Therefore, the general framework of tools and measures for offender management, risk assessment, post-release monitoring, mentoring, and resocialization apply. In Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal, there are also no specific radicalisation risk assessment methodologies applied, nor are there any special regimes or detention facilities for extremist offenders or tailored probation, rehabilitation and post-release mentoring programs.

Radicalisation counter and preventive measures in prison and probation

Prevention of the spread of radical ideologies in prisons involves the supervision and management of contact between extremist prisoners and the rest of the prison population, through different housing (segregation, dispersion or integration with the rest of the prison population) and supervision regimes. Different countries adopt a different approach with regard to the problems they face or perceive to face. As a result, the focus and attention given to radicalisation in prisons differs from tailor-made approaches to a one-size-fits all approach. Some such as France have adopted a wide range of measures to tackle this problem, others where religious extremism is rare – such as Greece or Portugal, have not given radicalisation the same amount of attention and rely on standard management and rehabilitation measures applicable to the broader prison and probation population.

Management of extremist offenders or inmates at risk of radicalisation

All countries have attempted to respond to the threat of prison radicalisation, from either current terrorist offenders in prison or the threat posed by contagion of radicalisation. These approaches have differed – from case specific programmes which focus on tailored deradicalisation programmes for extremists to penitentiary systems which separate individuals based on their perceived security threat. Some countries, such as **France**, have focused on creating programmes which are shaped around a specific individuals needs, utilizing a multidisciplinary approach that includes the security sector, as well as social services. Others such as **Greece** lack this specificity and have instead created programmes which can be applied across individuals and ideologies without differentiation or special attention to the characteristics of a case.

Within **Bulgaria** there has been no nationwide programme aimed at addressing the problem of prison and probation radicalisation. Instead, most responses to radicalisation in prison or probation originates from front-line staff within the penal system who seek to address problems they have experienced on the job. In the Bulgarian context radicalisation and the risk of radicalisation is an under-researched field which lacks both knowledge and scholarship to provide understanding of the local radicalisation contexts. This is largely due to the absence of inmates imprisoned for terrorism or extremist crimes and by extension the low levels of radicalisation amongst the wider population in Bulgaria. Even without localized studies, one can extrapolate from studies done in the US and France which show chances of individuals who have no prior extremist views becoming radicalised during prison is low which can account for the lack of prison radicalisation in Bulgaria.

Unlike France, **Bulgaria** does not have prisons used solely for high-security inmates, instead separating inmates into prison security levels based on their crime committed, chances of recidivism and behavior in prison. Other efforts by prison administration to dissuade radicalisation include the prohibition of material promoting hatred but efforts to police the prisons properly are hampered by poor prison conditions and overcrowding, understaffing, and a lack of knowledge in the subject of radicalisation. As a result, the prisons are susceptible to outside material being smuggled in or through illicit internet usage which can spread extremist propaganda.

Further exacerbating this problem in **Bulgaria** is a lack of religious understanding from administration and prison staff can create greater risks of radicalisation in prison. Without access to a spiritual guide individuals may self-appoint themselves as religious leaders, which can create problems if the individual is advocating an extremist version of the ideology. This has been a problem not only in Bulgaria, but also Italy and France where inmates may lack the language skills to talk with local religious figures and thus be compelled to self-appoint. Despite these risk factors which can contribute to radicalisation in prisons, the low level of overall radicalisation in Bulgaria has thus far resulted in not only low levels of incarcerated extremists, but also low levels of further radicalisation risk in the prison and probation populations as well.

France meanwhile, in response to the large number (349) of terrorist offenders and inmates considered radicalised (1,336) in the correctional system has utilized a tailored-made approach to combat risk of radicalisation. This method focuses on not only addressing the radicalisation problem through the use of prison and probation staff, but also includes educators, psychologists and religious figures throughout an offender's time in the penal system and in post-release programmes in an effort to administer the best possible rehabilitation programme to each individual.

In addition to its tailor-made approaches **France** is the only country of those studied that has implemented an elaborative risk assessment mechanism which examines a variety of elements including: the ideology and narrative individuals employ, their social environment and intentions, historical background and experiences, and their personal and ideological beliefs which are the source of violent extremism. In addition to this the government also uses risk assessment tools including VERA-2 and ERG22+ which aim to measure aspects of extremism such as an individual's ability to carry out violent extremist acts or weighing how involved a person is in violent extremism. In doing both the evaluation and individual assessment the state hopes to be able to prescribe an effective intervention dependent on individual needs of an extremist.

Additionally, all inmates in **France** convicted of terrorism must go through a four-month assessment which include psychologists, religious figures, and counsellors who evaluate if an individual is a danger through a high degree of radicalisation or to staff through violence. If they are a low threat to be violent and do not hold deeply radicalised beliefs are allowed to be in ordinary detention, while those with deeply rooted extremist views are put into a special section of the prison with additional supervision, and those who are thought to be a danger to staff are placed in solitary confinement.

Much like Bulgaria, **Greece** also lacks a significant amount of religiously inspired extremists, instead it is currently plagued by far-left and anarchist terrorists. This has created significant risks of radicalisation in prison, which has been exacerbated by overcrowded prisons and a lack

of tailor-made programmes addressing radicalisation. Part of this problem has been the connection between organised crime and terrorists in prisons – a relationship in which terrorists acquire weapons and explosives through contacts or individuals in organized crime. Also similar to Bulgaria, the threat of jihadism has been low, however a lack of social cohesion between second- and third-generation Muslim migrants and reciprocal radicalisation has created conditions for future radicalisation to take root.

Greece separates its inmates based on characteristics such as crime committed, age, sex and mental health. With only two types of prisons – those awaiting trial or on short-term sentences, and those convicted to long-term prison sentences. Rather than use tailor-made approaches to deter radicalisation Greece relies on utilizing the same programmes for extremists that is used for all criminal offenders during reintegration or rehabilitation into society.

Despite increasingly overcrowded prisons the **Italian** the penal system seeks to create tailor-made approaches for extremists for the 66 individuals incarcerated for jihadism and 478 individuals recognized as radicalised.¹³ One way Italy has tried to manage radicalisation is through the physical prison structure itself - by segregating extremists from not only the general population of the prison but also from those convicted of drug trafficking or members of organised crime groups. By doing this the government hopes to limit the interaction of terrorists with other convicted criminals who could be radicalised. Additionally, extremists are kept isolated from other likeminded individuals to avoid them from networking while in prison. One problem faced in Italy that other countries such as Greece and Bulgaria have also encountered is the lack of spiritual guide in many prisons, an issue aggravated further by the absence of places of worship in prison. This arises when finding or accessing a spiritual guide takes too long due to linguistic or cultural differences which can lead to self-appointment.

Italy also has a system which categorizes inmates according to their degree of radicalisation and need for monitoring on three levels; high, medium and low. These levels reflect how much or often prison management should monitor individuals – from monthly check for those who are in the “high” category to a as needed basis for those in “low”.¹⁴ Similarly, prisoners have three different levels of detention depending on their level of extremism, from those in prison for crimes related to terrorism in high-security prisons, those in prison for crimes involving violent ideology in medium security, and lastly prisoners who are thought to be easily radicalised or are followers in low security facilities. In addition, Italy has established its own police force which is dedicated to serving the prison system, the penitentiary police, which as part of its duties monitors and reports any signs of radicalisation in the prison population. As part of its efforts to curb radicalisation prison staff are taught to watch for sudden changes in behavior – such as religious practices or in daily life routines, which can indicate a changing perception.

With the threat of radicalisation differing depending on the country each country has chosen to address the problem in differing ways. However, in the case of religiously motivated

¹³ Marone, F. and Olimpio, M. (2019) *Jihadist Radicalization in Italian Prisons: A Primer*. ISPI, 4 March 2019. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/jihadist-radicalization-italian-prisons-primer-22401#nota29>

¹⁴ RAN P&P Study visit of the RAN Prison and Probation Working Group, Venice and Padua 26-27 October 2016, Ex-post Paper. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_study_visit_26_27102016_en.pdf

extremism and especially Islamic jihadism some problems persist across countries. For one, because of the culture differences between the inmates – who may be immigrants or first- or second-generation immigrants, prison staff has had difficulty managing and understanding the needs of prisoners as well as the problems which lead to radicalisation. One of the biggest examples is this is the issue surrounding spiritual guidance, in Italy language and cultural differences among spiritual guides and inmates allowed for self-appointment. As mentioned this has also been a problem in France and Bulgaria. In addition, lacking the proper cultural competencies, issues related to misunderstandings or perceived intolerance may become risk factors. Without knowledge of customs and traditions of a culture or religion this can lead to prisons not accommodating dietary restrictions, room for worship or recognizing holidays – such as Ramadan can create animosity and create conditions for individuals to be more interested in extremism.

Tailored rehabilitation and reintegration programmes

When it comes to post-imprisonment, Greece, Bulgaria and Portugal have no tailor-made rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist or terrorist offenders. The existing programmes apply for all criminal offenders. In **Greece** the post-release program's main components consist of individual and family counseling, referral to services when in need of social support, among others. In Greece, as the lack of civic education and unemployment are considered causes of violent extremism, specific initiatives have been developed in this field. However, no targeted mentoring programmes exist for former terrorist or extremist offenders.

Practitioners from **Bulgaria** and **Portugal** have reported on the need for tailor-made training programmes and information campaigns to educate prison and probation staff on radicalisation risks and how to address these. In **Portugal** a cross-departmental course for law enforcement officers has been developed and implemented, dealing with radicalisation and extremism, but no similar programme exists for prison and probation.

Italy has employed rehabilitation bodies composed of multidisciplinary teams under the supervision of judges which allow for individualistic intervention plans for each inmate aimed at reintegration back into society. Within these plans there are five elements which are modified to provide for the best outcomes from each individual. By focusing on the education, employment, relationship with family, religion, and sport, cultural and recreational activities there is a hope that this will grow critical thinking skills as well as provide for noncriminal outlets of time and energy – through sports, work or closer family bonds.¹⁵ As part of these rehabilitation plans each inmate has a team of educators, social workers, religious figures, and other experts which assist in helping inmates – with inmate approval and cooperation to understand their crimes and how to reintegrate easier into society.

¹⁵ RAN P&P Study visit of the RAN Prison and Probation Working Group, Venice and Padua 26-27 October 2016, Ex-post Paper. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-p-and-p/docs/ran_pp_study_visit_26_27102016_en.pdf

France also has put in place robust tailored preventative measures to various degrees in an effort to reduce radicalisation within prisons. France uses case-specific approaches from the start of detention – with individuals assessed by a multidisciplinary team which then creates an individual profile to support the prison administration in choosing the best detention methods for a prisoner, to post-release life when they are assisted by teams of specialists aiming at reintegrating extremists back into society. Another aspect of detention that is individualized is the risk assessment carried out used to dictate which intervention is best for extremists. The approach used by France for post-release is also tailor-made to individual needs and is discussed further in the next section.

Post-release supervision

The probation system in **Bulgaria** consists of compulsory registration and meetings with a probation officer and also involves a restriction in free movement but can also include proscribed vocational courses or community service depending on the case. Post-release measures to protect against further extremism are limited.

In **France**, there is a much more individualized approach to post-release supervision, which begins during detention assessment which provides information on individuals useful for intelligence services when they need to monitor and evaluate an individual following their release. Additional efforts have been made to reduce the likelihood of recidivism for ex-inmates – though because of the high number of current inmates this can be difficult for the state to manage efficiently. In response to this the state is currently setting up a supervision committee dedicated to ex-prisoners within the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit, however this has yet to be fully implemented. Once released from prison follow-ups are carried out by judges who specialise in anti-terrorism. The tools employed by these judges vary from surveillance techniques, such as tracking monitors, requiring ex-inmates to alert authorities of address changes and travel restrictions, to reintegration efforts utilizing social workers or mentorship programmes.

Other avenues of support in **France** include the Research and Intervention for Violent Extremism (RIVE), a multidisciplinary, individualized support programme which lasts at least six months but preferably for at least a year. Aiming at addressing what leads an individual to extremism, RIVE uses a myriad of interventions – from interviews and counselling to home visits and a mentor programme to reduce the risk of recidivism. Additionally, following release from prison inmates are required to register with the employment center where they can receive temporary benefits until they find employment.

While in **Greece** the state lacks tailor-made post-release reintegration several NGOs have stepped in to assist in the rehabilitation of individuals into society. These efforts range from supporting professional development and assisting individuals in building their capacities to enter the labour market to providing financial assistance and medical or psychosocial support. Otherwise, the post-release probation system closely resembles that of Bulgaria, which focuses on using basic social work methods, such as counselling and providing social support as needed, to assist former inmates.

Because of its laws in **Italy** most terrorists are ineligible for parole because their sentences are for over 4-years, however those who are in prison for other crimes and radicalised will be placed in the same probation system that other ex-inmates use. Instead of probation, for those

extremists whose release is approaching, prison administration notify law enforcement that a radicalised inmate is being released soon – giving the police time to develop a way to deal with the ex-inmate – whether it be through surveillance or even deportation.

Conclusions and recommendations

Despite the different radicalisation dynamics, radicalisation risks in prison and probation, as well as the institutional responses across the countries studied, the research identified that professionals in prison and probation need to be better equipped to deal with extremist offenders but also be aware of possible approaches to prevent radicalisation from taking place among the general inmate population. In this way, special attention needs to be put into programmes aimed at preventing the spread of radicalisation in prison more effectively and can be as diverse as cultural training and linguistic programmes to physical isolation and tailor-made rehabilitation programmes.

Even though some countries face a very limited inflow of terrorist offenders, the lack of capabilities of the prison and probation systems to respond to potential radicalisation risks is a common concern. Overcrowding, lack of funding and ill trained guards all contributes to prison systems which can be ill-equipped to deal with radicalisation in prisons before it becomes a problem. Because the problem goes unreported or unnoticed in many countries research into prison radicalisation in these specific country contexts is sparse. As a result, understanding of how radicalisation is impacted from external or internal factors is not well understood. However, some clear recommendations emerge that can be generalized across countries – there should be an increase in resources for prisons, more robust training programs for guards on how to notice and deal with radicalisation, more adequate access to spiritual guides, and lastly better cultural understanding and education amongst prison staff and administration.

Some of the major challenges identified include the application of adequate and robust risk assessment tools, multi-agency cooperation and information sharing, among others.

The INTEGRA project is set to address some of these key challenges.

Bulgaria

Background

On the national level, Bulgaria has so far been spared from large-scale terrorist attacks with the exception of the terrorist bus bombing committed at the Sarafovo airport in the city of Bourgas in 2012.¹⁶ Nevertheless, home grown threats as well as risks emanating from abroad exist and further terrorist acts cannot be excluded. The country's position on a major route to and from the Middle East made it a prime transit area for outgoing and returning foreign fighters as well as for the migration flow, which could potentially be used as cover for members and sympathisers of terrorist organisations to enter Europe. Despite the disintegration of Islamic State (IS) and the dissipation of the migration pressure on the country, these risks remain.

In terms of home grown Islamist radicalisation, there have been incidents of Bulgarian Muslims displaying open support for Islamic State. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that Bulgarian Muslims are resilient to the penetration of more radical Salafi interpretations of Islam, which are untypical for the Islam widely professed in Bulgaria.¹⁷ The adoption of Salafi Islam is limited, having taken root only among some of the most disadvantaged communities in the country who exhibit unstable religious and ethnic identities.

Far-right extremism resulting in violent and non-violent activities among which hate speech, vigilantism and hate crime have been observed in the country. Despite having been in existence longer and resulting in more victimisation in comparison to Islamist radicalisation, far-right extremism has received considerably less mainstream and institutional attention. The migrant crisis and terrorist attacks in Europe have further strengthened the appeal of already existing far-right organisations in Bulgaria and other European countries, while at the same time fueling the emergence of new extreme right populist movements on the Bulgarian political scene. These new formations have enjoyed a brief moment of infamy, before largely fading from the public eye.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the Bulgarian far-right scene remains active, enjoying a particularly fertile soil due to the increased polarisation of public opinion against migrants and traditional minorities such as the Roma in recent years.¹⁹

In light of the terrorist attack in Bourgas, developments abroad and the coming to light of instances of homegrown radicalisation, Bulgarian authorities have undertaken steps to strengthen existing measures for prevention and countering of terrorism and radicalisation by, *inter alia*, criminalisation of new acts, development of a multiannual Strategy and corresponding Action Plans, , etc. However, despite efforts to establish a comprehensive policy framework, measures have been revamped or established mainly with regard to preventing and reacting to terrorism by law enforcement and national security institutions. Thus the response remains focused on repression of potential terrorist activities, rather than the prevention and tackling of radicalisation. In addition, there is an implicit focus on Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, neglecting other types of extremism. At the same time, not all relevant institutions have been included in the development of measures and policies.

¹⁶ Kulish, N. and Schmitt, E. (19 July 2012). "Hezbollah Is Blamed for Attack on Israeli Tourists in Bulgaria". *New York Times*, 19 July 2012. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/europe/explosion-on-bulgaria-tour-bus-kills-at-least-five-israelis.html>

¹⁷ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

¹⁸ Stoyanova, N. and Dzhekova, R. (forthcoming). Vigilantism against ethnic minorities and migrants in Bulgaria. In Bjorgo, T. and Mares, M. (eds). *Vigilantism against migrants and minorities*. London: Routledge.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Notably, the current policy framework does not address prisons as a possible breeding ground for extremism. Due to the concentration of particularly vulnerable individuals, prisons in other states in the European Union (EU) and across the globe have long been recognised as potential problem environments where radicalisation can flourish.²⁰ It is therefore necessary to establish targeted approaches to counter radicalisation in penitentiary institutions. Probation authorities have more recently also been considered as an institution with an important role in preventing, detecting and reversing radicalisation. However, the development of a working approach towards countering radicalisation in prison and probation needs to be informed by a sound analysis of the risks faced, the existing institutional response and the gaps therein.

The current chapter aims to lay the foundation for the development of a roadmap for tackling radicalisation in Bulgarian prisons and probation. The analysis maps radicalisation risks, the measures in place to tackle it, and the related issues/needs to improve the institutional response in the country. The report is based on the analysis of data obtained through interviews and focus groups with first-line prison and probation staff, and the responses through to questionnaire by the same target groups. In total, two focus groups with eight participants each and two interviews were carried out – one focus group and interview with prison staff and one focus group and interview with probation staff respectively, among them staff from the General Directorate Execution of Sentences (GDES) administration, Sofia prison and Sofia district probation staff. The interviews and focus group discussions were based on a needs assessment questionnaire aiming to ascertain the extent to which practitioners are aware of radicalisation dynamics and manifestations, and to which they consider the phenomenon a (potential) problem, as well as the measures undertaken to tackle it and the related institutional needs. In addition, a tailored risk assessment questionnaire was completed by competent prison staff in the facilities in Sofia, Pazardzhik and Sliven . (four, one and nine officers picked by the prison directors respectively). Risk assessment questionnaires were also distributed to twenty probation services across the country, out of which sixteen replies were received.²¹ The risk assessment questionnaires aimed to assess radicalisation risks in prison and probation services along several dimensions – supply of extremist narratives, the availability or counter and de-radicalisation measures, as well as environmental and vulnerability factors.

Radicalisation dynamics

While the prison and probation environments present unique challenges with regard to radicalisation, these risks do not occur in a vacuum and are related to wider societal dynamics of polarisation and radicalisation. Thus, it is important to examine the wider context with regard to radicalisation and violent extremism in Bulgaria. The current section presents the main types of radicalisation observed in the country as well as their spread and manifestations.

Islamist radicalisation is often considered through the prism of the entry of Salafi interpretations of Islam in Bulgaria and their taking root in some Muslim communities in the country. While processes of adoption of stricter religious interpretations should not be equated to radicalisation, they are nevertheless noteworthy due to two important considerations. Firstly, Salafism is not typical for Bulgaria and is often considered as being at

²⁰ Dunleavy, P. (2011). *The Fertile Soil of Jihad: Terrorism's Prison Connection*. Washington DC: Potomac Books; Mulcahy, E. et al. (2013); The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability. *Journal of Human Security* 9 (1): 4-14; Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). (n.d.). *Dealing with Radicalisation in a Prison and Probation Context*. RAN Practitioners' Working Paper. Brussels: RAN.

²¹ Sofia, Nova Zagora, Sliven, Pazardzhik, Etropole, Botevgrad, Elin Pelin, Kostinbrod, Pirdop, Svoge, Slivnitsa, Assenovgrad, Plovdiv, Smolian, Varna, Kurdzhali.

odds with the traditional Hanafi Sunni Islam professed by the majority of Muslim communities in the country.²² Secondly, it was members of a Roma Salafi community who exhibited the most serious indications of Islamist radicalisation, including two convictions for one informal Roma Salafi preacher, as well as charges for the same preacher and some of his followers.

With the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, Muslims in Bulgaria started to be exposed to the outside world and the umma (the global Muslim community) following a 45-year-long isolation. The opening of borders and the freedom to travel were coupled with the lifting of suppressive measures over the profession of religion dominating the atheist communist society. Bulgarian Muslims could thus get to know interpretations of Islam different from the Hanafi Sunni tradition characteristic of the Balkans via four main channels: 1) foreign missionaries; 2) foreign charitable aid coming from Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait; 3) migration for religious education by young Muslims in the prestigious religious universities of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia; and 4) migration to Western European countries and encounters with local (immigrant) Muslim communities.²³

Salafi interpretations of Islam have been adopted by a small minority of Bulgarian Muslim communities.²⁴ In fact, Salafi influences in terms of dress, polygamy and piety remain limited to a few Bulgarian speaking Muslim villages and Roma settlements in Bulgaria.²⁵ The communities where Salafism has taken root tend to be the most disadvantaged communities hit hardest by the transition to democracy and market economy. According to law enforcement experts, recruitment into Salafi Islam among the Roma is also associated with financial stimuli for wearing the niqab.²⁶ These serve as an initial driver to conversion with genuine piety and religious feeling developing at a later stage.²⁷

In addition, some Muslim communities in the country, namely Roma Muslims and some Bulgarian speaking Muslims (as opposed to Muslims from Turkish descent) have displayed unstable religious identities which has rendered them open to alternative interpretations of Islam.²⁸ The official organisation of the Muslim denomination in Bulgaria had always prioritised the (spiritual) needs of the ethnic Turks, not least due to considerable funding from Turkey. This caused a spiritual vacuum, partly filled by more orthodox interpretation of Islam, especially in some ethnically mixed localities where Bulgarian speaking Muslims strive to differentiate themselves from ethnic Bulgarians by virtue underscoring their religious identity.²⁹

Beyond identity dynamics, problems in the organisation of Bulgarian Islamic educational institutions have facilitated the entry of radical interpretations of Islam. The opportunities for higher education in Islamic studies in the country are limited. The Higher Islamic Institute, which relies to a great extent on financial support and donations from Turkey and other Muslim countries,³⁰ is not accredited and its diplomas are not recognised in either Bulgaria, or Europe. Reportedly, it provides “exclusively low level of education and suffers from lack of

²² Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015). *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Kerem, O. (2010). *New Islamic Actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey's Return to the Muslim Balkans*. Oxford: European Studies Centre, University of Oxford.

²⁶ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015). *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid; Троева, Е. (2012). „Традиционен“ и „нов“ ислям в България. *Български Фолклор* 3-4: 5-23.

²⁹ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

³⁰ Zhelyazkova, A. (ed.). (no year of publication). *Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility Between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria*. Sofia: IMIR

qualified staff”.³¹ There are three Islamic high schools while some Muslim or mosque boards of trustees run Qur’an classes; the Chief Muftiate also organises summer Qur’an classes.³² All these classes, often funded by various religious foundations or foreign individuals, have no official accreditation, either. While the courses’ content is in principle approved by the Chief Muftiate, it remains unclear to what extent the Muftiate can control the curricula of some of them.³³ The lack of transparency with regard to funding and of official control over the content was brought into focus by a journalistic investigation from August 2004 featuring the Qur’an course in the town of Sarnitsa where orthodox Islam different from the Sunni Hanafi tradition was taught.³⁴ As mentioned, the Muslim clerics in Bulgaria have always tended to the needs of the Turkish minority, so another avenue towards more radical interpretations of Islam was through Bulgarian speaking Muslims pursuing Islamic studies in Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Jordan (with the support of the Chief Muftiate and official funding from Turkey or informal funding from various foreign foundations), rather than in Bulgaria.³⁵

Penetration of Salafi influences as well as some initial signs of Islamic radicalisation have been observed in some Roma communities. According to law enforcement and intelligence representatives, groups of Muslims and recent Muslim converts profess simplified interpretations of Salafism in the Roma neighbourhoods in the towns of Pazardjik, Plovdiv, Nova Zagora and Asenovgrad. They claim that manifestations of sympathy with the Islamic State have been observed among the local Roma and that these communities should be closely monitored.³⁶ The core group of Salafi followers (50-60 persons) formed around the preacher Ahmed Musa is based in Pazardjik; similar groups have started to emerge in the Roma quarters of the other mentioned cities,³⁷ their members usually recruited from among youth with addiction problems who are promised social support.

In comparison to the highly publicised instances of Islamist radicalisation, **far-right radicalisation** and extremism are better established and much more violent. Nevertheless, it has not received as much public attention, nor have there been any sustained efforts to assess or counter it. The far-right scene in Bulgaria includes a spectrum of actors roughly falling in the following three categories:³⁸ political parties, non-parliamentary activist organisations and informal groupings. The political actors include both politically relevant parties who have (had) representation in Parliament and a plethora of smaller parties. Informal groups represent gatherings mostly involved in hooligan acts and hate crimes without a particularly crystalised ideological foundation (e.g. Blood and Honour Bulgaria, skinhead movements). Last but not least, there are non-partisan activist formations which exhibit a more sophisticated degree of

³¹ Evstatiev, S. (2006). *Public Islam on the Balkans in a Wider European Context*. Budapest: Open Society Institute, p. 57.

³² Zhelyazkova, A. (2014). In Cesari, J (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of European Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 592.

³³ Ghodsee, K., (2010) *Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe. Gender, Ethnicity, & The Transformation of Islam in Postsocialist Bulgaria*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁴ Tavanier, B. (2005) Bulgaria: Mysterious Mosques and School. *Transitions Online 2 (1)*; Йорданова, Я. (21 август 2004). Ислямските училища не са това, което са. *Capital.bg*. Available at: http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2004/08/21/227583_isliamskite_uchilishta_ne_sa_tova_koeto_sa/

³⁵ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

organisation, ideological argumentation and political ambitions. The longest-running organisation of this type, the Bulgarian National Union (BNU), is one prominent example.³⁹

Compared to other countries in Eastern Europe, in Bulgaria a far-right party emerged as a politically significant force as late as in 2005, rather than during the significant political crisis and turbulence of the nineties.⁴⁰ The electoral success of *Ataka* (Attack) in 2005 was unexpected, as the party was formed only shortly before the elections of that year.⁴¹ While other far-right organisations existed before 2005, they were considered “fringe, small and politically irrelevant” despite widespread prejudice and violence against different ethnic and religious minorities.⁴²

The years between 2009 and 2013 marked a period of diminished public visibility of far-right organisations. The most successful party in the far-right spectrum *Ataka* experienced a decline and subsequent stagnation in election results after a high point in 2006.⁴³ Nevertheless, already in 2011, there were signs of intensification of the activity of far-right groups including attempts to recruit new members.⁴⁴ The protests and political unrest that Bulgaria experienced in 2013-2015,⁴⁵ coupled with the intensification of the migrant crisis⁴⁶ created a favourable environment for the re-invigoration of some existing far-right organisations and the emergence of new actors.⁴⁷ The parliamentary elections of 2017 resulted in the entry of the far-right Patriotic Front (PF)⁴⁸ into the governing coalition, thus making the far-right a decisive factor in government for the first time. In addition, new vigilante far-right formations and individuals emerged, primarily aimed at preventing irregular migration through informal border patrols. Some of these organisations and individuals were involved in illegal arrests of migrants. With the dissipation of the migration crisis they have struggled to remain relevant and have largely faded from public view.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the years since 2013 appear to have resulted in increasing societal polarisation as exemplified by the increase in instances of hate speech in the media.⁵⁰

³⁹ Even though it is supposedly non-partisan, the BNU was initially closely associated with the *Ataka* party and has produced affiliated parties, such as the *Guard* party. Avramov, K. (2015). *The Bulgarian radical right: Marching up from the margins*. In Minkenberg, M. (ed.) *Transforming the transformation? The East European radical right in the political process*. London: Routledge.

⁴⁰ Other far-right political parties had existed in the country since the early 1990s, but none of them had managed to gather substantial electoral support. On the other hand, nationalist rhetoric was not absent from mainstream politics as traditional parties, including the Bulgarian Socialist Party, were widely using them in that period.

⁴¹ Krasteva, A. (2016). “The Post-Communist Rise of National Populism: Bulgarian Paradoxes”. In Lazaridis, G., Campagni, G. and Benveniste, A. (eds.). *The Rise of the Far Right in Europe: Populist Shifts and 'Othering'*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁴² Ivanov, C. and Ilieva, M. (2005). Bulgaria. In Mudde, C. (ed.) *Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.

⁴³ Todorov, A. (2013). *The Extreme Right Wing in Bulgaria*. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

⁴⁴ Министерски съвет. (2012). *Годишен отчет за изпълнение на политиките и програмите на Министерския съвет за 2011 г.* София: Министерски съвет.

⁴⁵ In 2013-2014, there were a series of large-scale anti-government protests and changes in government. In this period, far-right groupings such as football fan factions were used by political actors for escalating public protests and counter-protests and for generating social tensions. Bezlov, T. (2015). “Football hooliganism”. In R. Dzhekova et al. *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁴⁶ For a more in-depth overview of the development of the migrant crisis in Bulgaria see Bezlov, T. and Stoyanova, N. (2017). *Transnational Organised Crime: Bulgaria and Norway in the context of the migrant crisis*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁴⁷ Минчева, Н. и Захариев, Л. (23 декември 2013). Най-значимите събития в България за 2013-та. *Economic.bg*. Available at: <https://www.economic.bg/bg/news/3/Naj-znachimite-subitiya-v-Bulgariya-za-2013-a.html>

⁴⁸ A coalition between two far-right parties, NFSB and IMRO-BNM.

⁴⁹ Stoyanova, N. and Dzhekova, R. (forthcoming). “Vigilantism against ethnic minorities and migrants in Bulgaria”. In Bjorgo, T. and Mares, M. (eds.). *Vigilantism against migrants and minorities*. London: Routledge.

⁵⁰ Николова, Ю. Спасов, О. и Даскалова, Н. (2016). *Езикът на омразата в България: Рискови зони, уязвими обекти*. София: Център за модернизирание на политики и Фондация Медийна Демокрация.

Non-violent activities of the far-right actors include demonstrations and protests, commemorations of historical figures and even charitable activities.⁵¹ However, numerous acts of hate speech, hate crime and vigilante incidents against ethnic, religious and sexual minorities associated with different far-right organisations and individuals have been recorded. Informal groupings such as skinhead and neo-Nazi gangs tend to be most often related to violent incidents, although individuals associated with different formal organisations also engage in violence. The Roma minority has traditionally been the most frequent target of violent hate crimes perpetrated by skinhead gangs,⁵² but other ethnic and sexual minorities, as well as migrants have also fallen victim to such attacks.

Football hooligans have much in common with far-right formations. According to estimations by football fans, around 90% of the ultras and hooligans in the country are right-wing.⁵³ Ring-leaders of factions are often members of radical right associations such as Blood and Honour and National Resistance. While commitment to and understanding of far-right ideologies varies greatly, racism in the sense of intolerance and violence against people because of their race or ethnicity is widespread among ultras and hooligans. According to fan faction members, racist attitudes are mostly held towards the Roma, but in the last two years refugees and migrants have also been targeted.⁵⁴ While in certain cases fan faction leaders manage to limit the expressions of racist views, they remain widespread among hooligan supporters of any football team.⁵⁵ There are ultras groups in most major Bulgarian cities. These fanatical supporters often engage in attacks on other fans, passers-by or members of minority groups and such physical assaults are frequently motivated by racial, national, regional or religious hatred, while, reportedly, in the period 2013-2014, football factions were also used for achieving political aims. Football fan factions have also been highly criminalised due to their ties and involvement in criminal markets, notably drug distribution.⁵⁶

Other types of radicalisation such as **left-wing extremism** are very limited in Bulgaria. Far-left wing parties and movements are marginal, although some surveys indicate that self-reported adherence to far-left ideas is high.⁵⁷ At the same time, despite the revolutionary rhetoric and ideas of some radical left-wing groups, the repertoire of actions of the radical left in Bulgaria is non-violent. Their activity is based on the belief that the political model must be changed, but only when left-wing ideas have gained popularity and society is ready. Hence, they tend to focus on political education and popularising left-wing ideas.⁵⁸ Clashes with (or rather attacks by) right-wing groups are the only violent actions, in which members of left-wing groups participate.

In summary, the different types of radicalisation vary significantly in terms of their spread, manifestations, the organisations and individuals involved, and the public attention and outcry they provoke.

⁵¹ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁵² E.g. Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) (2001). *Human rights in Bulgaria in 2001*. Sofia: Bulgarian Helsinki Committee.

⁵³ Bezlov, T. (2015). "Football hooliganism". In R. Dzhekova et al. *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Policy and institutional response

The terrorist attack on a passenger bus with Israeli tourists that took place in 2012 in the city of Burgas prompted a thorough review of the preparedness of government institutions to prevent and cope with the consequences of terrorist activity in Bulgaria. Terrorist attacks elsewhere, instances of home-grown radicalisation, and the migrant crisis have compelled the Bulgarian government to take steps for strengthening legislation and the institutional framework governing potential terrorist threat responses, and to try and counter more effectively the transit of foreign fighters. The institutional framework was also further developed through enhancing information exchange, coordination and intelligence gathering in the area of counter-terrorism. In 2015, a number of amendments were made to the Bulgarian *Criminal Code* (CC), expanding its scope with relation to terrorism by criminalising, among others, the assistance on the territory of Bulgaria to foreigners for committing terrorist acts abroad. In addition, the State Agency for National Security implemented a system of indicators for recognising foreign fighters.⁵⁹

A more holistic approach to the problem of violent extremism was initiated in 2015, with the adoption of the *Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020*.⁶⁰ In parallel, annual *Plans for Implementing the Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020*. Placing greater emphasis on prevention policies and better understanding of radicalisation processes, these policy documents set out a number of measures, a timeframe for their implementation and responsible institutions. However, the implementation of measures foreseen under the Strategy and its annual Plans for Implementation is seriously lagging with only about half of the measures foreseen for 2017 being implemented by the end of 2018.⁶¹ Similarly, the plan for 2018 was only adopted towards the end of that same year.⁶²

Although the Strategy adopts a broad understanding of violent radicalisation and aims at countering all its forms, the risks named in the document are mainly relating to **Islamist radicalisation** – external as well as home-grown. The risk of Islamist radicalisation and the transit of terrorist foreign fighters has been dominating the public debate in Bulgaria and beyond, while the issue of far-right radicalisation and hate crime has received limited to no attention from authorities, even though both political and non-political far-right radical groups have long been an established feature in the country.

In addition, the relevant **institutional infrastructure** in Bulgaria remains **underdeveloped** in terms of prevention and the necessary supporting analytical efforts. The focus has remained firmly on deterrence, with little involvement of actors beyond law enforcement and intelligence services. While it is unclear what analytical capacities and products these agencies use internally, reports released to the wider public tend to be general and focused on the broad threats facing the country with little actual assessment of the current state and

⁵⁹ Държавна агенция „Национална сигурност“. (2016). *Годишен доклад за дейността на Държавна агенция „Национална сигурност“ (2015 г.)* София: Държавна агенция „Национална сигурност“.

⁶⁰ Министерски съвет. (2015). *Стратегия за противодействие на тероризма и радикализацията (2015 – 2020 г.)*. София: Министерски съвет.

⁶¹ Министерски съвет. (2018). *Отчет за изпълнението на дейностите от плана за изпълнение на Стратегията за противодействие на радикализацията и тероризма през 2017 г.* София: Министерски съвет.

⁶² *Dnevnik.bg* (22 октомври 2018). Мерките срещу тероризма се отлагат с поне година. Available at: https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2018/10/22/3331359_merkite_sreshtu_terorizma_se_otlagat_s_pone_godina/

tendencies over time.⁶³ There are few ad hoc analyses which focus on specific topics and provide greater detail and scrutiny.

Law enforcement personnel from the Ministry of Interior (Moi) and the State Agency for National Security (SANS) officers have been **trained** by domestic and international trainers on subjects such as working in multi-ethnic environments, dealing with discrimination, recognising and investigating hate crimes and dealing with victims, recognising and responding to potential radicalisation processes, etc.⁶⁴ Some studies, though, argue that such trainings are not sufficient, for example with regard to investigating hate crime.⁶⁵ Radicalisation is a complex and sensitive topic and greater effort is needed in educating first-line practitioners and experts.

Modern principles of community policing have not yet become embedded in the work of Bulgarian police. The so called “securitisation” of cooperation agendas often undermines the trust between law enforcement bodies, and local communities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which need to work further to achieve mutual understanding.⁶⁶ The increasing administrative and expert capacity of key first-line practitioners must be complemented by a counter-radicalisation infrastructure and mechanisms for multi-agency cooperation, information sharing and support for those at risk. All these preconditions are likely to present significant challenges to Bulgarian institutions.⁶⁷ Mechanisms for **inter-institutional cooperation** exist at the local level, mainly in (youth) crime prevention, integration and ethnic issues. The municipal and regional Commissions for Public Order and Safety, for instance, are the main platforms for information exchange and cooperation between police, local authorities and other relevant institutions and community actors. They could potentially provide the channel for delivering problem-oriented interventions, including through the involvement of social and health services, NGOs, etc. In addition, there are regional and municipal Councils for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues, which are in charge of the implementation of Roma integration programmes.⁶⁸ However, the insufficient quality, depth and scope of multi-agency collaboration within such mechanisms may be a major obstacle to developing working solutions in the prevention and identification of radicalisation risks.

Sectoral approaches to preventing, detecting and reversing radicalisation are very limited. In relation to youth radicalisation, existing juvenile delinquency bodies at the local level should adapt their focus towards early prevention of radicalisation and developing targeted non-repressive interventions for those already on the path towards radicalisation.

The approach to addressing radicalisation in Bulgaria, as evident from both the Strategy and, especially, its implementation plans severely lacks **targeted measures aimed at tackling radicalisation in prison and probation contexts**. In contrast, a number of European countries regard prison and probation services as having a special role in radicalisation prevention, management and de-radicalisation due to the concentration of vulnerable individuals and convicted extremists under the care of these institutions.

⁶³ Е.д. Държавна агенция „Разузнаване“. (2016). *Предизвикателствата от бежанската вълна и заплахата от “чуждестранни бойци”*. София: Държавна агенция „Разузнаване“.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Амнести интернешънъл. (2015). *Пропускайки съществено: липса на адекватно разследване на престъпления от омраза в България*. Лондон: Амнести интернешънъл.

⁶⁶ Dzhejkova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Национален съвет за сътрудничество по етническите и интеграционните въпроси (2018). Областни съвети. Available at: <http://www.nccedi.government.bg/page.php?category=66>

Spread of extremist crimes

An important indicator of the threat presented by radicalisation to violent extremism generally, and in prison and probation specifically, is the dynamics of terrorist and extremist crime and related offences.⁶⁹ To date, there have been only a limited number of persons charged or convicted for offences related to terrorism and Islamist extremism. Due to this, the majority of cases are reported in the media and are easy to identify. The same, however, is not true with regard to violations related to far-right extremism, especially hate crime, which are much more numerous and less often reported on.⁷⁰

The first case where activities related to Islamist radicalisation led to a conviction was in 2004, when the informal Roma Salafi preacher Ahmed Musa was sentenced for preaching an anti-democratic ideology in 2004. Musa was convicted, along with twelve other individuals who got away with fines, again for similar offences under a case initiated in 2012.⁷¹ In 2014-2015, Ahmed Musa was charged, alongside thirteen of his followers, for a third time for activities such as displaying open sympathies for Islamic State, but there was also evidence that they engaged in other activities including logistical facilitation of foreign fighters and raising funds as a contribution to IS.⁷² The case has not yet been closed. In addition, two persons, a Canadian and an Australian of Lebanese descent are tried in absentia for participating in the orchestration of the terrorist act in Bourgas in 2012.⁷³

Other, more recent cases of Islamist radicalisation have resulted in the initiation of investigations and court trials, including abroad. Four persons arrested in 2016 were convicted in 2017 for preparatory actions, more specifically combat training or travelling to Syria to participate in combat activities.⁷⁴ Three of the convicts are foreigners, namely Syrian nationals with refugee status living in Germany, while one is Bulgarian-born who grew up and lives in Australia. Another individual, a Syrian with a Bulgarian passport, arrested in 2017 is currently on trial for participating in a terrorist organisation, terrorism financing and leading an organised criminal group involved in illicit tobacco trade. In addition, in 2018 a Bulgarian and an Austrian with Bulgarian-Turkish ethnicity were sentenced in Austria for preparing a terrorist attack and for recruiting others to travel to Syria and join Islamic State respectively.⁷⁵

It should be noted that the extremists who end up in Bulgarian prisons are a small proportion of those against whom some type of security measures have been applied due to suspicions of terrorism. Foreign nationals suspected of links with terrorist organisations are often subjected to the so called Compulsory Administrative Measures (CAMs).⁷⁶ As SANS indicates, CAMs do

⁶⁹ Dzhekova, R. et al. (2017). *Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends*. Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁷⁰ Nevertheless, some NGOs attempt to gather information on cases of hate crime from different sources. One such example is the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee's annual Human Rights in Bulgaria reports.

⁷¹ *Nova.bg*. (30 март 2018). Делото "Имами": Потвърдиха присъдата от 1 година затвор за Ахмед Муса. Available at: <https://bit.ly/348DoDR>

⁷² Dzhekova, R. and Mancheva, M. (2017). *Risks of Islamist Radicalisation in Bulgaria: A Case Study in the Iztok Neighbourhood of the City of Pazardzhik*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

⁷³ *Dnevnik.bg* (19 декември 2017). Делото за атентата в Сарафово започва на 17 януари. Available at: https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2017/12/19/3099661_deloto_za_atentata_v_sarafovo_zapochva_na_17_ianuari/


⁷⁴ Присъда на Специализирания наказателен съд по НОХД 1935/2016, постановена на 14 септември 2017 г.; Присъда на Специализирания наказателен съд по НОХД 3421/2016, постановена на 5 юни 2017 г.

⁷⁵ Цветков, Р. (20 септември 2018). Посолството ни в Австрия не е информирано за присъдите за тероризъм на двамата българи. *Btvnovinite.bg*. Available at: <https://btvnovinite.bg/svetut/posolstvoto-ni-v-avstrija-ne-e-informirano-za-prisadite-za-terorizam-na-dvamata-balgari.html>

⁷⁶ Official communication with SANS.

not represent a sanction, but rather have a preventive character.⁷⁷ There are three types of CAMs applied to foreigners: expulsion, revocation of the right to reside in and prohibition to enter the territory of the country.⁷⁸ The application of CAMs due to indications of links to terrorism or terrorist organisations do not always involve arrest, as indicated by the discrepancies between number of arrests reported to Europol and the number of CAMs that have been applied by SANS (see Figure 1). As a rule, when CAMs are applied, individuals are not charged in Bulgaria at all.

Figure 1. Number of individuals with CAMs imposed by SANS



Source: Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports 2016-2018; Annual Reports on the activity of SANS 2015-2017.

Beyond offences related to Islamist radicalisation and terrorism, however, estimating the spread of extremism-related offences is particularly challenging, mainly due to problems in the recording and investigation especially of hate crime.⁷⁹ There are reasons to believe that hate crime is largely absent from official statistics due to several factors, among them high latency levels, shortcomings in the Criminal Code (CC), and the investigation of hate crime under CC articles which overlook the discriminatory motive of the offence.⁸⁰

Data on crimes related to extremism are compiled according to the classification of crimes as per the Bulgarian Criminal Code. However, the legislative framework in the country is underdeveloped in respect to hate offences and these remain hidden within more general criminal classifications. For example, the law recognises the presence of xenophobic, racist and hooligan motives as an aggravating circumstance in the violent acts of bodily injury and murder but all three motivations are part of the same CC item, meaning that actual hate crimes cannot be distinguished from acts of hooliganism. Furthermore, since Bulgaria currently has no hate speech laws, some non-violent offences against individuals are often prosecuted

⁷⁷ ДАНС. (15 февруари 2013). *Наложени принудителни административни мерки по чл. 42 ЗЧРБ*. Available at: <http://www.dans.bg/bg/press-releases-menu-bul/183-chujdenci15-02-2013-art-bul>

⁷⁸ Compulsory administrative measures are applied by SANS in accordance with the Law on Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria and the Law on Entering, Staying and Departing from the Republic of Bulgaria of Citizens of the European Union, who are not Bulgarian Citizens and of Members of their Families.

⁷⁹ Амнести интернешънъл. (2015). *Пропускайки същественото: липса на адекватно разследване на престъпления от омраза в България*. Лондон: Амнести интернешънъл.

⁸⁰ Dzhejkova, R. et al. (2017). *Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

under alternative provisions such as hooliganism. Thus, any **analysis based on data which does not separate hooligan from discriminatory motivations will lead to threat exaggeration**. On the other hand, **analysis restrained only to data on CC provisions involving recognition of extremist or hate motivation as inherent to the offence will lead to a serious underestimation of the threat and in particular of the degree of violent activity**. As the data on recorded and cleared crime indicates, the acts under Art. 116, Para. (1), item 11 (murder with a hooligan, racist or xenophobic motives) and especially Art. 131, Para. (1), item 12 (bodily injury with a hooligan, racist or xenophobic motivation) far outnumber the registered and cleared crimes under other relevant articles.⁸¹ This makes the margin of error with regard to both including and excluding data on these articles particularly large.

Table 1: Registered and cleared crimes and perpetrators of extremism and related crimes⁸²

Crime	Year	Registered crimes	Total number of cleared crimes incl. from past years	Perpetrators of those crimes		Cleared perpetrators		
				Women	Foreigners	Total number of perpetrators	Women	Foreigners
Art. 116, Para. (1), it. 11	2012	4	4	0	0	5	0	0
	2013	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	4	3	0	0	6	0	0
	2015	3	6	0	1	8	0	1
	2016	3	1	0	0	1	0	0
	2017	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2018*	1	2	0	0	2	0	0
Art. 131, Para. (1), it. 12	2012	574	360	29	8	469	34	7
	2013	637	360	29	8	469	34	7
	2014	596	355	27	8	444	31	9
	2015	609	358	30	3	456	31	3
	2016	780	489	38	8	589	42	8

⁸¹ The Ministry of Interior does not record all offences of interest. MoI data does not include data on crimes falling under the heading Crimes against the Republic of the CC, which include offences related to terrorism. Data on persons convicted under these articles was gathered from the Supreme Judicial Council (See Table 2).

⁸² For a list of the specific offences covered by the cited Criminal Code articles, please refer to Table 5.

	2017	886	460	31	13	576	32	14
	2018*	414	218	23	5	279	24	6
Art. 162, Para. (1)	2012	3	1	0	0	1	0	0
	2013	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	4	1	0	0	2	0	0
	2015	7	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2017	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2018*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 162, Para. (2) and (3)	2012	0	2	1	0	3	2	0
	2013	0	2	0	0	7	0	0
	2014	0	1	0	0	2	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	4	2	0	0	2	0	0
	2017	2	2	0	0	2	0	0
	2018*	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 163, Para. (1), (2) and (3)	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	4	4	0	0	4	0	0
	2017	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2018*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 164- 166	2012	15	6	0	1	0	2	9
	2013	17	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	13	15	0	5	0	1	1
	2015	3	8	1	2	0	2	2
	2016	17	20	0	0	14	0	0
	2017	15	11	0	0	9	0	0

	2018*	4	1	0	0	1	0	0
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*Data available only for the first half of 2018.

Source: MoJ

Estimating accurately the spread of extremist crime and the number of perpetrators is important for a number of institutions, including prison and probation services, especially with regard to the perpetrators who end up serving time in a correctional institution or being sentenced to probation. The aforementioned problem of classification with regard to murder and bodily injury with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motivation, should be borne in mind by prison and probation staff who need to ascertain if the convicts under these articles had committed a hate crime or not. The following section presents the main aspects of the organisation of the prison and probation services in Bulgaria followed by an examination of radicalisation risks, institutional measures and gaps in response.

Radicalisation risks in prisons

The development of the Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020 signified the government’s recognition of the issue of radicalisation as a potential threat which requires a concerted and comprehensive response. However, the issue of radicalisation risks in prison and probation settings is a notable omission. No measures for threat and risk assessment, prevention or counteraction in prison and probation are foreseen in any of the three implementation plans which have been released so far. Efforts to increase the radicalisation awareness of prison and probation staff and their capacity to tackle it, and to institute radicalisation risk assessment measures are not part of a national-scale protocol, but rather ad-hoc initiatives born out of the perception that such a necessity exists among first-line staff and central prison and probation authorities. Further below, based on a review of the punishments deprivation of liberty and probation, and of the Bulgarian penitentiary system and probation authorities, radicalisation risks, existing measures and institutional needs are examined.

Organisation of the penitentiary system

The Bulgarian prison system is managed by a centralised prison administration, the General Directorate Execution of Sentences (GDES), subordinate to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and its territorial units specified below.⁸³

- Twelve prison facilities: Belene, Vratsa, Plovdiv, Sliven, Bobov Dol, Lovech, Bourgas, Pazardzhik, Stara Zagora, Pleven, Varna, Sofia. The facility in Sliven houses female convicts exclusively, whereas foreign nationals are housed in the Sofia prison.
- Eighteen open-type and six closed-type prison hostels, functioning alongside prisons.
- Two specialised hospitals for active treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, attached to the prisons in Sofia and Lovech.
- Two reformatories for underage offenders – in Vratsa for boys and Sliven for girls.
- Seven District Directorates Execution of Sentences: Blagoevgrad, Pleven, Bourgas, Plovdiv, Varna, Sofia, Veliko Turnovo.

⁸³ Главна дирекция „Изпълнение на наказанията“. Структура. Available at: <https://www.gdin.bg/struktura>

Prisoners are usually housed in a prison or a prison hostel (depending on the gravity of crime committed and some other considerations explained below) closest to their place of residence. This, however, is not possible for women, as there is only one female prison in the country, as well as for underage offenders of both genders who are housed in the two reformatories available in the country.⁸⁴

Bulgaria does not have specialised high-security prisons. Instead, the regime under which prisoners are housed depends on the severity of the crime committed, presence of recidivism and behavior once in prison. The establishment in which a prisoner is housed also depends on the security regime required. The applicable security regimes are **minimum-security, general security, strict security and special security regime**. Open prison hostels apply minimum and general security regimes, whereas prisons and closed prison hostels apply general security, strict security and special security regimes.

Prisoners are initially housed in an establishment depending on their initially assigned regime, as follows:

- Prisoners with assigned special security regimes are housed in prisons exclusively.
- Prisoners with initially assigned strict security regime are housed in prisons or closed prison hostels.
- Prisoners with initially assigned strict security regime are housed in open prison hostels.

Under **minimum security**, prisoners are housed in open prison hostels, in premises where the corridors are locked at night. Such prisoners are entitled to a monthly home leave of two days, can be eligible to spend all or part of their annual leave outside of the prison and may work on sites outside the prison hostel without security. Minimum security regime also affords prisoners other benefits, such as visiting hospitals or other medical establishments outside the hostel, and going to cultural, sports or other events in the vicinity of the prison hostel. Minimum security cannot be instituted as an initial regime by the court.

Under a **general security regime**, prisoners may be housed in closed and open prison hostels or prisons. Prisoners under this regime are housed on premises which are locked at night (in open hostels only the corridors are locked). Inmates housed in prison under this regime may assume duties related to service provision inside the prison itself (e.g. cleaning), while inmates housed in open hostels may work outside the hostel's premises. The **general security regime** is applied as an initial security regime to all prisoners (those who are convicted for the first time to less than five years and those sentenced for unintentional crimes) who enter open prison hostels, including underage offenders.

Under a **strict security regime**, the prisoner is housed in a closed prison hostel or a prison. Strict security regime is applied to underage offenders only in exceptional circumstances. Strict security regime is the initial regime, which is applied to all prisoners (recidivists and those sentenced to more than 5 years in prison) who serve in closed prison hostels. The **special security regime** is served in prisons only and is applied to inmates sentenced to life imprisonment and life imprisonment without the possibility for parole. Such prisoners are

⁸⁴ Yordanova, M. Markov, D. (2011). *Penitentiary policy and system in the Republic of Bulgaria*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

housed in premises which are locked and strictly guarded, are excluded from association with other prisoners, and may only work on separate premises under close surveillance.

The initial regime of housing is assigned by the court when issuing the verdict.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, depending on several factors, including the progress of the sentence, their behavior and physical state, prisoners can be moved between facilities and/or assigned a stricter or laxer security regime within the institution they are housed in. The initial regime of housing is assigned by the court when issuing the verdict.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, depending on several factors, including the progress of the sentence, their behavior and physical state, prisoners can be moved between facilities and/or be assigned a stricter or laxer security regime within the institution they are housed in. Generally, the imposition of a stricter security regime beyond the one initially assigned necessitates the approval of the competent district court. On the other hand, the application of a laxer regime is left to the competent prison or prison hostel authorities. Such a decision is taken by the Director of the prison or prison hostel, taking into account the opinions of the Head of the Social Work Unit and Deputy Head of Security or the Director of the respective penitentiary hostel.

Organisation of probation and probation authorities

In Bulgaria, the organisation of probation authorities is centralised, with Probation representing a sector in the Department of Social Activities and Educational Work at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences (GDES). As with imprisonment, the execution of probation in the country is also controlled, planned and supported by the district GDES. Furthermore, regional GDES administrative probation units which apply probation measures and work directly with the offenders.

Probation as a penalty can be given when the CC specifically allows for its application or for certain crimes where no minimum term of imprisonment is foreseen as a punishment.⁸⁷ Probation is most often given for crimes such as drunk driving, crimes against property, crimes against the individual (such as bodily injuries), crimes against marriage and the family (e.g. leaving a child unattended) crimes against the public order (e.g. hooliganism).⁸⁸ Other crimes which can also result in probation are arson, unsanctioned possession of firearms or munition, drug related crimes etc.⁸⁹

The Bulgarian *Criminal Code* foresees the following probation measures, which can be given as either a separate punishment, as an accompanying measure to another penalty or as measures to be executed during conditional early release:

- compulsory registration – the probationer is bound to a certain location where he/she needs to sign with the probation office (or an alternative location in some cases) with a certain regularity (e.g. twice a week);
- compulsory meetings with a probation officer;
- restrictions of free movement – usually involves prohibition to visit a specific place or category of places (e.g. bars and other places where alcohol is served);

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Чипева, Н. (22 юни 2018). Защо пращането на пияни шофьори в затвора е безсмислено. *Capital.bg*. Available at: https://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2018/06/22/3203829_zatvornici_na_korem/

⁸⁸ Теллалов, Т. (2010). Принципът за индивидуална работа с осъдени лица с наложено наказание пробация. *Научни трудове на Русенския университет* 48 (6/2): 78-83. Георгиев, Т. (2014). *Пробацията в наказателното право*. Автореферат. Пловдивски Университет „Паисий Хилендарски“.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

- taking part in vocational courses;
- corrective work – this type of labor involves the convict working in his existing job in the private sector with some part of his salary paid to the state for the duration of the probation measure;
- community service – involves probationers performing non-paying jobs in state owned enterprises.

The first two measures are uniformly applied, but the with varying frequency. The remaining ones are supplementary,⁹⁰ and, in general, different combinations of measures are possible. The first four measures can be applied for a total of six months to three years, while corrective labor can be applied for between three months and two years. Community service can be carried out for between 100 and 320 hours annually for no longer than three consecutive years. The type and intensity of the probation measures are determined by the court when issuing the verdict. Probation councils are established and function in the same territory covered by the jurisdiction of the relevant regional court. The probation council includes a probation officer, representatives of the municipal council, the local employment agencies, youth institutions, civil society organisations.⁹¹ Among other matters, the probation councils can decide on the strictness and regularity of the probation measures in relation to the behavior of the offender and can ask the court to approve a conditional early suspension of the remaining sentence or, to the contrary, a substitution of the probation measure with imprisonment.⁹²

Radicalisation risks in prisons and probation

Prisons and probation authorities work with individuals who are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation as well as convicted extremists.⁹³ Therefore, while radicalisation dynamics in the wider society has a bearing on the risks as they manifest in prison and probation contexts, these institutions face unique challenges in this regard. Previous attempts to measure radicalisation risks in Bulgarian prison and probation are very limited and far from comprehensive. One such example is an internal GDES analysis based on information about inmates and defendants identified as radicalised based on their behavior and, the offence for which they are convicted or are on trial, as well as on internal analyses of prison population and existing measures.⁹⁴ While valuable, the analysis does not take into account the opinions of prison and probation staff and mainly focuses on a limited examination of potential risks presented by the presence of Islamist extremists in prison.

This is an attempt to provide a comprehensive examination of possible risks stemming from a variety of factors as identified in research carried out in other countries and the measures which exist to recognise, prevent and tackle radicalisation. For the purposes of the assessment, radicalisation is defined as a phenomenon which “represents a dynamic process whereby an individual increasingly accepts and supports violent extremism. The reasons behind this

⁹⁰ Теллалов, Т. (2010). Принципът за индивидуална работа с осъдени лица с наложено наказание пробация. *Научни трудове на Русенския университет* 48(6/2): 78-83

⁹¹ Фондация „Фонд за превенция на престъпността - ИГА“. (2016). *Независим мониторинг върху законодателното и институционално развитие на пробацията в България*. Пазарджик: Фондация „Фонд за превенция на престъпността - ИГА“.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Neumann, P. (2010). *Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

⁹⁴ Tsevtkov, T. and Milotinov, R. (2015). *Analysis of the radicalisation risks among inmates and indicted individuals and defendants subject to detention and measures for prevention and counteraction of radicalisation*. Unpublished report. Sofia: General Directorate Execution of Sentences.

process can be ideological, political, religious, social, economic or personal.”⁹⁵ As to violent extremism, it “consists in promoting, supporting or committing acts which may lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic or religious supremacy or opposing core democratic principles and values.”⁹⁶

The analysis is based on primary data obtained through interviews and focus groups with first-line prison and probation staff guided by a tailored Needs Assessment Questionnaire and through the administration of targeted Risk Assessment Questionnaires among the same target groups. It should be noted that the insufficient knowledge among prison and probation staff of radicalisation dynamics, risks and manifestations represent a drawback of the methods employed, which are to some degree reliant on the opinions, perceptions and interpretations of staff. However, in order to offset this, the data was triangulated with other information sources, such as official statistical data. In addition, the Risk Assessment Questionnaires were formulated in a way which allows the gathering of data on main radicalisation risks as identified by research carried out in other countries, minimising subjectivity.

Radicalisation dynamics in Bulgaria in general is poorly studied, and research of the phenomenon and its manifestation and drivers in local correctional and probation institutions is practically lacking, making it difficult to measure factors which have been identified as relevant in the specific national context. It is research carried out in other countries that highlights the factors affecting radicalisation dynamics in correctional settings.

An important component of radicalisation dynamics is the contact of non-radical prisoners with extremist narratives and ideologies,⁹⁷ mainly in their communication with extremist convicts. Studies from the US and the UK suggest that the presence of charismatic terrorist kingpins and radical ideologues is an important driver of prisoner radicalisation.⁹⁸ Apart from playing a role in radicalising inmates, ideologues could also orchestrate attacks from inside prisons as exemplified by cases from Canada⁹⁹ and the US.¹⁰⁰ Another conduit of extremist narratives in prisons in countries such as the UK and the US are gangs based around a racial, ethnic, religious or nationalistic principle.¹⁰¹ Gangs provide a number of benefits to their members such as physical protection and sense of belonging. Inmates often join them for these reasons but are subsequently exposed to the extremist ideology of the gang. Gangs draw in persons who were previously not associated with gang activities and “capitalise on, and sharpen, existing prejudices and hatreds held by incoming prisoners”.¹⁰² Rivalries and clashes between prison gangs further strengthens in/outgroup prejudices.

Cases from France¹⁰³ and the US¹⁰⁴ demonstrate that influence from outside prisons can also significantly contribute to the radicalisation of inmates.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, a study covering eight

⁹⁵ Council of Europe. (2016) *Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism: Terminology used for the purpose of the Guidelines*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Hannah, G., Clutterbuck, L. and Rubin, J. (2008). *Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners*. London: RAND Europe.

⁹⁸ Hamm, M. (2013) *The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat*. New York: New York University Press; Liebling, A., Arnold, H. and Straub, C. (2012) *Staff-prisoner relationships at HMP Whitemoor: 12 years on*. London: National Offender Management Service.

⁹⁹ Wilner, A. (2010). *From Rehabilitation to Recruitment: Stopping the spread of terrorist doctrines within our prisons before it becomes a national security problem*. Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

¹⁰⁰ Ballas, D. (2010) Prisoner Radicalization. *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 79:1-5.

¹⁰¹ E.g. Brandon, J. (2009). *Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons*. London: Quilliam Foundation.

¹⁰² Anti-Defamation League (2002) *Dangerous Convictions: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons*. New York: Anti-Defamation League, 5.

¹⁰³ Khosrokhavar, F.(2013) Radicalization in Prison: The French Case. *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 14 (2): 284-306.

countries – Afghanistan, France, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, the UK, and the US – has found that despite efforts to screen communication of inmates with the outside world, infiltration of extremist content had occurred in all examined countries.¹⁰⁶ Accessing extremist materials online is also considered as a possibility. although no such cases have been reported.¹⁰⁷

The data gathered under the present study suggests that **radicalisation risks for prisoners who have not held extremist views prior to serving their sentence** are low, as the opportunities for getting into contact with extremist inmates or outside actors or accessing extremist propaganda are limited. There are very few offenders in Bulgarian prisons convicted for terrorism and extremism, especially when the two articles which merge hooliganism with racist or xenophobic motivation (Art. 116, Para. (1), it. 11 for murder and Art. 131, Para. (1), it. 12 for bodily injury) are excluded (see Table 1). Only the prison in Sofia has reported housing an inmate convicted under one of the CC articles of interest.¹⁰⁸

Table 2. Convicts for terrorism, extremism and related crimes per type of punishment (imprisonment and probation)

Crime	Year	Total persons sentenced for all penalties	Prison (up to 3 years) excl. conditional sentences	Prison (between 3 and 10 years)	Prison (between 10 and 30 years)	Life imprisonment	Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole	Probation
Art. 108, Para. (1)	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	13	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2017	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 108 a	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2017	4	0	4	0	0	0	0
Art.	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

¹⁰⁴ Hamm, M. (2013) *The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat*. New York: New York University Press.

¹⁰⁵ Brandon, J. (2009). *Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons*. London: Quilliam Foundation.

¹⁰⁶ Neumann, P. (2015). *Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries*. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

¹⁰⁷ Rupali, J. (n.d). *Treatment of Offenders: With Focus on Terrorists in Prison*. Birmingham: Xiphos Intelligence and Security Solutions.

¹⁰⁸ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

109	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	13	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2017	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 110, Para. (1)	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 110, Para. (2)	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Art. 116, Para. (1), it. 11	2012	12	1	8*	2**			0
	2013	6	2	1*	5**			0
	2014	3	0	1*	1**			0
	2015	5	0	1*	4**			0
	2016	7	0	7	0	0	0	0
	2017	5	0	1	4	0	0	0
Art. 131, Para. (1), it. 12	2012	259	41	8*	0		0	64
	2013	182	19	3*	0		0	40
	2014	209	25	4*	0		0	33
	2015	238	25	0*	0		0	56
	2016	197	19	5*	0		0	53
	2017	286	32	1*	0		0	76
Art. 162-163	2012	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2016	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2017	5	0	0	0	0	0	3
Art. 164-166	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

*Imprisonment (between 3 and 15 years);** Imprisonment above 15 years.

Source: SJC.

As Table 2 demonstrates, their share when juxtaposed against the general prison population is particularly low. It should be borne in mind however that, as explained previously, there is a possibility for significant underestimation of crimes with discriminatory motives (see Section on Spread of Extremist Crimes). Due to this, it is likely that the number especially of far-right extremists in prisons is higher. Nevertheless, even when taking into account the number of persons sentenced for bodily injury and murder with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motivations, the proportion of potentially extremist convicts remains low.

Table 3. Extremist prisoners and the general prison population¹⁰⁹

Year	Convicts sentenced to prison (excl. Art. 116 and 131)	Convicts sentenced to prison (incl. Art. 116 and 131)	Prison population (as of 31 December of each year)
2012	0	60	8172
2013	0	30	7375
2014	2	33	7202
2015	0	30	6719
2016	1	32	6553
2017	4	42	6349

Source: SJC and GDES.

In addition, **prison gangs** are practically absent in the Bulgarian context. While there is evidence that in some prisons social groups do form on the basis of shared ethnicity, religion or place of origin and that in some cases such groups provide protection to their members,¹¹⁰ their existence has generally been described as relatively unstable and transitory, and socialisation – as guided by personal interest, rather than by any firm allegiance to a specific groups.¹¹¹ Where such groups exist, there are no indications of animosity and violent conflicts between them.¹¹² Instead, conflicts are often interpersonal and often occur inside a specific group, e. g. within the largest ethnic group in Bulgarian prisons, the Roma.¹¹³ The lack of such in/outgroup dynamics and clashes prevents the formation of strong social ties and bonding around a certain ideology based on the perception of a common enemy. The statistical data is in line with opinions expressed by prison staff during the interview and focus group discussion that radicalisation is not considered to be a significant problem in prisons.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ It should be noted that the number and the composition of the prison population is dynamic due to streams of outgoing and incoming prisoners. It is therefore for each individual prison to monitor the number of extremist prisoners in general and respective to the general prison population at regular intervals.

Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹¹¹ Tsevtkov, T. and Milotinov, R. (2015). *Analysis of the radicalisation risks among inmates and indicted individuals and defendants subject to detention and measures for prevention and counteraction of radicalisation*. Unpublished report. Sofia: General Directorate Execution of Sentences.

¹¹² Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹¹³ Хаджийски, М. и Минев, Х. (2016). *Наръчник за професионалистите, работещи с лишени от свобода*. София: Институт по социални дейности и практики.

¹¹⁴ BG-P1; Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

The low number of prisoners convicted for offences related to Islamist extremism correlates to the limited extent of radicalisation among Bulgarian Muslims outside of prison.¹¹⁵ The number of far-right extremist offenders who enter prison, although not known with certainty due to the imprecise *Criminal Code* provisions, is higher in comparison. A number of football hooligans, many of whom espouse far-right views, are engaged in illicit activities such as drug crimes and thus might end up in prison on charges unrelated to extremism.¹¹⁶ Certain factors, though, have the capacity to hinder the spread of far-right ideologies in prison. As in other Eastern European countries, far-right extremists in Bulgaria hold strong anti-Roma views.¹¹⁷ The Roma are considered as being the predominant ethnic group held in Bulgarian prisons,¹¹⁸ but it should be noted that there are no reliable estimates of their proportion, as data on perpetrators of crime is based on self-reported ethnic background. In a 2002 study 40% of the prisoners self-identified as Roma, while according to prison staff the share goes beyond 60%.¹¹⁹ According to Hadjiiski and Minev, despite forming the majority of prison population, Roma prisoners generally show respect toward ethnic Bulgarian convicts. Conflicts between the two ethnic groups tend to be related to everyday matters and rarely escalate, while conflicts within the ethnic groups predominate.¹²⁰ Thus, the Roma also do not present a sufficient threat in prison against which far-right groupings can form to provide protection to ethnic Bulgarian prisoners. Therefore, while those convicted for offences related to far-right extremism are unlikely to openly propagating far-right ideologies and to try to radicalise others, they still pose a challenge with regard to de-radicalisation.

There is no evidence of **outside groups trying to radicalise inmates** in Bulgarian prisons, either.¹²¹ Established far-right organisations (whether political parties or non-partisan groups) as a rule disavow any connections to illegal activities and criminality, even though they often admit convicted persons in their ranks.¹²² Nevertheless, far-rights prefer targeting youth (e. g. by delivering lectures at schools and universities), rather than convicts.¹²³ In the case of religious radicalisation, even though recruitment tactics used by the Pazardzhik Salafi Roma group include support for vulnerable individuals,¹²⁴ there is no evidence that inmates or former inmates were specifically targeted.

The holding and reception of print and other materials preaching ethnic, racial or religious hatred is forbidden in Bulgarian prisons.¹²⁵ While corruption is a serious problem in Bulgarian prisons that may compromise these controls,¹²⁶ there are no indications of attempts to use such vulnerabilities for the spread of extremist materials in prison.¹²⁷ Internet usage is not

¹¹⁵ Dzhékova, R. et al. *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

¹¹⁶ Bezlov, T. (2015). Football hooliganism. In R. Dzhékova et al. *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

¹¹⁷ Todorov, A. (2013). *The Extreme Right-Wing in Bulgaria*. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

¹¹⁸ Хаджийски, М. и Минев, Х. (2016). *Наръчник за професионалистите, работещи с лишени от свобода*. София: Институт по социални дейности и практики.

¹¹⁹ Български хелзински комитет (2002). *Затворите в България*. София: Български хелзински комитет.

¹²⁰ Хаджийски, М. и Минев, Х. (2016). *Наръчник за професионалистите, работещи с лишени от свобода*. София: Институт по социални дейности и практики.

¹²¹ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Министерски съвет. (2012). *Годишен отчет за изпълнение на политиките и програмите на Министерския съвет за 2011 г.* София: Министерски съвет.

¹²⁴ Dzhékova, R. et al. *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

¹²⁵ Law on Execution of Penal Sanctions and Detention in Custody (LEPSDC), Art. 97, it. 7.

¹²⁶ European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). (2015). *Public statement concerning Bulgaria*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

¹²⁷ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

officially sanctioned by the prison administration and surveyed prison staff do not report any instances of inmates accessing extremist materials online.¹²⁸

Despite the above considerations, it should be noted that isolated **cases of potential radicalisation in prisons have been reported** by prison staff who participated in the research, indicating that the Bulgarian penitentiary system is not immune to such processes. A case was detected by staff in the prison of Belene of a Bulgarian national from Turkish origin who was convicted of murder in Turkey and was serving his sentence in Bulgaria.¹²⁹ The prisoner managed to radicalise two other inmates, who subsequently participated in verbal and physical clashes on religious and ethnic grounds with other inmates and prison staff.¹³⁰

Information gathered during the research also points to interactions which can be flagged as problematic, as they resemble the initial stages of recruitment. In the case of the informal Islamist preacher Ahmed Musa, prison staff report that marginalised prisoners were intrigued by the fact that he and others in his circle were receiving financial support from outside¹³¹ and were able to buy more goods in prison.¹³² The use of financial incentives and the targeting of vulnerable individuals such as drug addicts have been observed as a tactic for recruitment into Salafism among the Roma community.¹³³ Thus, the initial contact with and the entry into an extremist preacher's circle could be inspired by the promise of gain such as collective security or monetary benefits which could subsequently turn into radicalisation. There is evidence suggesting that at least one prisoner came under the influence of Musa's group. According to information in court documents, one vulnerable prisoner while staying in the defendant unit of the Pazardzhik prison, was gravitating towards the group of radical Islamist defendants and was receiving money from them.¹³⁴ The inmate is described as a socially isolated alcoholic without any family ties.¹³⁵ While there is no concrete evidence that he was being radicalised, such instances demonstrate how radical inmates with experience in recruitment can attract vulnerable inmates. Prison staff needs to be aware of this possibility and to closely monitor such interactions.

There have also been cases of **extremist propaganda** being uncovered in the Sofia prison, which reached between 10 and 20 prisoners before being discovered and removed.¹³⁶ It is unclear how this content made it inside the prison. In addition, due to problems in the organisation of the Bulgarian Muslim religion as elaborated in the previous section, there is a potential for prisoners to be reached by radical imams. There have already been such suspicions which led to the removal of one imam from serving the needs of Muslim inmates in the Sofia prison.¹³⁷

¹²⁸ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹²⁹ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ The money for the leader's parole were gathered by his followers and people from the same neighbourhood. Соколова, Т. (29 ноември 2017). Вярващи от Пазарджик събраха гаранцията на Ахмед Муса. *Dariknews.bg*. Available at: <https://dariknews.bg/regioni/plovdiv/viarvashti-ot-pazardzhik-sybraha-garanciata-na-ahmed-musa-2063862>

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Dzhhekova et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

¹³⁴ Протокол по ЧНД № 107/2018 на Пазарджишкия окръжен съд постановен на 14 февруари 2018 г.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

While **internet usage in prisons** is not sanctioned, as leaked videos and pictures have shown¹³⁸ and some of the survey respondents have admitted,¹³⁹ prisoners have unregulated access to the internet and therefore the risk of accessing extremist propaganda through such channels cannot be discounted. In fact, the presence of technical devices such as phones within prison can be used by extremist inmates to continue their activities and communication with their followers and associates as well as for accessing extremist propaganda. This was apparently the case for Ahmed Musa in whose cell four mobile phones were uncovered containing pictures with a jihadist character and text in Turkish.¹⁴⁰ The prosecutor leading the case against Musa expressed the opinion that the group continued “their contacts on the outside and were looking for websites on the internet with Jihadi content”.¹⁴¹ According to anonymous sources from the investigation quoted in the media, the phones had also been used to conduct a number of international calls with people located in Cologne, Germany.¹⁴²

Specific risks are also associated with the **population of foreign prisoners**. The 2013-2017 migrant crisis led to an increase in the number of foreigners from the Middle East and Africa convicted for numerous attempts to cross the border illegally and for facilitating illegal entry into the country.¹⁴³ As these migrants often come from conflict zones where terrorist and extremist organisations are active, it is fairly likely that some of the inmates in Sofia prison are Islamist radicals or at least vulnerable individuals. The risk of Islamist radicalisation is arguably higher since radical interpretations of Islam are much more widely professed in some of the countries of origin of such prisoners. Translators for the native languages of such inmates are insufficient,¹⁴⁴ which poses an additional risk by hampering effective supervision and communication with them. Risks related to foreign prisoners are dependent on a possible future rise in migration pressure and an ensuing increase of conviction rates. On the other hand, the risk that potential radicals from this prisoner group can influence Bulgarian prisons is low, as foreign inmates tend to avoid social contacts outside of their own group¹⁴⁵ and the language barrier is likely to hamper attempts at recruitment.

At the same time, while there is no data of instances of far-right radicalisation in prisons, the issue should not be neglected, especially considering high levels of prejudice against ethnic and sexual minorities outside prisons and the presence of offenders convicted for violent hate crimes. The focus of response, though, should be more on the de-radicalisation or disengagement of extremist prisoners, since, as elaborated above, the spread of far-right ideologies to non-extremist prisoners is a smaller risk.

Poor prison conditions and disorderly and understaffed penitentiary intuitions have also been identified as factors facilitating processes of radicalisation in research carried out

¹³⁸ *Btvnovinite.bg*. (14 април 2016). Селфи от затвора: Росен Петров-Животното качва снимки в интернет, докато е зад решетките. Available at: <https://btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/obshtestvo/selfi-ot-zatvora-rosen-petrov-zhivotnoto-kachva-snimki-v-internet-dokato-e-zad-reshetkite.html>

¹³⁹ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹⁴⁰ Петрова, Н. (16 юли 2016). Откриха четири мобилни телефона в килията на Ахмед Муса Ахмед. *Bnr.bg*. Available at: <http://bnr.bg/post/100715028/sadat-v-pazardjik-shte-zasedava-po-deloto-sreshtu-ahmed-musa-ahmed>

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*.

¹⁴² *Ibid*.

¹⁴³ In 2016, there were 181 foreign inmates in the Sofia prison. Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria. (2016). *2016 Annual Report of the Office of the Ombudsman as National Prevention Mechanism*. Sofia: Office of the Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria.

¹⁴⁴ Tsevtkov, T. and Milotinov, R. (2015). *Analysis of the radicalisation risks among inmates and indicted individuals and defendants subject to detention and measures for prevention and counteraction of radicalisation*. Unpublished report. Sofia: General Directorate Execution of Sentences.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

elsewhere.¹⁴⁶ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) considers that “while not in itself sufficient to trigger radicalisation to violence, poor living conditions and prison overcrowding can generate resentment and provide the ground for antisocial narratives to take root.”¹⁴⁷ Therefore, analysis of radicalisation risks in Bulgarian prisons should also take into account the poor conditions and overcrowding in Bulgarian prisons and detention facilities, which have long attracted significant criticism from the civil society sector, institutions such as the Ombudsman and international organisations and observers. In 2015, alarmed by the lack of sufficient progress in terms conditions and the ill treatment in Bulgarian prisons and detention facilities, the Council of Europe Committee against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment (CoE CPT) published a Public Statement, urging Bulgarian authorities to take action to ensure improvement.¹⁴⁸

The committee’s subsequent report welcomed improvements in material conditions and the reduction of ill-treatment of prisoners by staff in penitentiary facilities.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, problems remain with regard to overcrowding, the availability of healthcare staff and the limited engagement of inmates in work, educational programmes or vocational training, among others.¹⁵⁰ In addition, there is significant shortage of all types of prison staff.¹⁵¹ It should nevertheless be reiterated that poor prison conditions do not by themselves lead to radicalisation and that these problems vary between prisons.

Of the surveyed penitentiary institutions, the prison in Sliven and Pazardzhik house less inmates than their capacity allows, but no information was provided for the capacity of the Sofia prison.¹⁵² In the Sliven prison, the correctional staff-to-inmate ratio is 1 to 14 for the main prison building and the open prison hostel altogether,¹⁵³ whereas in the Sofia prison it is 1 to 28, 1 to 25 and 1 to 60 in the main prison building, the closed prison hostel and the open prison hostel respectively.¹⁵⁴ Both correctional institutions are far from the critically understaffed category of 1 correctional officer to 250 and more inmates as considered by the Prison Conditions Monitoring Index.¹⁵⁵ However, the Sofia prison is particularly far from to the 1 to 4 ratio considered as sufficient by the Index. In addition, none of the prisons attains the social worker to inmate ratio of 1 to 10 considered as sufficient by the Prison Monitoring Index. The Pazardzhik prison performs best with 1 social worker for every 25 inmates. Sofia prison is close to the opposite scale of the Index (1 to 100 and more) with 1 social worker for every 70-90 inmates. Both the Sofia prison and the Pazardzhik prison do not provide sufficient work opportunities for all in inmates.¹⁵⁶ In the latter prison vocational training has not been

¹⁴⁶ See for example Hamm, M. S. (2009). Prison Islam in the age of sacred terror. *British Journal of Criminology* 49 (5): 667-685.

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2016). *Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 12.

¹⁴⁸ European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). (2015). *Public statement concerning Bulgaria*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

¹⁴⁹ European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). (2018). *Report to the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Harizanova, S. (2014). Job Burnout Among Bulgarian Prison Staff. *International Journal of Scientific Research* 8 (3): 307-308.

¹⁵² Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Markov, D. and Doichinova, M. (2015). *Prison conditions Monitoring Index: Methodology and Pilot Results*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

provided since 2012.¹⁵⁷ In contrast, the Sliven prison has managed to provide employment opportunities and vocational training for about two thirds of the inmates.¹⁵⁸

In comparison to correctional settings, radicalisation risks with regard to probation are more diffuse and to a larger extent related to radicalisation dynamics in the wider society and especially in the locality/local community in which probationers live. Probation staff also considers **radicalisation risks in probation settings** to be limited.¹⁵⁹ Among the surveyed probation authorities there are no probationers convicted for terrorism or extremism-related crimes.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, as Table 3 demonstrates, similar to the situation in prison, probationers sentenced for terrorism, extremism or related crimes form a very small proportion of the general probation population. This remains the case even when considering those convicted for murder and bodily injury with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motivation.

Table 4. Extremist probationers and the probation population

Year	Convicts sentenced to probation (excl. Art. 116 and 131)	Convicts sentenced to probation (incl. Art. 116 and 131)	Probation population
2012	0	64	13466
2013	0	40	12031
2014	2	35	11035
2015	2	58	10401
2016	0	53	7732
2017	5	81	5774

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ BG-PR1. Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁶⁰ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

The majority of probation officers do not consider that the localities they work in are marked by significant polarisation and conflict between different ethnic and religious groups and are not aware of any extremist organisations which are active in the proximity of probationers they work with.¹⁶¹ The only exception, as reported by one of the respondents, is the presence of roughly sixty members of football fan clubs in the Elin Pelin and Gorna Malina municipalities. It is, however, unknown to what extent they are involved in hooliganism, and no other risk factors are reported for the same localities.¹⁶² Muslims are not considered as a large proportion of probationers in Sofia district and the ones that the consulted probation officers work with were described as rather secular.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, there is a consideration among probation officers working in the district of Sofia that radicalisation processes are underway in some regions of the country inhabited by Bulgarian speaking Muslims due to the presence of Islamist organisations which fund the adoption of radical interpretations of Islam.¹⁶⁴ The latter, though, should not be equated with radicalisation; moreover, these concerns were not shared by probation staff respondents working in such localities.¹⁶⁵

Source: SJC and GDES.

Football hooligans are among the clients of probation institutions who, along with other offenders, even if convicted for other crimes express intolerance towards the Roma (reciprocal intolerance against Bulgarians has also been expressed by Roma probationers).¹⁶⁶ However, according to Sofia city probation staff, football hooligans are few in number.¹⁶⁷ These findings correspond to the wider context with regard to radicalisation in Bulgaria, namely the circumscribed nature of adherence to radical interpretations of Islam and the more pronounced presence of far-right organisations, as well as the general polarisation between the Bulgarian ethnic population and the Roma, including the widespread prejudices against the latter.¹⁶⁸

The above considerations indicate that currently the risk of radicalisation in Bulgarian prisons is not acute due to the low number of convicted extremists, especially radical leaders, the lack of established ideology-driven gangs and the generally limited possibilities for the activities of outside extremist actors and entry of extremist content. Radicalisation risks in probation seem to be likewise limited at the moment.

Risks, however, should not be considered non-existent. In prisons, the main risks stem from the presence of extremist ideologues who, even if few in number, can potentially find fertile ground among particularly marginalised prisoners and use different tactics to entice and draw them in their remit of influence. Extremist propaganda has also reportedly found its way into

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by probation staff.

¹⁶³ BG-PR1. Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by probation staff.

¹⁶⁶ Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Dzhékova, R. et al. (2015) *Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends*. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy.

prison facilities probably due to gaps in monitoring. Risks are associated with the possibility for already radicalised inmates to access extremist content or to communicate with extremist actors, which can hinder any efforts for de-radicalisation, as well as compromise prison and wider security. On the other hand, no instances of previously non-radical inmates accessing extremist content online have been observed and therefore the extent to which this represents a risk is unknown.

Radicalisation risks in probation are to a larger extent related to wider processes of radicalisation at the national, and especially at the local level. They are thus much more difficult to monitor than the processes taking place in the microcosm of a prison where surveillance and monitoring are much easier. Radicalisation risks in probation settings can emerge rapidly and are not to be discounted. In light of these considerations, it is important to review existing measures in prison and identify gaps in relation to the risks examined in order to improve preparedness and response to any potential instances of radicalisation.

Response and institutional needs

A number of measures are applied in countries across the world to deal with radicalisation in prison and probation that fall into three categories: radicalisation prevention, radicalisation risk assessment and de-radicalisation. Cross-cutting areas which are relevant to tackling different problems within prisons and probation, including radicalisation, encompass issues of prison and probation management, inter-institutional cooperation, staff training and awareness raising, and prison conditions. Currently, there are no targeted measures aimed at preventing, detecting and reversing radicalisation among prisoners and probationers to guide the relevant Bulgarian authorities,¹⁶⁹ and for this reason prison and probation staff have been working ad hoc making the best of the existing measures at their disposal.

Prevention of the spread of radical ideologies in prisons involves the supervision and management of the contact between already extremist prisoners and the rest of the prison population by, among other things, creating **policies on housing** that could be based on different approaches. The Netherlands, for instance, completely segregates extremist or terrorist prisoners.¹⁷⁰ The Philippines, on the contrary, integrate such prisoners within the general population.¹⁷¹ Research has shown that integration can support de-radicalisation of extremist prisoners through preventing their further encapsulation and validation of extremist views.¹⁷² In Bulgarian prisons, measures such as the placement in a specific institution, the corresponding level of supervision and separation from the prison population depend on what has been initially determined by the court. Therefore, extremist prisoners can be either dispersed within the general prison population, or practically isolated from all other prisoners. However, the special security regime which entails isolation usually only applies to those sentenced to life imprisonment and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and such sentences are rarely pronounced.¹⁷³ Still, the law provides the possibility to apply a

¹⁶⁹ BG-P1, BG-PR1; Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia; Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁷⁰ Veldhuis, T. (2016). *Prisoner radicalization and terrorism detention policy. Institutionalized fear or evidence-based policy making?* London: Routledge.

¹⁷¹ Jones, C. and Morales, R. (2012). Integration versus segregation: A preliminary examination of Philippine correctional facilities for de-radicalization. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35 (3): 211-228.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Between 2012 and 2016, there were a total of 5 sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility for parole given out by the courts. Петров, С. (2017). *Доживотен затвор без замяна: Скорошни промени и продължаващи основания за загриженост*. София: Български хелзинкски комитет.

stricter security regime, including a special security regime involving near total isolation, if a prisoner's behavior warrants such an action.

Bulgarian prison authorities routinely pay special attention to prisoners convicted for crimes related to Islamist radicalism within their assigned security regime, as well as to those who are held in detention and are undergoing trial for similar offences. While in custody, Ahmed Musa and his associates were mostly separated from the rest of the prisoners and were closely monitored.¹⁷⁴ Another inmate held in Sofia prison for a terrorism-related offence is also under close supervision. The man is of dual Bulgarian-Australian nationality and does not speak Bulgarian. His wish of remaining among foreign inmates was not respected and he was housed together with Bulgarian inmates to facilitate his supervision by removing the language barrier for prison staff.¹⁷⁵

Similarly, when there are indications of radicalisation detected by staff, despite the shortage of instruments for countering it, prison authorities apply the available measures to prevent further radicalisation and recruitment of other inmates. Such was the case of the Belene prison inmate convicted for an offence unrelated to extremism, who managed to radicalise two other convicts. The three inmates were subsequently separated and placed in different prisons under supervision and were included in different social activities. The extremist recruiter was placed in the prison of Lovech and was involved in work activities to avoid idleness and to provide opportunities for better surveillance of his activities.¹⁷⁶

In terms of **measures preventing the access of prisoners to extremist propaganda**, the methods applied to other prohibited items are employed, namely checks of all stuff entering correctional institutions as well as searches and confiscation of such items from inside the prison.¹⁷⁷ The Ministry of Justice has approved a list of items which prisoners are allowed to possess and to receive from family, friends and others outside the prison.¹⁷⁸ Possession of any print and other materials with pornographic content or preaching ethnic, racial or religious hatred is prohibited by law. In case there is doubt that extremist content is encountered, the GDES and the competent prosecution are notified.¹⁷⁹ No specific problems in terms of designating extremist content were reported by prison staff.¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, beyond the prohibition in the legislation, there do not seem to be any specific guidelines about what is to be considered extremist content, nor is there any list of specific materials to be disallowed in prisons.¹⁸¹ It would be useful to develop such guidelines both in terms of preventing the entry of extremist content and of facilitating decision-making in cases when inmates have accessed extremist content online. Probation officers could also benefit from them if they suspect that probationers are accessing such content.

The European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services considers the **provision of religious care as an important preventive measure** aimed at ensuring that mainstream

¹⁷⁴ Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁷⁷ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹⁷⁸ Министерство на правосъдието. (2017). *Разрешени лични вещи, предмети и хранителни продукти, които могат да се получават, ползват и държат при себе си или на определените за целта места лишени от свобода и задържаните под стража по реда на Наказателно-процесуалния кодекс, настанени в затворите, поправителните домове, затворническите общежития и арестите в затворите*. София: Министерство на правосъдието.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

interpretations of religion reach prisoners.¹⁸² At the same time, this measure can aid de-radicalisation of already radical inmates.¹⁸³ Care for Bulgarian prisoners' religious needs is viewed as the most widely covered form of care, at least in Sofia prison where arrangements are being made to also cater for the needs of rare religious denominations.¹⁸⁴ In order to ensure that no extremist messages are reaching prisoners, only accredited representatives of the religions are allowed in.¹⁸⁵ Surveillance and discussions with both representatives of the respective clergy and inmates are also employed in view of preventing the spread of radical narratives from outside prisons. It is a matter of concern, though, that not all prisons meet the religious needs of Muslim inmates. The prison in Pazardzhik has reported that despite the fact that there are Muslim groups in the penitentiary institution, it is only the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church and the Evangelical Church that cater to the religious needs of prisoners.¹⁸⁶ In addition, the Pazardzhik prison is where the members of the Roma Salafi Muslim community were housed while on trial for demonstrating sympathies for IS and for preaching religious hatred. Previous research has shown that this and other correctional institutions had tried to provide religious services for the Muslims inmates, but the imams they approached refused to get involved.¹⁸⁷ No specific measures aimed at preventing the radicalisation of prisoners from other outside extremist actors were reported.¹⁸⁸

Besides the lack of standardised guidelines on the designation of extremist content, on how extremist prisoners should be housed and monitored, as well as the insufficient coverage of preventive measures such as religious care, Bulgarian authorities have **no risk monitoring and assessment instruments** at their disposal. A few instruments currently in use could be adapted to support such an assessment, though. As mentioned above, prison gangs as encountered elsewhere do not exist in Bulgarian prisons. Screening inmate dynamics is nevertheless important in case more stable groupings begins to form. Penitentiary authorities already carry out an assessment of prison communities every six months,¹⁸⁹ which can be developed further to take into account possible radicalisation and polarisation dynamics in the prison population and can be used as a valuable supporting tool for risk monitoring at the specific prison institution.

Importantly, the **lack of a radicalisation risk assessment methodology allowing for the detection of vulnerable individuals and individuals on the path of radicalisation** may result into hidden processes of radicalisation being overlooked by prison and probation authorities. In addition, inmates convicted for extremist offences cannot be properly assessed for the risk they pose and the effect of inclusion in any de-radicalisation programmes cannot be monitored. Currently, inmates are screened for the risk of recidivism and potential damage through the OaSys instrument.¹⁹⁰ Before entering the prison, new offenders go through an

¹⁸² European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services (2016). *Prison chaplaincy and de-radicalisation*. The Hague: European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff; Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁸⁵ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁸⁶ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹⁸⁷ Петров, С. и Банков, Г. (2008). *Затворите в България: Изследване на системата на местата за лишаване от свобода*. София: Български Хелзинкски комитет.

¹⁸⁸ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

¹⁸⁹ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁹⁰ Хаджийски, М. и Минев, Х. (2016). *Наръчник за професионалистите, работещи с лишени от свобода*. София: Институт по социални дейности и практики.

introduction programme which aims to prepare the prisoner for serving the sentence.¹⁹¹ During this period, the health, ability to work and general personality traits of the prisoner are assessed and a recidivism risk assessment is carried out.¹⁹² In prisons, such assessments are to be carried out by a doctor, social worker and psychologist. At the end of the introductory programme, an individual plan for the execution of the sentence is developed, which highlights the problem areas and the capabilities of the prisoner and details any corrective actions that should be taken to address issues (mainly inclusion in specific individual or group programmes). A psychological evaluation is compulsory with regard to those sentenced to life imprisonment and life imprisonment without the possibility for parole, as well as to inmates whose risk for recidivism is considered to be high or very high.¹⁹³

Probation authorities also use a modified version of the OaSys tool for recidivism risk assessment which is carried out in the first two weeks of the sentence by the probation officer.¹⁹⁴ Probation officers also examine the offender's personality traits, life situation and needs. Subsequently, a probation plan is drawn up with the involvement of the probationer.¹⁹⁵ Probation programmes are tailored to the individual, but group programmes are also developed, with both types led by probation officers. The assessment is repeated twice for probationers with shorter sentences and a greater number of times for those with longer sentences.¹⁹⁶ The individual offender's plan is reviewed twice a year by the relevant probation council, and changes to it are made if necessary.

The OaSys instrument includes an item on discriminatory attitudes along with other items which partly overlap with specialised radicalisation risk assessment tools such as VERA and ERG 22+.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, OaSys seems to be ill-suited to radicalisation risks assessment, as it can only cover some alarming signs, without being a specialised instrument that can be used to make a thorough informed assessment. Most prison and probation staff consider that the adaptation of the OaSys instrument for radicalisation risk screening would not produce the desired results.¹⁹⁸ In addition, research has shown that the OaSys instrument already has issues of its own and needs to be better adapted to the Bulgarian context.¹⁹⁹ This clearly points a specialised radicalisation risk assessment tool needs to be developed which Bulgarian prison and probation staff can apply after undergoing appropriate training.

Specialised de-radicalisation programmes do not exist in Bulgarian prison or probation authorities. Prison programmes, which are aimed at rehabilitation and re-education vary widely across issues and prisons, depending on the local needs.²⁰⁰ Some already existing programmes, however, could be helpful for radicalised inmates. Such programmes are applied

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Art. 55, Para. (2) Law on Execution of Penal Sanctions and Detention in Custody (LEPSCD).

¹⁹³ Art. 55, Para. (3) Law on Execution of Penal Sanctions and Detention in Custody (LEPSCD).

¹⁹⁴ Теллалов, Т. (2010). Принципът за индивидуална работа с осъдени лица с наложено наказание пробация. *Научни трудове на Русенския университет* 48 (6/2): 78-83.

¹⁹⁵ Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁹⁶ Станков, Г. (2017). *Оценката на риска и рисковете на оценката: Системата OaSys за оценка на риска от рецидив и вреди*. Презентация изнесена по време на лекция в Тракийския университет.

¹⁹⁷ Pressman, E and Flockton, J. (2014). Violent Extremist Risk Assessment: Issues and Applications of the Vera-2 in High-Security Correctional Setting. In Silke, A. (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*. London: Routledge; Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* 2 (1): 40-52.

¹⁹⁸ Focus group discussions with prison and probation staff. Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

¹⁹⁹ Бояджиева, Ю. (2013). *Системата за оценка на риска от рецидив през погледа на пенитенциарната система*. София: Комисия по помилването при Президента на Република България.

²⁰⁰ General Directorate Execution of Sentences. (2013). *Survey results on education programmes for staff and offenders in prisons and probation*. Sofia: General Directorate Execution of Sentences.

with regard to inmates potentially holding extremist views (e.g. displaying intolerance towards ethnic groups). For example, in 2013 two prisons recognised the need for establishment of programmes aimed at increasing ethnic tolerance either specifically targeted towards ethnic Bulgarian offenders or aimed at the general prison population.²⁰¹ Different programmes can be relevant to radicalised prisoners, including those aimed at fostering inter-ethnic tolerance and anger management. One such initiative is the Tolerance in Prison, Tolerance in Life programme applied in the prison of Pazardzhik, which is aimed at fostering understanding and acceptance of religious or sexual orientation differences. The programme comprises ten two-hour group work sessions held in the course of a month.²⁰² Other programmes such as those aimed at supporting and fostering thinking skills can be beneficial to countering black and white thinking and simplistic ideas.

Similar to the situation in prisons, probation programmes are applied on a per need basis and some existing programmes, such as those aiming to foster tolerance towards difference can be beneficial for radicalised individuals. The Fostering Tolerance Programme applied by probation authorities in Sofia consists of five group sessions carried out within three months.²⁰³ The participation of both inmates and probationers in tolerance fostering programmes is on a voluntary basis.²⁰⁴

Radicalisation in probation and prisons is an issue whose tackling would benefit from a good **overall cooperation with other institutions as well as civil society and community organisations**. Currently, certain institutions are unwilling to share with prison authorities the instruments developed by them.²⁰⁵ Probation officers, in their turn, report that they are often not properly assisted by the police when probationers behave aggressively.²⁰⁶ A related problem is the poor level of support provided to released prisoners, as there is simply no established mechanisms to direct them to suitable support providers, whether private or state-funded.²⁰⁷ On the positive side, there are occasional examples of good cooperation which should be encouraged and further developed, one such example being that NGOs' working with inmates inside prisons provide regular feedback to prison authorities.²⁰⁸ The described situation confirms the need to establish specific mechanisms for cooperation between different institutions and civil society organisations to facilitate the successful management of cases of radicalised and vulnerable inmates and probationers.

Prison and probation staff do not see radicalisation as an imminent risk, but they consider preparedness to react is considered as important. In this sense, the dominant view remains that **there is insufficient knowledge of the issue of radicalisation and of measures and tools which can be employed** by prison and probation staff.²⁰⁹ In terms of training of staff, the GDES has recognised the need for improving knowledge on radicalisation in recent years. Training on the process of radicalisation to violence, the different ideologies and measures for de-

²⁰¹ General Directorate Execution of Sentences. (2013). *Survey results on education programmes for staff and offenders in prisons and probation*. Sofia: General Directorate Execution of Sentences.

²⁰² Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison staff.

²⁰³ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by probation staff.

²⁰⁴ Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison and probation staff.

²⁰⁵ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

²⁰⁶ Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

²⁰⁷ Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ BG-P1. Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia.

radicalisation and disengagement has been included as a priority issue in the GDES agenda for 2018.²¹⁰ GDES is involved in international projects aiming to transfer best practices, to develop a mechanism for detecting and dealing with vulnerable and radicalised individuals, to increase the capacity for rehabilitation of radicalised prisoners, to train staff in recognising radicalisation and to foster solid and up-to-date understanding of the dynamic process of radicalisation.²¹¹ Still, only a small number of the probation and prison staff surveyed had undergone training on radicalisation, and thus understanding of the issue and the methods of tackling it remains limited.²¹²

While not exclusive to preventing radicalisation, **improving the living conditions and the management of Bulgarian prisons and strengthening the guarantees for prisoners' safety and rights** would be an essential step in discouraging the spread of radical ideologies in prisons. As a result of the continued international pressure, a number of initiatives have been undertaken, including the construction of two new prison hostels²¹³ and a new reformatory for underage male offenders,²¹⁴ as well as the refurbishment of a number of prisons.²¹⁵ In addition, in 2017 several amendments were made to the Law on Execution of Penal Sanctions and Detention in Custody (LEPSCD), aiming to tackle facility overcrowding.²¹⁶ The efforts currently underway should be stepped up and measures should also be undertaken to address outstanding problems such as prison understaffing and the shortage of jobs for prisoners.

The results of the current research show that with regard to preventing and tackling radicalisation Bulgarian prison and probation authorities currently work on an ad-hoc basis and with existing instruments at their disposal, such as increased oversight, separation of and transfer to other prisons of inmates conditional on perceived signs of radicalisation, as well as inclusion in available programmes targeting the problems identified. There is no possibility to assess inmates who are already radicalised for the risk they pose, or inmates and probationers are suspected to be on the path of radicalisation. There is also a lack of guidelines, instruments and staff training on how to recognise signs of radicalisation, to flag extremist propaganda or to work with convicted extremists, which could bring about the establishment of a more uniform approach. The needs of prison and probation authorities in terms of more effective detection, prevention and countering of radicalisation include staff training, the development of new, targeted tools to assess radicalisation risk. Other, already existing mechanisms for analysis of group dynamics or programmes for rehabilitation can be adapted to have more impact in reversing and monitoring radicalisation. Existing methods for the prevention of the spread of extremist narratives need to be made more effective (e.g. stopping extremist propaganda from entering prisons) or more encompassing (e.g. provision of religious services from accredited moderate representatives of the major religious denominations).

²¹⁰ Official correspondence with GDES.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² BG-P1; BG-PR1; Results from focus group discussion with prison staff carried out on 18 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia; Results from focus group discussion with probation staff carried out on 23 May 2018 at the General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Sofia; Results from Risk Assessment Questionnaire filled in by prison and probation staff. Respondents from probation services in Assenovgrad, Plovdiv, Kurdjali have reported undergoing courses on the process of radicalisation, its manifestations and corresponding measures.

²¹³ *News.bg*. (21 юли 2017). Съдът в Страсбург: България работи по проблема с лошите условия в затворите. Available at: <https://news.bg/crime/sadat-v-strasbourg-balgariya-raboti-po-problema-s-loshite-usloviya-v-zatvorite.html>

²¹⁴ *Offnews.bg*. (16 август 2018). Откриха нов поправителен дом за младежи във Враца. Available at: <https://offnews.bg/politika/otkriha-nov-popravitelten-dom-za-mladezhi-vav-vratca-686399.html>

²¹⁵ *24chasa.bg*. (16 февруари 2017). Килия от 4 квадрата и тоалетна за всеки затворник във Варна. Available at: <https://www.24chasa.bg/novini/article/6061696>

²¹⁶ Committee against Torture and Other Cruel and Degrading Treatment. (2018). *Report to the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 25 September to 6 October 2017*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Conclusion and recommendations

Radicalisation dynamics in Bulgaria is poorly understood and in need of further study. Islamist radicalisation thus far appears to be limited, as Bulgarian Muslims have proved largely unreceptive to more extreme interpretations of Islam which are far removed from interpretations traditional for the country. Nevertheless, instances of radicalisation have been observed among the most vulnerable and marginalised Muslim communities. The most serious manifestations of radicalisation include declarations of support for IS as well as suspected financing and contacts with terrorist organisations and facilitation of foreign fighters.

Far-right extremism is a more established phenomenon. Its ideologies are espoused by a number of actors, including political parties represented in parliament, fringe parties, non-partisan organisations and informal groupings. Extreme far-right actors engage in both non-violent activities such as commemoration of historical figures, and in violent actions such as hate crime and vigilantism. On the other hand, left-wing extremism is very limited and largely non-violent.

Radicalisation into violent extremism has only recently entered the policy agenda in Bulgaria, which, except for one terrorist attack in 2012, has been spared from large-scale terrorist activities. The first steps in the formation of an official response to the threat of radicalisation were taken with the development of the Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism 2015 – 2020 and its annual implementation plans. These, however, remain focused on law enforcement measures, the deterrence of terrorist acts, and dealing with their consequences. Islamist radicalisation and terrorism are prioritised, but far-right extremism is a more established threat producing more victimisation, especially from hate crime. Sectoral approaches to preventing and countering radicalisation remain underdeveloped, including for prisons and probation authorities, for which no specific measures are foreseen in either the Strategy, or the implementation plans. This is a serious oversight as, due their work with both convicted extremists and convicts who might be particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, prisons and probation are considered as facing considerable risks.

As research into the matter is lacking, it is difficult to identify the factors specifically relevant to the Bulgarian context. The current study seeks to address this gap, using knowledge from other countries to identify and assess radicalisation risks in Bulgarian prisons and probation. The analysis shows that currently radicalisation risks in prison and probation are not acute, but they exist and should not be overlooked, as neither radicalisation risks nor the correctional and probation environments are static.

In prison, the limited risk is due to the few extremist prisoners present, especially radical preachers, the absence of stable and adversarial ethnic, and racial, religious or ideological gangs, the lack of outside actors attempting to radicalise inmates and the difficulty of practicing extremist propaganda in prisons. However, some major risks stem from the possible entry into prison of radical ideologues who can take advantage of vulnerable and impressionable inmates, the undetected entry of extremist content in prison and the possibility for accessing such content online or communicating with outside radical actors through unsanctioned possession of electronic devices. At the same time, the poor prison conditions, which remain the norm in Bulgaria, can foster resentment which can be exploited by extremist recruiters, while understaffing can glitch adequate response to emerging issues. Besides, prison and probation staff is poorly trained to recognise and respond to radicalisation dynamics and manifestations, lacks instruments to detect and assess radicalisation, has no

guidelines to recognise extremist content and has only a limited choice of specialised programmes to which they could direct convicted extremists and those identified as being in the process of radicalisation.

Unlike in prisons, radicalisation risks for probationers are more closely linked to those in the wider society. In general, they appear low due to the limited number of probationers convicted for extremist offences and radicalisation dynamics observed in the wider society. However, considering the instances of Islamist radicalisation and especially the more prominent manifestations of far-right extremism, such risks exist. In addition, probation officers are not equipped to follow and respond to this dynamics, so the situation could change substantially without them becoming aware of it. They are not well trained and lack the instruments needed to spot and assess convicts in the process of radicalisation. There are no specialised de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes to which probationers convicted for terrorist, extremist or related offences can be directed.

In order to address risks effectively and to institute a comprehensive approach, Bulgarian prisons and probation authorities need to develop new tools and programmes, strengthen the existing mechanisms for prevention, improve the awareness and capacity of staff to recognise and tackle radicalisation and solve persistent cross-sectional problems. The following specific steps will lead to considerable improvements:

- **Train staff on radicalisation dynamics, risk and vulnerability factors, extremist ideologies, radicalisation manifestations, best practices and measures.** Bulgarian prison and probation authorities have recognised the necessity of improving awareness and knowledge on radicalisation among staff. Their current efforts to this end need to be expanded. Prison and probation authorities across the country has to be properly trained on the main elements of radicalisation dynamics and manifestations and the information should be adapted to the varying risks faced by prison and probation staff. Within prisons, the different categories of staff also need to receive tailored training suited to their possible role in countering radicalisation and the measures which they will be implementing (e.g. behavior monitoring by front-line correctional staff; individual radicalisation risk assessment by psychologists/social workers; organisational risk assessment by senior prison management).
- **Develop and implement risk assessment instruments.** The development, piloting, fine-tuning and implementation of risk assessment instruments is crucial to the effective monitoring, prevention and reversal of radicalisation in Bulgarian prisons. Risk assessment can be performed on the organisational level as well as on the individual level. The individual risk assessment serves two purposes: to assess specific prisoners suspected to be on the path of radicalisation, so that they can be directed to de-radicalisation/disengagement programmes if necessary; to assess prisoners convicted for extremist offences in order to support de-radicalisation and disengagement, and to assess the effectiveness of de-radicalisation/disengagement programmes. Since currently no such instruments are in use in Bulgaria, it is necessary to draw upon existing instruments applied elsewhere and develop a tool which will be piloted by prison and probation staff and subsequently adjusted to the national context. On the organisational level, risk assessment allows to increase institutional

preparedness to deal with radicalisation risks through monitoring factors such as the presence and number of extremist prisoners, the effectiveness of the measures in place, and other environmental factors. A tool for risk assessment on the organisation level can similarly draw on instruments applied elsewhere, while incorporating or adapting already existing measures applied in Bulgaria, such as the bi-annual analysis of prison communities.

- **Strengthen measures aimed at preventing extremist narratives from reaching convicts.** The measures which aim to prevent the entry of radical content in prisons have not been entirely effective. Expanding the coverage of religious care, especially by accredited imams in prisons serving regions in the country where Islamist radicalisation has been observed is an important step to prevent the spread of radical interpretations. Additional effort should also be put in preventing the acquisition of banned electronic devices through which extremist convicts can continue their illicit activities on the outside. Specific guidelines should be developed, designating in more detail what is to be considered as extremist content in order to ensure that it cannot make its way into prison and to assess whether content accessed online can be considered as such. Guidelines can also benefit probation officers in case they have suspicions that probationers are accessing such content.
- **Develop de-radicalisation/disengagement programmes.** Once prisoners and probationers sentenced for terrorist, extremist or related crimes and convicts suspected of being on the path of radicalisation are assessed and found to be in need of intervention, they should be directed to de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes. In Bulgaria, existing programmes applied by both prison and probation authorities can be used as a basis for the development of targeted de-radicalisation programmes through adaptation and extension of the duration and scope of the topics covered. Alternatively, existing programmes can be used as supplementary to specialised programmes aimed specifically at de-radicalisation/disengagement.
- **Improve inter-institutional cooperation.** Inter-institutional cooperation between prisons and probation and other authorities, namely the police, prosecution, security services and courts in terms of information sharing and support is essential in ensuring that cases of extremist convicts and individuals radicalised during imprisonment or probation are tackled effectively. In addition, mechanisms for cooperation with community organisations should be developed in order to ensure that cases of radicalised prisoners and probationers can be supported after they have served their sentence.
- **Improve prison conditions, staffing and guarantees of prisoner rights.** Poor prison conditions, understaffing and substandard prison management are not by themselves sufficient to result in radicalisation. Nevertheless, they can generate resentment which could play into the hands of extremist recruiters and facilitate the adoption of radical ideologies or association with extremist groups. The efforts to improve material conditions currently underway should be expanded and applied to all penitentiary institutions. In addition, they should be supplemented with measures for alleviating understaffing and for opening up labor opportunities for inmates.

Table 5. Offences prohibited under the Criminal Code articles of interest

Art. 108, Para. (1)	Preaching fascist or other anti-democratic ideology or the forceful change of the social and state order as established by the Constitution.
Art. 108a	Terrorism, terrorism financing, training activities, travelling to engage in terrorism in another country
Art. 109	Forming or leading an organisation or group with the aim of perpetrating crimes against the \, including terrorism
Art. 110, par (1) and (2)	Preparatory actions aimed at committing crimes against the Republic, including by foreign citizen
Art. 116, Para. (1), it. 11	Murder with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motivation
Art. 131, Para. (1), it. 12	Bodily injury with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motivation
Art. 162, Para. (1)	Preaching or inciting discrimination, violence or hate based on race, nationality or ethnicity
Art. 162, Para. (2)	Using violence against someone or damaging their property due to their race, nationality, ethnicity, religion or political convictions
Art. 162, Para. (3)	Forming or leading an organisation which aims to commit crimes under Art. 162, Para. (1) and (2) or systemically allowing for such crimes to be committed
Art. 163, Para. (1), (2) and (3)	Leading or participating in a(n) (armed) crowd, gathered to attack the certain communities, separate citizens or their property due to their nationality, ethnicity or race, including cases which result in death or serious bodily injury
Art. 164	Preaching or inciting discrimination, violence or hate on religious grounds; damaging religious establishments
Art. 165	Using threat or coercion to prevent citizens from professing their religion or from performing their religious services or rites; using threat or coercion persuade someone take part in religious services or rites; crimes under Art. 163 aimed against religious communities
Art. 166	Forming a political organisation on a religious basis or using religion against the state
Art. 407	Propagating war

Table 6. List of respondents for Bulgaria

Respondent code	Position	Institution
BG-C1	Inspector, Sofia prison	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P1	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C2	Head of Sector, GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C3	Inspector, GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C4	Inspector, GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice

BG-C5	Inspector, GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C6	Inspector, Sofia prison	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C7	Inspector, Sofia prison	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C8	Head of Sector, Sofia prison	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-C9	Inspector, Sofia prison	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P2	Inspector, GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P3	Inspector, GDES	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P4	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P5	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P6	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P7	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P8	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice
BG-P9	Inspector, Sofia city probation services	General Directorate Execution of Sentences, Ministry of Justice

France

Background

In France, radicalisation is considered a major problem in detention and probation facilities. Currently, 349 terrorist offenders are detained (up from 90 in 2004), among them 31 women and 18 minors. Out of the total, 55 inmates are kept in solitary confinement for being violent or for refusing to cooperate and communicate. Furthermore, 1,336 inmates are identified as radicalised (as against 700 in 2015). 359 open-environment probationers are radicalised, 125 of whom are still under judicial review. Out of the 196 sentenced terrorists, 22 will be released come the end of 2019, and more than half will be released in 2020. Come 2022, 75% of those detained for terrorism will have served their sentence.

Prison and probation staff are familiar with the issue of radicalisation since some probationers are supervised for being linked to terrorism and radicalisation. In French prisons, 502 inmates are being detained for terrorism, and 1,074 common criminals have shown signs of involvement in violent extremism.

Response and institutional needs

Governmental agenda

The fight against “radicalisation” has become a high-priority target for public policy that is greatly mediatised. Nowadays, legislative and administrative frameworks are implemented, such as the May 9, 2016 Action Plan Against Radicalisation which includes 80 more or less new measures in the fields of intelligence, public safety, education and urban policies. These measures question the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights despite not being based on a solid conception of “radicalisation”, but rather aiming at predicting behaviours in order to prevent any kind of terrorist act. This results in a shift in perspective, for the aim is then to identify people that are prone to tipping towards an ideology that could lead to violent action, rather than simply preventing the terrorist act in itself.

The following regulations allow the detention of a person for radicalisation or terrorist acts:

- Law of December 21, 2012

From December 2012 onwards, the French judicial arsenal is strengthened with a law allowing the conviction of French nationals having taken part in terrorist acts abroad. This law, combined with the actions of intelligence services, has led to almost 300 legal proceedings against 1,200 nationals involved in jihadist networks.

- April 2014 Control Plan

In 2014, the French government implemented a global plan against terrorist networks and violent radicalisation. It includes 5 complementary sections: preventing minors and adults from leaving the country; dismantling recruitment networks operating in France; supporting and providing guidance to families; communicating, increasing awareness, training and strengthening international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

- Law of November 13, 2014

The law of November 13, 2014 strengthens the provisions for the fight against terrorism. This law aims to prevent and counteract the departures of French citizens who intend to take part

in terrorist activities abroad. Their passports may be confiscated for up to six months, and the confiscation may be renewed during two consecutive years. The aim of this measure is to prevent such people from acquiring competence in armed conflict abroad, which could pose, upon their return, a threat for national security.

The law also takes into account the new operating modes and the increasing actions of isolated terrorists. It punishes the preparation for terrorist crimes. Art. 5 expands the provisions of the *Penal Code* on criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist enterprise, a keystone for terrorism procedures. Prison services are also given appropriate means of investigation, even in the case of individual enterprise.

The crackdown on glorification of terrorism is reinforced: up to 7 years of imprisonment and an EUR 100,000 fine can be imposed for acts that were committed with the help of online communication.

On January 12, 2015, the first immediate prison sentences were given for glorification of terrorism.

The law of November 13, 2014 also makes it possible for administrative authorities to order internet providers to block access to websites glorifying terrorism or provoking its glorification.

Existing measures

French authorities are currently working on creating the best supervision possible and preventing any risk of recidivism for the 450 radicalised offenders which are expected to be released in 2019.

Such a high number of inmates gives an idea of the extent of supervision that will have to be set up within a very short time span. In France, over 510 people are detained following terrorist procedures. Furthermore, 1,200 people sentenced for volume crimes (theft, robbery, etc.) have been radicalised. Of the inmates releasable in 2019, around 50 are detained for terrorism, and 400 are radicalised volume crime offenders (one third of the total). These people have not carried out attacks (most of them are still awaiting trial) but are members of networks from Iraq and Syria who have been prosecuted from 2013 onwards.

To avoid any recidivism, the Ministry of Interior will create, within the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit, a supervision committee exclusively for ex-prisoners. However, the efficiency of such measures will be assessable only after they have been implemented. The supervision measures are as follows:

During detention

The inmates will serve for a four-month period in one of the three (soon to be six) Radicalisation Assessment Quarters. Prisoners will be assessed by a multidisciplinary team (educators, psychologists, prison and probation staff, religious figures, etc.) who will then draft a written summary. This tool will allow the penitentiary administration to choose the best suited detention regime.

The Central Office for Prison Intelligence ([Bureau central du renseignement pénitentiaire](#) (BCRP)), comprising 400 officers, plays a prominent role in this measures thanks to its first-hand observers which located in prisons. The AP has admitted that “Our department delegates aren’t all fully operational, this may take some time. We have chosen to prioritise human intelligence over technology. Our preliminary results are very encouraging.”

The Ministry of Interior proudly declared that “For every prisoner that is released, the BCRP communicates a very useful report to the intelligence services.

Judicial follow-up

After release from prison, enforcement **judges specialised in anti-terrorism** (juges d'application des peines spécialisés dans l'antiterrorisme (JAPAT) are in charge of the individual's judicial follow-up. Although the aim is to avoid “sharp” releases - i.e. releases without support - conditional releases are uncommon.

In their legal arsenal, the JAPAT may draw a judicial surveillance measure, which consists in enforcing a series of actions ranging from the obligation to answer a summon, to the wearing of a geo-tracked bracelet, or even compulsory medical treatment. Such measures do not apply to those convicted for periods longer than seven years, and who, following assessment, are found to be high-risk in terms of recidivism. Judicial surveillance applies during a period equaling that by which the sentence has been reduced.

Furthermore, judges may direct less dangerous released prisoners towards the RIVE programme. RIVE is an individual support programme which lasts a minimum of six months. Following Paris, an identical programme should open in Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhône).

Intelligence supervision

Once the sentence is served, the judicial system is no longer involved. However, some form of supervision is maintained by the intelligence services. The Ministry of Interior's aim is clear-cut: the General Directorate for Internal Security (Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI) must be informed of all releases. The DGSI has also explained that “systematic” surveillance measures must be implemented. More specifically, these measures can be: tailing or shadowing, administrative surveillance, or drawing up an S Card (fiche S).

Post-release programmes

These prisoners are released later than most inmates. In France, all inmates may ask for adjustment of penalty or early release, under the conditions determined by a judge and framed by the Prison Rehabilitation and Probation Service (SPIP).

Most of those sentenced for terrorism have received a period of unconditional detention representing two thirds of their sentence. When such convicts apply for parole, their request is usually rejected, their sentence is often reduced. The law of July 2016 toughened the enforcement of sentences by excluding terrorists from automatic sentence reduction and certain other penalty adjustments (day parole, suspension or division of sentence. etc.).

Nowadays, over 600 people are monitored by SPIP after release for radicalisation reasons. Some of them have been sentenced or are awaiting trial for terrorism, glorification of terrorism, or for having traveled to Syria. The Research and Intervention for Extremist Violence (RIVE) programme which was launched in Paris in 2016 was created for these profiles with 21 individuals been monitored so far. The programme will be extended to Marseille, Lyon and Lille.

Within this framework, each person is individually monitored by several social workers (including an educator, a psychiatrist and a chaplain) over a year to help them withdraw from extremist violence and reintegrate into the community. This intensive monitoring is based on a mentorship model and ordered by a judge. Further judicial measures can be implemented such as electronic surveillance during a period matching that by which their sentence has been

reduced. For instance, an inmate who leaves prison after six years instead of eight may wear an electronic bracelet during the remaining two years.

Since July 2016, those sentenced for terrorism are automatically registered in the national automated Judicial Database for Terrorist Offenders (Fichier judiciaire national automatisé des auteurs d'infractions terroristes (FIJAIT) and must declare every change of address or travel abroad no later than 15 days before the date of the travel. The offender will also be registered in the Wanted Persons File (Fichier des personnes recherchées (FPR). A specific support programme has been created to supervise radicalised minors after their release from prison.

Detection

Within the framework of the radicalisation supervision policy, assessment is carried out specifically by radicalisation assessment quarters. All those detained for terrorism or radicalisation must go through Radicalisation Assessment Quarters (Quartiers d'évaluation de la radicalisation (QER). These quarters aim at measuring the danger and the degree at which inmates are radicalised. The assessment takes approximately four months, during which various social workers can intervene such as psychologists, religious advisers, or prison and probation counsellors (CPIP). There are six QER in France. The first QER opened in February 2017 at Osny prison.

After having gone through the QER, inmates whose prognostic offence risk is low, may return to ordinary detention. However, those who score high for the risk of attacking a staff member are placed in solitary confinement.

Those whose ideologies are deeply rooted but who do not present a high risk of aggression are redirected towards a Quarter for Radicalisation Supervision (Quartier de prise en charge de la radicalisation (QPR). Out of the 480 the inmates who have undergone assessment, 80% went into ordinary detention, 10% were placed in QPR, and 10% in solitary confinement.

Risk assessment

Considering their various nature and their various uses, assessment tools must be analysed in contrast to supervision programmes, which are gaining momentum in probation practices.

In France, as part of the PREVA action research initiated in October 2014 (assessment programme for people under criminal justice control based on the principles of risk, needs and receptivity), CPIPs in Bordeaux and Paris were offered to test five tools: the LS/CMI, the FACILES-RX, the IREC, SAPROF, and the guide INFO2. This project was created in a context of political affirmation and presents an opportunity to formally evaluate the person under criminal justice control (Personne Placée Sous Main de Justice (PPSMJ). The project meets the needs for uniformisation, for effective practices, for respect and for moving away from the term "dangerousness".

Risk assessments allow to measure the risk posed by an individual, its nature and its degree of severity. Such information helps define the best kind of intervention the individual (inmate or probationer) may need in order to minimise the said risk and use all possibilities towards a positive change while meeting the individual's personal needs.

Risk assessments are a way of highlighting the elements of violent extremism which are considered as concerning and measuring their severity. These elements include:

- beliefs and opinions (ideology, narrative);

- social environment and intentions, including family relationships, groups and networks the person is associated to, and that may influence his or her projects and promote ideological violence;
- a person's capacities regarding his or her antecedents and previously acquired baggage;
- personal and ideological needs at the source of violent extremism.

Risk assessment currently exists in two forms: the gathering, control and analysis of information; and the use of tools specifically aimed at violent extremist delinquents and those suspected of being in the process of radicalisation, or abetting others in it.

These tools include Vera 2, Risk Assessment Extremism for Managing (REM) and the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+).

The VERA-2 53 risk assessment tool formulates specific indicators associating beliefs and attitudes supporting an ideology, historical antecedents and events which may shape one's ideas and beliefs, involvement and motivational factors, and the person's capacity to plan and perform a violent extremist act. These elements are then weighted according to the protection indicators which may alleviate dangerous behaviour.

The guidelines for the ERG22+ risks of extremism stem from studies led by the U.K. government regarding radicalisation processes. They were introduced in 2011 as an assessment tool by the NOMS intervention services task group. This tool is based on 22 primary radicalisation factors. It is used as part of the Channel Vulnerability Assessment (CVA). The same weighting is assigned to each indicator, and one can observe extra factors outside these 22 indicators (each of them split into three areas: involvement, intentions, and capacity factors).

Recidivism assessment measures

In terms of recidivism prevention, since 2007 the French prison administration has chosen to shift towards group supervision. The administration developed a tool used exclusively by the SPIP which may be adapted to inmates as well as to those monitored for an alternative to imprisonment. These Recidivism Prevention Programmes (Programmes de prévention de la récidive (PPR) are commonly applied to sexual offenders.

The PPRs originate from the confrontation between the immediacy of public concern regarding the recidivism of sexual offenders, and a continual questioning on the part of prison administration about the effects and development of such programmes.

Support

After release, ex-prisoners may be subject to a period of unconditional imprisonment, and may therefore, as part of the SPIPs, be required to register for RIVE support programmes. These programmes aim to encourage ex-prisoners to turn away from violent extremism and towards social reintegration in an open environment.

RIVE was created in early 2017 following a public contract tabled by the Prison administration board and carried off by the Association for Applied Criminal Policy and Social Reintegration (Association de politique criminelle appliquée et de réinsertion sociale (APCARS). It addresses the increasing number of legal proceedings dealing with terrorism as well as that of people under criminal justice control who have been reported as being radicalised. This programme

reinforces SPIP's action. Their purpose is to allow the disengagement from violent extremism in open environments through multidisciplinary, individualised, global and intensive support.

The RIVE programme is mandatory for people under criminal justice control in open environments. It is designed to support up to 50 people at a time and focuses on two types of profiles: those prosecuted or convicted for offences linked to a terrorist act; and people detained for non-terrorist offences, but who have been identified as radicalised or in the process of radicalisation by the prison administration. Any kind of violent extremist can be supervised by RIVE.

SPIP directs these people towards the RIVE programme after they have been legally obliged to follow a particular supervision (C. pr. pén., Art. 138-8, 18° ; C. pén., Art. 132-45, 22°) as part of probational measures before and/or after trial (judicial review, house arrest, sentence with probation, electronic supervision, parole, etc.)

RIVE aims at strengthening existing open environment programmes for those under criminal justice control. RIVE comes in addition to and in partnership with the SPIPs, which are nonetheless the main actors in these people's judicial follow-up. This support lasts as long as the judicial measure is effective. However, for maximum effectiveness, the RIVE programme must be followed for at least one year.

The first step of the programme consists in building a bond of trust and completing a multidisciplinary assessment with the individual. The RIVE team identifies the factors which could have led them to violent extremism, their motives and potentialities, as well as the threats they pose, in order to reduce them.

This task usually relies on psycho-criminological tools and allows the preparation of an intensive individualised programme (several hours per week) which is often adjusted according to the individual's evolution.

Various methods are used: individual or paired interviews, administrative help, activities, family counselling, home visits, individual meetings with specialists, restorative justice (upcoming), etc.

This procedure is subject to a dual assessment, regarding its organisation, tools and methods on the one hand, and regarding its impact on the individual's trajectory on the other.

The RIVE team is composed of experienced professionals: social advisers, a clinical psychologist, a cultural adviser, a psychiatrist. Each attendant benefits from a mentoring programme.

RIVE also involves a research dimension which aims at improving knowledge on violent extremism and identifying and activating the levers which can help an individual shift away from violence. Researchers, criminologists and/or various radicalisation specialists may collaborate for RIVE in many ways.

Inmate employment

All provisions must be made for inmates to have the opportunity to work and to access vocational training ([Art. 717-3 of the Code de procédure pénale \(CPP\)](#)). Inmates must be able to work productively and sufficiently, so as to complete a regular day's work. However, the kind of job must depend on the individual's prison regime, on the prison's effective functioning, and on the local employment possibilities ([Art. D. 432-3 of the CPP](#)). This job must be taken into

account when looking at the inmate's behaviour and reintegration possibilities. Upon release, ex-inmates must register at an employment centre. They will then receive temporary unemployment benefit. Only 20% of released inmates find a job within a year of their release. However, 45% of those who have had access to vocational training manage to find a job.

Stakeholder measures

The following measures can increase prison and probation staff capacities/the implementation and improvement of prevention measures/deradicalisation and disengagement programmes:

- Specialised training for all prison staff as well as for partners which may come to operate in the prison environment, for religious contributors, and for NGO staff who may interact with inmates. The purpose of this training is to enable the early detection, prevention and management of potentially radical or extremist behaviour. The training also emphasises the importance of appropriate recruitment and training of religious, philosophic and secular representatives. These representatives must meet the cultural and spiritual needs of prisoners in penitentiary centres, and also contribute to counteracting potential radical narratives.
- Prison educational programmes must be financed in order to encourage critical thinking, religious tolerance, and reintegration into society. Special help must also be provided to young, vulnerable inmates who are more prone to be radicalised or recruited by terrorist organisations. This help must be provided with respect for the inmates' human rights. Additional support measures must also be provided after the inmate's release.

Interdepartmental cooperation

In France, radicalisation prevention policies are multidisciplinary, multi-professional and interdepartmental. The government has established an interdepartmental action plan based on inter-institutional actions:

- protecting people from radicalisation;
- combining detection and prevention;
- understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalisation;
- professionalising local stakeholders and evaluating practices;
- adapting disengagement.

Conclusion and recommendations

The improvement of prevention plans can be made possible through the creation of several more counter-radicalisation units called Radicalisation Prevention Units (Unités de prévention de la radicalisation (UPRA) along with an increase in workforce numbers and funds, more professional Muslim chaplains, and the creation of a database for those accused or convicted of terrorism.

In accordance with the **National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation presented by the French Prime Minister on February 23, 2018**, several new Radicalisation Assessment Quarters (QER) must be opened.

Closed quarters will also be created in 78 facilities, in order to accommodate 1,500 (450 more before the end of 2018) of the most dangerous radicalised individuals. These facilities will all

have recourse to Radicalisation Prevention Programmes (PPRV). Further measures will also be implemented.

During the focus group, participating prison officers' main demand was for more security and appropriate means for the surveillance of radicalised inmates. As the secretary of the Ministry of Justice trade union for the Hauts-de-France region explained: "We have not been trained to manage radicalised inmates. Our colleagues are very annoyed at this."

Another discussant corroborated this: "Usually, we isolate the most dangerous of our inmates, like we did with Salah Abdeslam, and the least dangerous live among their fellow inmates. Nowadays, prison wardens are annoyed because they are understaffed, and they haven't necessarily been trained and are not equipped to deal with such issues." However, he did claim that he had seen some improvements in the past year, notably in terms of prison intelligence: "Prisons used to be completely closed up, so you can say there has been some kind of improvement."

Table 7. List of respondents for France country report

Respondent code	Position	Institution
FR-P1	Prison rehabilitation and probation service director	Prison Rehabilitation and Probation Service
FR-C1	Director, PJJ	Youth Judicial Protection
FR-C2	Prison intelligence lieutenant	Magdelone detention facility
FR-N1	Specialised education support partner	
FR-N2	Psychological support partner	
FR-C3	Detention facility psychologist	
FR-N3		FACE foundation, fighting against discrimination
FR-C4	Muslim preacher	Montpellier detention facility

Greece

Background

In Greece, radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism is mainly politically driven and connected with the outcome of two central traumatic events – the civil war of 1944–1949 and the military dictatorship of 1967–1974.²¹⁷

Considering those two events as the main ideological mechanisms fueling radicalisation and the justification of political violence, we can highlight three broad phases of radicalisation in modern Greece from 1974 onwards:

- Phase 1, post-dictatorship period, 1974-2007. The Greek junta leaders were put on trial and democracy was re-established. Far-left extremism emerges and far-left terrorist groups are formed, led by the November 17 group.
- Phase 2, 2008 – 2010. The police killing of teenager Alexandros Grigoropoulos in December 2008 sparked massive and violent rioting in Athens and other cities across Greece. This period saw anarchist-nihilist terrorism and extremism on both the far left and the far right.
- Phase 3, 2011 to the present. The ratification of austerity measures led to popular unrest, while increased migration flows fueled polarisation between natives and migrants. This period saw more anarchist-nihilist terrorism and extremism on the far left and far right.

At the moment, the main threat is from the far-left and anarchist terrorist organisations. Their ranks are numerous and they are successful in radicalisation and recruitment. On the other hand, far-right extremism is also on the ascent in Greece, while there have been a number of incidents, most notably attacks targeting immigrants, leftists and anarchists, and new groups have been formed.

Another important factor are the links between organised crime and terrorists, sometimes formed in prisons by first and second phase prisoners. Anarchist terrorist organisations in particular seem to have close connections with criminals, at least for the supply of weaponry and explosives.

Islamist radicalisation is not the main local concern but it is one of the major issues southern Europe faces at the regional level. At present, there is no extensive mobilisation of the Muslim population in Greece, but there are a number of risks which the country should manage in order to avoid the escalation of Islamist radicalisation.

The most important risks are the lack of integration among second and third-generation migrants, the absence of a legitimate and credible representative body for the Muslim community, the unofficial mosques, the possible reactions to far-right and racist violence, links between youngsters and foreign radicals using Greece as a transit point, logistics hub, and an escape route to the EU for foreign fighters, and local polarisation in hot spots such as refugee centres.

Regarding the Greek prisons, there are no religion-inspired radicalisation phenomena. On the contrary, several members of politically inspired extremist and terrorist organisations are

²¹⁷For this historical and current background see Karatrantos, T. (2018). "Radicalization in Greece: Trends and Challenges, European Eye on Radicalization", *European Eye on Radicalisation*, 6 June 2018. Available at <https://eeradicalization.com/radicalization-in-greece-trends-and-challenges/>

currently incarcerated in Greek prisons. Moreover, prison and probation services in Greece do not use any specific violence risk assessment methods and tools either for radar observations, or to evaluate issues of vulnerability or potential risk of further (re)offending. However, any approach on the subject matter would not deviate from the usual social enquiry report which assesses issues of social behaviour, mental health, previous aggressive expressions or previous convictions and criminal acts.

When it comes to post-imprisonment, Greece has no tailor-made rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders. The respective Greek programme applies for all criminal offenders. On the other hand, as lack of civic education and unemployment are considered causes of violent extremism, while specific initiatives have been developed in this field.

Radicalisation dynamics

Far-left and anarchist extremism

Notable attacks on Greek soil include those from extreme the leftist groups November 17 (17N), Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), Revolutionary Struggle (EA), and Sect of Revolutionaries (SE). Other attacks were borne from anarchist group Conspiracy of Fire Cells (SPF). More recent violent terrorist groups that have popped up since 2013 include Wild Freedom – Instigator of Social Explosion, the Group of Popular Rebels, and Green Nemesis, an environmental terrorist group.²¹⁸

Revolutionary Organisation November 17 was a Greek far-left militant organisation formed in 1975. 17N conducted an extensive urban guerrilla campaign against the Greek state, banks, and businesses, as well as American, Turkish, and British targets. The organisation committed 103 known armed robbery, assassination, and bombing attacks, during which 23 people were killed. 17N was designated a terrorist group by Greece, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the United States, and disbanded in 2002. Nineteen individuals were charged with some 2,500 offenses relating to the activities of N17. Fifteen of the accused, were found guilty; another four defendants were acquitted for lack of evidence. The convicted members were sentenced on December 2003. All those convicted defendants appealed. On 3 May 2007, the convictions were upheld. In 2018, the group's chief of operations/hitman Dimitris Koufodinas was moved from Korydallos prison to a low-security agricultural facility after the prison council approved his parole request.

Revolutionary Struggle is a Greek group known for its attacks on Greek government buildings and the US Embassy in Athens. It emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of the Greek leftist groups November 17 and Revolutionary People's Struggle. It is designated as a terrorist group by the Greek government, the EU, and the United States. On April 10, 2010, the Greek police arrested six suspected EA members, including their purported leader Nikos Maziotis, who later escaped. On April 3, 2013, five members of EA were convicted, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and another accused EA conspirator, Paula Roupa, were convicted in absentia. Prior to Maziotis's recapture, RS conducted a bomb attack outside a Bank

²¹⁸ See also Counter Extremism Project, *Greece: Extremism & Counter-Extremism*. Available at https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/GR-01222019.pdf

of Greece office in Athens on April 2014; In March 2016, Maziotis was sentenced to life in prison plus 129 years. Roupa was sentenced in absentia to 11 years in prison on misdemeanor charges. In January 2017, Greece arrested Paula Roupa, the country's "no. 1 most wanted" terrorist operative that had been on the run since 2012, returning to anarchist terrorism after having served 18 months in pre-trial detention. In July 2018, she was given a life term plus 25 years in prison.

Conspiracy of Fire Cells (SPF) is a prominent anarchist and anti-authoritarian organisation active in Greece. The group emerged in 2008 with a wave of 11 fire-bombings against luxury car dealerships and banks in Athens and Thessaloniki. In November 2010, SPF carried out a parcel bomb campaign targeting international leaders outside of Greece. On December 2014 convictions of 5 to 27 years of imprisonment were imposed on the 14 defendants who were found guilty of either participating in the terrorist organisation, or of terrorist acts that took place without the veil of the organisation. In March 2017, the group (still in action despite the convictions of its members) claimed responsibility for ten parcel bombs sent to EU leaders, institutions, and multinational companies, including the German Finance Ministry and the International Monetary Fund headquarter in Paris. In July 2019, two prominent members of the group (actually brothers) were released from prison after serving one-third of their sentence under the 4322/2015 Law of the Greek *Penal Code*.²¹⁹ These members were initially sentenced to over 70 years' imprisonment, and each of them, after mergers, had 20 years to serve. In June 2019, a member of SPF known as "The Syntagma Archer" escaped from the agricultural prison of Tyrintha, while in the same month two Anarchist robbers and an associate with alleged ties to SPF were arrested while attempting to rob a money delivery van in the city of Thessaloniki.


The Popular Fighters Group is a Greek left-wing terrorist group that is anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. Formed as a response to the Greek government-debt crisis the group has carried out attacks primarily targeting the Government of Greece and German organisations in Greece. The group is still in action without any arrests noted so far.

According to Europol's *Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018*,²²⁰ in 2017 left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity occurred almost exclusively in Greece compared to all EU Member States.

Table 8. Overview of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2017 per EU Member State and per affiliation

²¹⁹The law lays down measures for prison decongestion in particular.

²²⁰ European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (2018). *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE-SAT 2018)*. Available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018>



Member State	Jihadist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Separatist	Single issue	Not specified	Total
Belgium	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Finland	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
France	11	1	-	42	-	-	54
Germany	1	1	-	-	-	-	2
Greece	-	8	-	-	-	-	8
Italy	1	7	-	-	-	6	14
Spain	2	7	-	7	-	-	16
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
United Kingdom	14	-	5	88	-	-	107
Total	33	24	5	137	0	6	205

Source: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE-SAT 2018).

It is also noted that the anarchist extremist milieu in Greece has provided fertile ground for radicalisation and recruitment. Greek anarchists (e. g. the members of the “anarchist collective” Rouvikonas that was formed in 2013 in the midst of the Greek financial crisis and has since carried more than 50 attacks such as paint throwing, glass smashing, attacking ATMs and occupying monuments against high profile targets) have also supported imprisoned anarchist terrorists with solidarity and fundraising activities. Moreover, they appeared to be somewhat interconnected throughout Europe—exchanging messages of solidarity and sharing propaganda online. Left-wing and anarchist groups in Greece and Italy have claimed to comprise an international network, called Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (FAI/FRI). Moreover, in 2017, Greek authorities arrested three suspected jihadists and 12 suspected left-wing terrorists, compared to 15 suspected jihadists and only one left-wing terrorist in 2016.

Figure 2. Number of failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2017 per EU Member State and per affiliation

Source: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (TE-SAT 2018).

According to Henry Jackson Society report, Greece also saw a significant change, although here the trend was upward, rising from four incidents and 7.41% of the total in 2016 to eight attacks and 11.76% of the total in 2017. This made Greece the fourth, worst affected by terrorism, country that year. Moreover, the country with the most attacks for which no assailant was apprehended was Greece, with ten such attacks across both years.

Table 9. Response to terrorist attacks by authorities in Greece

	2016	%	2017	%	Total	%
Greece	4	7.41%	8	11.76%	12	9.84%
Arrest Post Attack		0.00%	2	2.94%	2	1.64%
Not Apprehended	4	7.41%	6	8.82%	10	8.20%

Source: Wilson, T. (2018). Terrorism in The West: An Age of Extremes. London: The Henry Jackson Society.

According to Europol's 2018 *Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*, left-wing offences continued to bear the highest average prison sentences (10 years) in Europe in 2017, followed by jihadist terrorist offences (5 years), and separatist and right-wing terrorist offences (both 4 years). A comparison across EU Member States shows that Greece handed out exceptionally high prison sentences for terrorism-related charges. With an average sentence of 17 years, Greece greatly exceeds all European countries that penalise terrorists with six or less years of imprisonment on average.

Far-right and ultranationalist extremism

The country's far-right political movement Golden Dawn has grabbed international headlines in recent years. Its rise in popularity during the early 2010s has been attributed in part to the country's failing economy.

Golden Dawn is an extremist neo-Nazi political party with openly anti-immigrant policies. It propagates an extremist Greek supremacy ideology at the exclusion of the country's immigrants, homosexuals, and religious and ethnic minorities. The party appears to have capitalised on the refugee crisis to curry favor with the population. In 2014, Golden Dawn was elected into the European Parliament, taking three of 21 available seats for Greece. Moreover, Golden Dawn leaders finished third in the country's January 2015 election, despite having to run for office from prison. The party was elected in the recent elections of July 2019, though. The group is currently on trial on charges of operating as a criminal organisation.

Golden Dawn members have reportedly carried out the majority of recorded racist attacks in the early 2010s. Following the 2013 murder of anti-fascist Greek rapper Pavlos Fyssas by a Golden Dawn member, almost 70 Golden Dawn members have been charged with belonging to a criminal organisation.

In February 2015, a judicial panel charged 69 defendants—including 18 Golden Dawn MPs of the 2012 parliamentary period—with belonging to a criminal organisation (see reference to Law 187 above), as well as possession of illegal weaponry, extortion, bodily harm and murder. Although the Greek constitution does not permit the possibility of proscription, Golden Dawn is the first political party to be put on trial. Trial began on April 20, 2015 and is still ongoing. In the meantime, all detained Golden Dawn

members have been released because Greek law allows for a maximum pre-trial detention period of 18 months.

Golden Dawn has employed a range of strategies to recruit members, including grassroots mobilisation and participating in neighborhood initiatives. Within the country, Golden Dawn is heavily focused on recruiting from Greek youth population, using gyms, athletic clubs, and martial arts clubs as recruitment grounds.

Golden Dawn has a youth club, Galazia Stratia (Blue Army) that has used bribes to recruit younger members. Members of the Galazia Stratia have also been regular participants and instigators of soccer hooliganism. Within this context, in November 2017, hooligans of the Thessaloniki PAOK soccer club insulted and attacked local Pakistani Muslims who publicly celebrated the birth of the Prophet Mohammed.

Golden Dawn's actions became the reason to formulate Art. 29 of *Law No. 4356/2015* which introduced Art. 361 Bgr CP, according to which, whoever supplies goods or provides services or publicly announces such provision or supply excluding individuals out of contempt because of their race, color, national or ethnic origin, descent, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or characteristics is punished by imprisonment of at least three months (to five years) and a fine of EUR 1,500 to EUR 15,000. The participation of two or more persons in the act constitutes an aggravating case and is punishable by imprisonment of at least six months (to five years) and a fine of EUR 5,000 to EUR 25,000 euros. The new article of the *Penal Code* was directed, first of all, against Golden Dawn, whose activists aggressively practiced free distribution of food stuffs during religious holidays to "clean" Greeks, and donations of "clean Greek" blood.

Moreover, in March 2018, the Greek police arrested several members of Combat 18 Hellas, a neo-Nazi group that has reportedly carried out more than 30 attacks on anarchist squats, left-wing social centres and Jewish memorials. Hellenic Police arrested 11 suspected members of the organisation, seven of whom faced charges of running a criminal organisation. Four out of the seven were detained, while the rest were temporarily released under restrictive conditions.

Facts that are related to far-right extremism are being recording systemically, while as influencing factors the role of Golden Dawn, and the alarming existence of incitement to racial hatred in the public discourse are specifically indicated.²²¹ Greece regularly reports hate crime data to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the State Security headquarters of the Greek Police collect hate crime data. Also, Greece's *Penal Code* contains a general penalty-enhancement provision for hate crimes as presented below.

Law No. 4285/2014 amending Law No. 927/1979 and adjustment to the Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008

²²¹ See Council of Europe (2015). *European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Report on Greece*, (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 10 December 2014, published on 24 February 2015, <https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-greece/16808b5796>, cited in: Pitsela, A. & Chatzisprou, T. "Criminal policy developments against racism in Greece", in: Spinellis, C. D. et al (eds.) (2017). *Crime in Crisis: Essays in Honour of Nestor Courakis*. Athens: Editions Ant. N. Sakkoulas Limited Partnership. Available at http://crime-in-crisis.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/73-PITSELA-KOURAKIS-FS_Final_Draft_26.4.17.pdf

(1) "Anyone, who publicly incites, provokes, or stirs, either orally or through the press, the Internet, or any other means, acts of violence or hatred against a person or group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability, in a manner that endangers the public order and exposes the life, physical integrity, and freedom of persons defined above to danger, will be punished by imprisonment of three months to three years and a fine of EUR 5,000 to EUR 20,000.

(2) Anyone, who publicly incites, provokes, or stirs, either orally or through the press, the Internet, or any other means, acts of destruction against the assets of a person or group of persons defined by reference to race, color, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability, in a manner that endangers the public order and exposes the life, physical integrity, and freedom of persons defined above to danger, will be punished by imprisonment of three months to three years and a fine of EUR 5,000 to EUR 20,000.²²²

Table 10. Hate crimes recorded by the Greek police

Year	Hate crimes recorded by police	Prosecuted	Sentenced
2017	128	46	6
2016	40	6	2
2015	60	27	4
2014	71	29	5
2013	109	9	0

Source: *Hate Crime Reporting. (2017). Greece.*²²³

Also, in 2011, the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) was established at the initiative of the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) and the Office of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees in Greece (UNHCR), along with the participation of non-governmental organisations and bodies. The programme systematically monitors and records racially motivated acts of violence, and analyses trends of racist violence in Greece. The RVRN shares its findings with Greek authorities, alerts them to developments in hate crime, and provides recommendations to the Greek government for tackling racist violence. Moreover, the RVRN organises training programmes for civil society and institutional bodies on how to identify, record, and combat hate crime.

From January to December 2018, the RVRN documented, through interviews with victims, 117 incidents of racist violence, with more than 130 victims. In 74 incidents the victims were: migrants or refugees assaulted on grounds of ethnic origin, religion,

²²² Greek *Penal Code*, available at <http://www.c00.org/p/greek-penal-code.html> See also, **Tourkochoriti, I.** (2016). "The New Regulation against Hate Speech in Greece: Strengths and Weaknesses". *CritCom*, 20 February 2015. Available at <http://critcom.councilforeuropeanstudies.org/the-new-regulation-against-hate-speech-in-greece-strengths-and-weaknesses/>

²²³ Hate Crime Reporting (2017). *Greece*, <http://hatecrime.osce.org/greece>. ODIHR observes that Greece has not reported on cases of hate crimes separately from cases of hate speech.

colour, associations of third country nationals, human rights defenders due to their connection with refugees and migrants, as well as a memorial to the victims of shipwrecks. In six incidents, Greek citizens were targeted due to their colour, foreign or ethnic origin. In nine incidents, the targets were Jewish sacred or symbolic places and the Jewish community and in one incident the target was a Greek citizen due to educational activity against anti-Semitism or perceived religion. In 27 incidents the targets were LGBTQI+ persons, including five refugees, asylum-seekers and EU citizens. In 59 incidents more than one victim was targeted, whereas in 63 incidents the assault was committed by a group of at least two people.²²⁴

Islamist extremism

Islamist radicalisation is not the main local concern, but it is one of the major issues southern Europe faces at the regional level. At present, there is no extensive mobilisation of the Muslim population in Greece, but there are a number of risks which the country should manage in order to avoid the escalation of Islamist radicalisation.

The most important risks are the lack of integration among second and third generation migrants, the absence of a legitimate and credible representative body for the Muslim community, the unofficial mosques, the possible reactions to far-right and racist violence, links between youngsters and foreign radicals using Greece as a transit point, logistics hub, and an escape route to the EU for foreign fighters, and local polarisation in hot spots such as refugee centres.

Radicalisation risks in prisons

Overview of the Greek penitentiary system

The form of the Greek prison system is regulated by: the Greek *Penal Code* (*Greek Law 2776/1999*); the internal rules of procedures for the type A/type B prisons (*Ministerial Decision 55819/2003*, Off. Gaz. B' 463) and for the Special Premises of Young Persons (*Ministerial Decision 62367/2005*, Off. Gaz. B' 463); Safety Regulation of Prisons (*Ministerial Decision 104356/2014*, Off. Gaz. B' 3581); the legislation about the external guard (*Greek Laws 2721/1999*, *3388/2005*, *Presidential Decrees 265/1999* and *215/2006*)

Bodies of penal policy

According to the *Penal Code* the architecture of the penitentiary policy system is divided between bodies with different roles which serves the need for not only a core strategic direction but also for the per prison implementation of the strategic initiatives and laws. The bodies of penal policy in Greece are:

- General Anti-Crime Policy Secretary responsible for conducting the Strategic Plan of Penitentiary System.²²⁵
- Central Scientific Prisons' Council which advises for policy-making in the field of sentences' execution and security measures.²²⁶
- The Central Transfer Commission responsible for facilitating inmates' transfers to places of interrogation and the court or any other public authority.²²⁷

²²⁴ *Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) Annual Report 2018*. Available at <http://rvrn.org/2019/04/rvrn-annual-report-2018/>

²²⁵ Art. 5 of the *Greek Law 2776/1999*.

²²⁶ Art. 6 of the *Greek Law 2776/1999*.

- The Prison's Council which specifies the penitentiary policy of the Ministry of Justice in the prison. The Council comprises the director of the prison, a psychologist or a social worker, and a sociologist or criminologist.²²⁸

There should be a special reference to the Body of Prisons' Inspection which is responsible for the regular or not tactical visits in prisons in order to examine the condition and the protection of the inmates' rights, the staff's duties and the right implementation of the *Penal Code*.

Finally, the *Penal Code* is referred to EPANODOS P.L.E. that aims on the vocational training of prisoners and released prisoners, rehabilitation, financial assistance, and preparation and promotion of their overall social reintegration.²²⁹ Its actions include encouragement, support and utilisation of initiatives of non-profit bodies or voluntary organisations about avoiding social exclusion (Art. 2 case c of P.D. 300/2003 [GG A 256]).

The work of EPANODOS also includes the preparation and support of adult and juvenile released prisoners for their social reintegration and promotion in the employment market. To this direction, the body provides psychological, legal and employment counseling and support to persons released from prison.²³⁰

Equal treatment

The Greek Penitentiary system is promoting the equal treatment of the prisoners. No sex, color, religious, ideological, etc. discrimination is allowed. However, any special treatment is justified if there are special needs (nutrition, religious duties, professional or academic activities etc.).²³¹

Separation of the inmates²³² and selection of prison

The separation of the inmates in Greek prisons depends on the reason of custodial measure (in custody, convict, debtor, foreigners under deportation) and their condition (sex, age, mental health).

For the selection of detention facilities, the segregation and the specialisation of the treatment of detainees is taking into account the detention phase and their living conditions (they are in a transitional phase of information and adaptation immediately after their entry into the detention facility, they have previous experience of confinement in one or more detention facilities, etc.).

Detention centres

The detention centres are divided into general, special and therapeutic detention centres. The general detention centres are further divided to type A (for inmates awaiting trial and for convicted inmates who serve short-term prison sentences) and type B (for inmates convicted to long-term prison sentences, lifers included). Type C detention centres (high-security prisons) have stopped operating in Greece since 2015. However, the latest government has planned to reinstate this type of prisons.

²²⁷Art. 7 of the Greek Law 2776/1999

²²⁸Art. 8 of the Greek Law 2776/1999

²²⁹Art. 86 of the Greek Law 2776/1999.

²³⁰See <http://www.epanodos.org.gr/>

²³¹Art. 3 of the Greek Law 2776/1999.

²³²Art. 11 of the Greek Law 2776/1999.

The number and type of detention centres operating in Greece are as follows:²³³ 22 general detention centres; 4 special detention centres for young persons; 3 therapeutic detention centres (general and mental hospitals and drug detoxification centres); 5 prison camps.

Statistical data of inmates

The total number of inmates as of July 16, 2019 is 10,495. However, the total available spaces in prison cells are 9,935.²³⁴ The overpopulation of Greek prisons is a main issue which affects the living conditions of the inmates. It creates distress, riots and may have consequences in fueling radicalisation and extremist ideologies. In 2015, efforts for prison decongestion were made under the *Law 4322/2015 entitled Reforms of penal provisions, abolishment of type C detention facilities and other provisions*. This law attempted to address directly the serious issues of the penitentiary system, which has "legalised" a distorted perception and practice regarding the correct penal and correctional treatment. The letter and the spirit of this provision focus on: less prisoners, less time of incarceration, particular attention to special cases, implementation of alternative detention measures.

Probation service

The structure²³⁵ of the Greek probation service is described below.

The Department of Social Support is responsible for the support and monitoring of offenders who are released under condition or have been convicted to a suspended sentence under supervision, or to whom restrictive conditions have been imposed by court decision or by order of the prosecutor. They are also responsible for writing reports regarding prisoners awaiting trial or offenders to whom restrictive conditions have been imposed.

The Department of Community Service is responsible for liaising with local organisations in order to find and guarantee workplaces for the implementation of community service schemes. It also submits proposals to the competent prosecutor for the supervision of orders, the determination of the terms of specific orders, as well as for the initiation of breach proceedings.

The Department of Administrative Support deals with the observation of protocol and file, the distribution of correspondence, the observation of official files of personnel, and the cleanness of spaces and operation the equipment.

The Departments of Social Support and of Community Service have some competences in common, e.g. the formulation of proposals for the more effective operation of service, the commission, per quarter, of reports on the activities of probation officers, including statistic data on the work of the service, the observation of relative files, books and supporting documentation on the affairs handled by the service.

The number of staff employed by probation agencies and persons under the supervision of probation agencies in 2018 in Greece²³⁶ was as follows: total number of

²³³Ministry of Justice, General Anticrime Policy Secretariat. *Strategic Plan for the Penitentiary System 2018-2020*. Available at: <http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/site/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ayLLhES531Q%3d&tabid=492>

²³⁴<http://www.ministryofjustice.gr/site/en/PenitentiarySystem/Statisticaldataondetainees.aspx>

²³⁵ *Presidential Decree 195/2006*.

²³⁶ Aebi, M. F., & Hashimoto, Y. Z. (2018). *SPACE II – 2018 – Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics: Persons under the supervision of Probation Agencies*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Available at: http://wp.unil.ch/space/files/2019/05/SPACE-II_report_2018_Final_190520.pdf

staff – 83, top-level executives at the regional probation administrations ²³⁷–1, senior probation officers (chiefs of units)²³⁸ – 31, probation officers (qualified probation staff)²³⁹ – 38, probation agency officers (unqualified probation staff)²⁴⁰ – 5, other staff – 8. The total number of probationers in Greece is 19,927.

Concerning probation measures/alternative sanctions, Art. 100 of the Greek *Penal Code* provides probation measures if the following general circumstances are met:

- imprisonment for more than three years;
- absence of prior irrevocable criminal sentence for felony or misdemeanor of more than one year.

If the above conditions are met, a conditional suspension of the sentence is granted, under the supervision of a probation officer.

Probation measures/alternative sanctions could be classified as follows, depending on the procedural stage:

Alternative measures to pre-trial detention²⁴¹

Home detention with electronic monitoring may be imposed only in felony cases following request by the accused, and provided that he/she has a fixed place of residence and other restrictive conditions are not regarded sufficient (according to Art. 282 paragraphs 2-3, 283A *CPP* as amended by *Law 4205/2013*). The measure is imposed on condition that the expenses are prepaid by the accused, unless it is proved the he or she is unable to pay, in which case the state undertakes to cover the expenses. The accused also has the obligation to report his or her place of residence and any change of address to the investigating judge. Compliance to the imposed restrictive conditions is supervised by the police authorities.

Admittance to a drug treatment programme is declared by the director of the drug treatment organisation and compliance is monitored by the programme personnel who are obliged to submit regular progress reports to the investigating authority. In case of breach of the restrictive conditions, they may be replaced with remand detention.

Pre-trial detention may be imposed as a last resort, after restrictive conditions have been considered as inadequate, under strict requirements which should lead to a reasoned judgment that the accused person intends to abscond or there is a high probability of re-offending (Art. 282, Para. 4 *CPP*).

Pre-trial detention may be replaced with restrictive conditions. Especially in the case of participation in a drug treatment programme by order of the judicial council, a request by the remanded detainee is needed, provided that the he or she has been admitted to an official drug treatment programme (Art. 31c, *Law 4139/2013*). The involvement of the probation service at the pre-trial/trial stage is very limited, although preparing pre-sentence reports and supervising persons on restrictive conditions awaiting trial are within its statutory tasks.

²³⁷ Managerial position.

²³⁸ Senior probation officers are local chiefs of units and are qualified officers employed to manage and account for the work of teams of probation officers and staff.

²³⁹ Staff that possess specific qualifications (e.g. diplomas in probation or social work) employed for specific tasks related to supervision of persons under various CSM or probation sanctions and measures.

²⁴⁰ Staff employed to assist qualified probation officers. Generally, they have no specific qualifications in the probation field, but may have done some short training (e.g. management of the probation files, etc.)

²⁴¹ Koulouris, N. Aloskofis, W., Vidalis, S., Koros, D., and Spyrea, S. (2015). *Alternatives to prison in Europe- Greece*. Rome: European Prison Observatory. Available at: <http://www.prisonobservatory.org/alternatives/ALTERNATIVES%20TO%20PRISON%20IN%20EUROPE.%20GREECE.pdf>

Sentence calculation stage²⁴²

- suspension of execution of the sentence under certain conditions and under supervision (Art. 100 of the *Penal Code*);
- suspension of execution of the sentence under the condition of the follow-up of a treatment programme for dependent users (Art. 32, Para. 1c of *Law 4139/2013*);
- conversion of the sentence into social work (Art. 82, Para. 5-7 of the *Penal Code*).

At the stage of the sentence assessment²⁴³

- execution of the sentence at home;
- home detention with electronic surveillance (Art. 110B and 110C of the *Penal Code*);
- prisoners' leaves (Art. 54-58 of the *Penitentiary Code*);
- early dismissal for the continuation of treatment programme out of prison (Art. 35 Para. 1 of *Law 4139/2013*).

Individualisation of probation programmes²⁴⁴

In the case of unsupervised alternatives, the guiding principle is the preventive potential of the threat of imprisonment. The amount for the monetary conversion of a custodial sentence is defined after the personal and social circumstances and the financial condition and obligations of the offender are taken into account. This consideration, though, is usually casual, without a prior substantial investigation of facts. With the payment of the defined amount of the monetary conversion, the custodial sentence is considered as fully served. Unsupervised suspension of the sentence is ordered on the condition not to re-offend, without the imposition of additional obligations, so there is no ground for an individualised programme to be implemented.

In supervised alternatives for adults, probation officers use basic social work methodology, such as counselling and motivational interviewing. Supervision is individualised in the sense that probation officers intervene to assist offenders or to enforce court orders. At the decision stage, though, obligations are pronounced by the competent judicial authorities without sufficient information on the situation of the accused person. On the other hand, juvenile law is oriented to rehabilitation and educational interventions.

The probation service for juvenile offenders has been operating as a separate public service since the 1950s. It constitutes an important integral partner in the juvenile court procedure, mediating between the court and the juvenile, writing social enquiry reports, proposing the appropriate individualised treatment of the juvenile offender and undertaking the implementation of the chosen measures. Lack of such reports is a reason for the court to postpone the hearing of the case.

²⁴² Hellenic Parliament (2018), Report of the Special Permanent Committee of Penitentiary System, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/510129c4-d278-40e7-8009-e77fc230adef/ekthesi%20%CE%99%CE%96-%CE%93%20sofronistikou.pdf>

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Koulouris, N. Aloskofis, W., Vidali, S., Koros, D., and Spyrea, S. (2015). *Alternatives to prison in Europe- Greece*. Rome: European Prison Observatory, <http://www.prisonobservatory.org/alternatives/ALTERNATIVES%20TO%20PRISON%20IN%20EUROPE.%20GREECE.pdf>

Key radicalisation risks in Greek prisons

The Korydallos prison complex in Piraeus is Greece's main "Type B" maximum-security prison. It is the largest prison in Greece for both male and female prisoners. In May 2008, the women prisoners section was transferred to the Thiva prison complex, following years of protests and complaints to the government by the Korydallos municipality and inhabitants.

In January 2014, the convicted 17 November member Christodoulos Xiros escaped from Korydallos prison during a scheduled 8-day leave from prison in order to visit his family. According to the restraint order,²⁴⁵ Christodoulos Xiros was in home detention and he was supposed to show up every day at the Police Department of N. Kallikratia in Northern Greece. On the last day of his leave he did not show up. Following the escape, the authorities of Hellenic Police confirmed the close relationship and the frequent visits within prison between Christodoulos Xiros and the imprisoned members of the Conspiracy of Fire Cells, as it is strongly believed that the latter helped him organise his escape. Moreover, members of SPF had attempted to escape from Korydallos prison in December 2011, along with a notorious long-term convict. This case has shown that within Greek prison the risk of osmosis not only among old and new terrorists, but also between terrorism and organised crime is present. Prison leave conditions in their turn present a high risk of no return of the prisoner. After this incident, the Ministry of Justice reexamined the detention conditions and treatment of prisoners in order to avoid probation violations in the future.

Data from 2017 shows that the Korydallos prison was overcrowded with its 1,721 inmates,²⁴⁶ instead of the 1,396 it has been designed. A significant factor in these excessive numbers is the high percentage of pre-trial prisoners being held there rather than, as would normally be the case, in lower-security "Type A" prisons. Radicalisation within the prison is a major issue, while it is related not only with political-driven-factors but also with violent "gangs" coming from organised crime ranks.²⁴⁷

Response and institutional needs

Legal framework

Greek criminal law has adopted the trichotomy of criminal offenses into petty offenses, misdemeanors and serious crimes. The Greek *Penal Code* avoids using these terms, unless this is dictated for the clarity of the provision. On the contrary, it sets out the objective constitutive elements of the offense and threatens a specific sanction, the severity of which denotes whether it is characterised as a petty offense, misdemeanor or serious crime.²⁴⁸

Greek legislation does not include any provisions specifically referring to radicalisation. Nevertheless, the Greek *Penal Code* codifies the terrorism statute under Art. 187A. The definition of a terrorist act incorporates a broad list of crimes, thus covering actions deemed to be terrorist as reflected in international instruments dealing with the fight against terrorism. Both Art. 187A and the relevant provisions of the part of generic provisions of the *Penal Code*

²⁴⁵<https://www.newsit.gr/egklhma/i-penthimeri-adeia-ton-eksi-imeron-toy-xristodoyloy-ksiroy-oi-pente-oroi-poiouy-mporoyse-na-vlepei-pote-epepe-na-gyrisei-sti-fylaki-ta-eggrafa/1657146/>

²⁴⁶<https://www.newsbeast.gr/society/arthro/2702968/posi-kratoumeni-chorane-stis-ellinikes-filakes>

²⁴⁷<http://www.ekathimerini.com/236798/article/ekathimerini/news/emergency-meeting-called-over-prison-violence>

²⁴⁸ Anagnostopoulos, I. & Magliveras, K. (2000). "Criminal Law in Greece", *International Encyclopaedia of Laws (IEL) / Criminal Law Series*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

criminalise participation in acts of terrorism in all its forms. Domestic legislation is also shaped by the transposition of all relevant EU laws pertaining to issues of terrorism and organised crime. *Laws 2928/2001, 3251/2004, 3691/2008 and 3875/2010*, and Art. 187 and 187A of the Greek *Penal Code* regulate the issue of terrorism and organised crime in Greece.

Law 2928/2001 entitled *Modification of Provisions of the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure and Other Provisions for the Citizens' Protection from Criminal Acts of Criminal Organisations* was adopted in June 2001, and amended the *Penal Code* and the *Code of Penal Procedure*. The Law was presented as anti-mafia, and lacked an explicit legal definition of terrorism. Instead, terrorist groups were included in the definition of criminal organisations under Art. 187 of the *Penal Code*, which also defined terrorist and organised criminal acts and their respective sanctions. *Law 2928/2001* criminalised the formation of and participation in a terrorist or criminal organisation/gang, and the threat or preparation of using terrorist or organised violence. It also gave the police greater powers in countering terrorism and organised crime, and created Greece's first-ever witness protection programme. Moreover, it eliminated the use of jurors during trials and replaced them with a three-judge panel, while it transferred the crimes committed by criminal organisations under the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court of Appeals.

Law 3251/2004 entitled *European Arrest Warrant and Confrontation of Terrorism*, amended the earlier *Law 2928/2001* in part by specifically defining terrorism as "an act committed in such a way or to such an extent or under such circumstances that it could seriously damage a country or an international organisation, and is aimed at inducing fear among the population or forcing illegally any public authority or international organisation to proceed to an act or to refrain proceeding to it or to seriously harm or destroy the fundamental constitutional, political or economic structure of a country or an international organisation". Moreover, *Law 3251/2004* sanctioned lone-actor terrorists, increased the statute of limitations on terrorism-related crimes from 20 to 30 years, increased prison terms for terrorist leaders, and heavily sanctioned those who threaten or prepare to commit a terrorist crime.

Law 3691/2008 entitled *Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and Other Provisions* came into force on August, 5 2008. *Law 3691/2008*, as it is in effect after its amendments,²⁴⁹ aimed to improve the legislation on the prevention and countering of money laundering and terrorist financing, and to safeguard the financial system from the risks which accompany such offences. The Law incorporated into the national legislation the provisions of *Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and the European Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing*. Additionally, it incorporated certain provisions of *Directive 2006/70/EC of the European Commission* and replaced specific provisions of *Law 2331/1995*. More specifically, *Law 3691/2008* defined the actions that are regarded as money laundering and terrorist financing; the natural and legal persons that are obliged to take due diligence measures against their customers; the standard due diligence measures that should be taken; and the relevant sanctions. To further combat terrorist financing, Greece operates an Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigation Authority

²⁴⁹ *Law 3932/2011* (Government Gazette No. 49 A') entitled *On the Authority for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and Source of Funds Investigations*, *Law 4021/2011* (Government Gazette No. 218/A/3) entitled *Reinforced Credit Institutions' Supervisory and Resolution Measures - Regulation of Financial Issues - Validation of the Framework Agreement of the European Financial Stability Fund and its amendments and other provisions*, *Law 4099/2012* (Government Gazette No. 50/A/20) entitled *Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities. Implementation of Directives 2009/65/EC, 2010/78/EC, 2010/73/EC, 2011/96/EC, 2009/133/EC, 2004/113/EC and Other Provisions*.

pursuant to *Law 3932/2011*. The Authority comprises three units including the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the Financial Sanctions Unit (FSU), and the Source of Funds Investigation Unit (SFIU). The units work together to collect, investigate, and analyse suspicious transaction reports (STRs) forwarded from both legal entities and civilians. Greece is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

Law 3875/2010 modified Art. 187A of the Greek *Penal Code*, stating that serious threat to cause terror shall be punished with imprisonment of at least two years. It also criminalises acceding to a terrorist organisation, defined as “a structured group with a continuous activity, consisting of three or more persons acting jointly and with the purpose of committing [a terrorist offence]”.

There is no specific law for the incitement of a terrorism-related crime; instead, Art. 184 and 185 of the Greek *Penal Code* penalise public incitement to commit a terror offence, in addition to the public glorification, in any way, of an offence that has been committed, thus endangering public order.

Finally, regarding the administration of prison population and specifically the treatment of prisoners, for the time being there are no national measures from relevant legislation on radicalised prisoners.

Post release / response activities

Psychological assistance, counseling, education, training and support are key factors for the successful professional and social reintegration of people may have been subjected to radicalisation before or during their imprisonment.

The Role of NGOs

In Greece, there are several NGOs whose aim to guarantee prisoners’ smooth integration back into society, their education, and the protection of their rights:

- The European Prison Education Association (EPEA) Hellas Branch²⁵⁰ works to promote education in prison according to the *Recommendation No. R (89) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States of the Council of Europe* (1989) as well as to support and assist the professional development of persons involved in education in prison through european co-operation, to work with related professional organisations, to support research in the field of education in prison, and to monitor and support the development of prison education in Greece.
- EPANODOS P.L.E.²⁵¹ works in the following area of vocational training of prisoners and released prisoners, rehabilitation, financial assistance, and preparation and promotion of their overall social reintegration. Its actions include encouragement, support and utilisation of initiatives of non-profit bodies or voluntary organisations about avoiding social exclusion.
- The PRAKSIS Post Release Reception Centre in Athens²⁵² deals with the reintegration of both male and female ex-prisoners. It provides guidance and information to released prisoners, regardless of their gender or ethnicity, about

²⁵⁰<http://www.epea.org/portfolio/epea-hellas/>

²⁵¹<http://www.epanodos.org.gr/en/web/guest/archike>

²⁵²<https://bit.ly/2ZwxLjn>

the institutions/organisation they can address depending on their demands. PRAKSIS provides medical support; psychosocial support, strengthening and development of skills, so as to achieve social integration; legal counseling; promoting employment through the comprehensive preparation of ex-prisoners for their return to the labour market.

Counter and de-radicalisation initiatives

Prevention policies of the Hellenic Police

The Hellenic Police has developed an Anti-Corruption Policy Programme, 2015-2019, which constitutes a central point of reference for all police services. This programme, which is a sequel of the Crime Policy Programme 2010-2014, attempts to rationalise prevention and repression of crime with the ultimate goal of ensuring citizens' safety, without sacrificing citizens' rights.

The Strategic and Operational Programme of the Hellenic Police (2015-2019) (SOPHP) aims to record the basic guidelines to which the services of Hellenic Police should be oriented in the period 2015-2019. SOPHP has several strategic and operational axes which concern the organisational structure of the police, the management of human resources, the logistical equipment in the operating budget as a whole and by organisational structure, the key strategic and operational objectives, modernisation and development, and cooperation with other authorities, services and agencies, in particular with local government agencies.

National Strategy to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism (under consultation). The Hellenic Police has taken the initiative to prepare a plan on national strategy for countering terrorism, which will also covers issues of violent extremism and radicalisation. This plan, after being approved by the political leadership of the Ministry of Citizen Protection, will constitute the basis of consultation between the competent ministries, for the elaboration and adoption of the national strategy.

European networks and initiatives

Greece participates in the High Level Commission's Expert Group Radicalisation (HLCEG-R), the Steering Board Prevent Policymakers Secretariat, and the Radicalisation Awareness Network – Police and Local (RAN Pol and RAN Local). Within the framework of the above initiatives, Greece's priorities are:

- prison and probation, rehabilitation and reintegration;
- exchange of best practices and ideas/multiagency cooperation;
- identifying and addressing the risk of radicalisation of individuals belonging to groups requiring particular attention.
- communication and countering online propaganda;
- education and social inclusion.

Interagency cooperation

Although in previous years the exchange of data and information between Greek authorities was regarded with suspicion by them, today, there is a non-typical network of police, ministries and other agencies (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Digital Policy, General Secretariat of Integration, General Secretariat of Roma etc.) that ensures the exchange of information in a non-typical or constituted way. This effort has been empowered

by the Hellenic Police after the sharing of the Manual for the Signs of Radicalisation to the ministries or agencies in charge. Thus, the police raised awareness about a problem that should have a multilevel solution and approach.

The Center for Security Studies (KEMEA), a scientific, consulting and research agency under the Minister of Citizen Protection, whose purpose is to conduct theoretical and applied research and to perform studies, particularly at the strategic level, on security policies, also performs a variety of activities aimed at countering radicalisation:

- cooperation with the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN);
- synergies with local government agencies;
- thematic workshops for the enhancement of multi-agency cooperation regarding the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism;
- training of first-line practitioners that are dealing with radicalisation and violent extremism;
- creation of educational useful pocket-size manuals and distribution to end-users and the competent agencies;
- intercultural trainings promoting the understanding of third-countries citizens culture.

Post-imprisonment

When it comes to post-imprisonment, Greece has no tailor-made rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders. The respective Greek programme applies for all criminal offenders. Its main components consist of individual and family counseling, and escort to services when in need of social support (accommodation, catering, job search, health and sanitation problems, income, social solidarity and financial independence, etc.).

Further, as lack of civic education and unemployment are considered causes of violent extremism, specific initiatives have been developed in this field. Currently, 12 Second-Chance Schools (SCS) are in operation, educating 692 inmates at high-school level, with opportunities to continue their education after release and pursue higher education. Similarly, 3 Public Institutions for Professional Development are qualifying 87 inmates for employment, facilitating their reintegration and socio-economic resilience. In this framework, a variety of other educational programmes and vocational training, as well as sport and cultural activities (creational activities, volunteering, theatre, art workshops, etc.) contribute to their rehabilitation and return to society.

In light of the above, such initiatives and programmes require the engagement and cooperation of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, namely public authorities and agencies and the competent ministries, and other more specialised services such as drug rehabilitation, mental health services, etc. When cooperation within the reintegration and rehabilitation process is not provisioned by law, then it is applied on a voluntary basis.

Recently, a research project is being implemented by the Ministry of Justice, aiming to develop the existing rehabilitation and reintegration programme for inmates close to release that will engage probation officers in preparing inmates at least 3-6 months prior to release and continue support until release.

The educational level of inmate in Greek prisons is rather revealing and the numbers go as follows: illiterate – 1,484, with primary education – 2,355, with secondary education – 3,639, and with tertiary education – 627.

Since 1984, the General Secretariat for Lifelong Learning has been implementing educational and vocational programmes for inmates, as well as counseling programmes, and in the last decade it has also included programmes of psychosocial support for inmates. In cooperation with the Youth and Lifelong Learning Foundation, there has been an effort to organise a network of activities of formal and non-formal education in this field.

In 2004, the innovative institution of SCS was introduced in Greek prisons. SCS are attended by adults who have graduated from primary school and have not completed lower secondary education. In 2004, the first SCS started operating in the judiciary prison in Larisa. Since then, SCSs have been set up in several prisons of the country, i.e. in Korydallos (Ahtens), in Grevena (region of Southern Macedonia), in Larisa and in Trikala (region of Thessalia), in Diavata Salonica (region of Central Macedonia), in Eleonas Thives (region of Continental Greece) and in late 2014 – in Domokos, which has now suspended its operation. The decision of the Greek state to set up SCS in prisons, according to the equivalent European plan of action, clearly shows the need for holistic education for inmates, aiming at the trainees' general development and participation in financial, social and cultural life, as well as at their more effective participation in the labour market. The SCSs constitute an institution of social justice and offer inmates a second chance for a fresh start in life, changing their way of thinking and helping them make the right choices. The education provided by SCS is systematic and continual, and leads to the acquisition of a certificate equivalent to the one of lower secondary school. The full course extend over two academic years, for 18 months in total.

Conclusion and recommendations

Following the elections of July 7, 2019, the appointed Minister of Citizen Protection Michalis Chrysochoidis, in his programmatic statement, set as a priority the prevention of radicalisation and organised crime, declaring that "in our democracy there is no room for terrorism". Radicalisation can be countered through prevention. One of the main four objectives of anti-criminal policy²⁵³ is to formulate a new, modern criminal and punitive policy, with interventions on prisoners' living conditions and with respect for human rights. At the same time, the Minister has announced changes in order to empower the citizens' sense of security, transferring the prison system's competences from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Citizen Protection.

In his statement, the minister has also pointed out: "Nowadays, in democratic countries, it is impossible to fight crime and delinquency if rights are violated. The two are not separate. They always stay together. The Ministry has a strategic choice. Home security, city safety, security in the country. And the prerequisite for us to achieve security is this: the Ministry of Citizen Protection should be a Ministry of Citizens' Rights Protection. We need to mention that the situation in prisons in recent years is out of order. The rights have been violated by the organised crime. Organised crime killers murder innocents inside and outside prisons". The statement has further underlined that the safety of prisoners and officials will be restored and the prison will produce penitentiary work. Especially for the abolition of Korydallos Prison, he said that actions are already being taken to establish a non-urban penitentiary within Attica, near a major road for easy access.

²⁵³<http://www.ekathimerini.com/242840/article/ekathimerini/news/citizens-protection-minister-outlines-four-priorities>

Last but not least, it seems that the penitentiary system will be at the centre of attention of the new Greek government, as according to their pre-election statements,²⁵⁴ they intend to restore the highest security prisons (type C) for unrepentant terrorists.

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²⁵⁴<http://www.ekathimerini.com/240632/article/ekathimerini/news/supreme-court-to-rule-tuesday-on-koufodinas-leave>

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Italy

Background

It is undeniable that the attention of public opinion with regard to terrorism and, in particular, to the phenomenon that is called jihadism, has become a key issue on the national and international agenda.

In addition, special attention has been devoted on radicalisation dynamics in the prison environment as a place which might drive vulnerable people to become terrorists. Consensus on the role of the prison environment in facilitating radicalisation is lacking and it is worth studying the position of Professor Useem²⁵⁵ as an alternative view on this issue.

Of course, while it has to be remembered that only a small number of prisoners has been really radicalised,²⁵⁶ it is very important to remain vigilant about possible radicalisation paths inside and outside prisons.²⁵⁷ In fact, the radicalisation dynamics in prison has not been thoroughly studied, above all due to the difficulties in collecting useful information.²⁵⁸

Italy started to be concerned about the topic some years later in comparison to other European countries (above all because from a demographical point of view, the first group of immigrants of second generation has only become adult in recent years), instituting a targeted system of prevention with a multilevel approach that will be discussed in this chapter.

According to Vidino,²⁵⁹ Italy was one of the first European countries to experience a quite strong jihadist presence since the 1990s due to the activism of the North African group. At the start of 2000, though, when most European countries were facing an increasing threat placed by jihadist networks of foreigners and homegrown extremists, the Italian scene was relatively quiet.

Since the beginning it has been possible to identify arrested terrorists as mostly the lone-wolf type. This means that the Italian context is more subject to the action of people that do not belong to international organised crime, but choose by themselves to become terrorists and to follow a radicalisation path (that can be developed in different ways).

The fact that the autochthonous jihadism is the most relevant model in Italy doesn't mean that the traditional network are no more active in the country. According to Vidino's report, they have been strongly affected by a large number of arrests and expulsions from the country.

Most of the lone-wolf extremists start their path thanks to a social network or the internet in general, and they are normally not linked with violent actions, but exercise their militancy only through internet, posting and spreading propaganda material.

This kind of behavior is prohibited by Art. 270 of the Italian *Criminal Code* that punishes the training for terrorist activities, including international ones. Incriminating behavior, though, is

²⁵⁵ Useem, B. (2011). *Testimony of Professor Bert Useem before the United States house of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security*. <https://homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/the-threat-of-muslim-american-radicalization-in-us-prisons>

²⁵⁶ Brandon, J. (2009). "The danger of Prison radicalisation in the West". *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 2, Issue 12.

²⁵⁷ Hamm, M. (2013). *The Spectacular Few: Prisoner Radicalisation and the Evolving Terrorist Threat*. New York: New York University Press; King, R. and McDermott, K. (1990). "'My geranium is subversive': Some notes on the management of trouble in prisons". *British Journal of Sociology* 41.

²⁵⁸ Cilluffo, F., Saathoff, G.B., et. al. (2006). *Out of the Shadows. Getting Ahead of Prisoners Radicalisation*. Washington, DC: The George Washington University; Dindo, S. (2015). "Radicalisation en prison: une question prise à l'envers?". *Dehors*, 87, 4 april 2015.

²⁵⁹ Vidino, L. (2014). *Il Jihadismo autoctono in Italia: nascita, sviluppo e dinamiche di radicalizzazione*. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale.

not always easy to detect, and when it involved Italian people converted to Islam, expulsion from the country is not applicable

In a few cases, militancy on the internet can pass to real life and when it happens it normally involves people who don't belong to Italian mosques, who aren't linked with traditional terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and use internet to communicate. They might decide to move abroad and join a jihadi network through the help of people who can offer strategical contacts with well organised groups outside Europe and that are not necessarily marginalised people with economic problems.²⁶⁰

To describe the Italian approach to the fight against international terrorism we need to consider the Italian *Criminal Code*, the Italian *Criminal Procedure Code* and a certain number of specific laws that have entered into force since 2001, after the events that irremediably changed the global assets of peace around the world.

As part of the provisions of the key pieces of legislation mentioned above, it is worth remembering that the four most important laws to fight international terrorism entered into force following the twin towers attack of 11 September 2001 (*Law of 18 October 2001 n. 374*), the London attack in July 2005 (*Law of 27 July 2005 n. 144*), the Paris attack of January 2015 (*Law of 18 February 2015 n. 7*) and after the Nice truck attack in July 2016 (*Law of 28 July 2016 n. 153*; the object of this law was the ratification of some international convention and protocols, so it is not strictly linked with the Nice attack). Before these four laws, the Italian fight against terrorism was almost exclusively oriented to internal terrorism, (right-wing as well as left-wing) which required very different repressive approach.

The first change was made by the law of 2001 that introduced in the *Criminal Code* the idea of international terrorism (Art. 270 bis). Before this law, the only relevant prosecuted offences were nationally oriented. The other relevant change is linked to the financing of terrorism – until then, financing wasn't considered part of the crime, while now it is and can be punished accordingly. From the point of view of investigation, this law provides for greater powers of the police while in search of relevant evidence.

The *Law of 27 July 2005 n. 144* allows the Ministry of Interior and the competent prefect to apply an immediate expulsion of a foreigner when there are serious concerns that his/her presence on Italian territory can facilitate terrorist networks, both internal and international.

Moreover, the law in question criminalised additional offences such as providing information about how to make firearms, explosives, or chemical weapons even without the presence of a specific terroristic intent. In addition, the new Art. 497 bis of the *Criminal Code* punishes the fabrication of false identities and documents needed to travel abroad, while Art. 270 punishes recruitment to participate in a terrorist organisation in Italy or abroad, and training to participate in a terrorist organisation. Art. 270 doesn't create any new criminal offence, but gives a precise and comprehensive definition of what constitutes behavior with a terrorist aim.

Law n. 43 of 2015 added a new part to Art. 270 of the *Criminal Code* in regard to foreign fighters by prescribing a prison sentence of between 5 and 8 years for persons enrolled with the aim of committing international acts of terrorism, while the violation of enlisting people to

²⁶⁰ As it has been discussed in depth in an academic paper about radicalisation in Kenya, there is no evidence that people that become terrorists have a low level of economical inclusion or are not integrated with the local society; see: Rink, A. and Sharma, K. (2016). "The Determinants of Religious Radicalisation: Evidence from Kenya". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 62, No 6.; see also: Awan, I. (2013). "Muslim Prisoners, Radicalisation and rehabilitation in British Prisons". *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33: 3.

become foreign fighters had already been punished with a prison sentence of between 7 and 15 years. The Law also criminalised the new offence of “organisation of transfers with the aim of terrorism” (Art. 270, Para. 1). of the *Criminal Code* also punishes the so called “lone-wolf terrorists” by referring to people that self-train for terrorism.

With regard to procedural matters, *Law n. 43* of 2015 attributes stronger power to judicial authorities to monitor, stop and prosecute propaganda via the Internet. In addition, a certain number of financial and personal precautionary measures are introduced to fight the activities of terrorist groups.

For the same purpose, *Law of 28 July 2016 n. 153* introduced a new offence: “the financing of behavior with terrorist aim”, punishing in this way everyone who supports terrorist groups economically. Another important new offence concerns “acts of nuclear terrorism” and punishes persons who create a nuclear weapon or a risk of nuclear attack, with a terroristic intent.

Radicalisation dynamics

As pointed out, Italy has a distinctive story of Jihadism that in which the lone-wolf terrorists plays a more prominent part than the traditional network of terrorist groups.

According to Vidino, what lone actors have in common is the situation of marginalisation and a kind of psychological weakness. The centre of the Italian Jihadism has always been located in the most famous mosque of Milan (the so called mosque of Jenner Street), that for a certain period was attended by members of the Egyptian *Jamaat Islamiya*. This mosque, together with the mosques of Turin, Bologna and Naples (used above all by Algerian networks) became hubs for the recruitment of combatants for Bosnia and Iraq. In the 1990s, one could hardly speak about Italian Jihadism, as no direct attack on Italian soil had taken place.²⁶¹ From the 2000s on, there have been some attempts of terrorist attacks, realised by lone actors (2002, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009), but the number of radicalised people doesn't suggest any real risk to Italian security. Some isolated cases, however, generated a specific concern, such as the 24-year-old Italian man converted to Islam who died while fighting in Syria in 2013.

Having in mind these cases, it is possible to say that second-generation immigrants and Italian nationals converted to Islam could be at a much higher risk of radicalisation than first-generation immigrants. The spread of lone actors doesn't prevent Italy from the risk of hosting traditional terrorist networks (especially from Tunisia) who try to stay in touch with individuals and Italian cells for propaganda purposes. In fact, in recent times there have been increased contacts among the Tunisian branch of Ansr Al-Shari'a of Salafist influence.²⁶²

Furthermore, the standard radicalisation path passes through the internet, while the role of mosques is marginal with only a small number of places frequented by extremists that are tolerated by mosques' religious leaders.

With the above-mentioned in mind, it should be noted that the collection (or availability) of data on this issue cannot be taken granted. On the contrary, it is quite hard to capture the Italian scene through up-to-date and relevant data. The annual report of the activities of the Italian police should be considered one of the most important and reliable source (data can

²⁶¹ Gaudino, U. (2018). “Islam e radicalizzazione jihadista in Italia. Cosa possiamo imparare dal caso francese?”. *Iriad Review*, vol. n. 4.

²⁶² Vidino, L. (2014). *Il Jihadismo autoctono in Italia: nascita, sviluppo e dinamiche di radicalizzazione*. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale.

also be obtained from crime bulletins, but as is well known, they are not collected in a systematic and statistically reliable manner).

The following table is taken from the latest national police report published in August 2018. It juxtaposes the periods 2016–2017 and 2017–2018, and takes into consideration the most recent available data.

Table 11. Police statistics on individuals arrested, expelled, or placed under surveillance for extremism in Italy (August 2016-July 2018)

	1 August 2016 – 31 July 2017	1 August 2017 – 31 July 2018
Expulsion for security reasons	96	108
Of whom, Imam	8	2
Arrested extremists*	24	43
Monitored foreign fighters	125	135
Of whom, dead	37	48
Of whom, returned in Europe	22	26
People under surveillance	272,557	510,492
Vehicles checked	87,262	195,434
Motor vessels checked	165	316

Source: *Dossier Viminale Ferragosto 2018*, www.interno.it.

Radicalisation risks in prisons

The prison population in Italy as of May 31, 2018 was 58,569 individuals, 2,499 of whom women, and 19,929 foreign nationals, mainly coming from Morocco (16.4% of the total foreign prison population), Romania (12.9% of the total foreign prison population), and Albania (12.6% of the total foreign prison population). Italy has 190 prison facilities and its overall capacity, according to the Ministry of Justice, is 50,615 people.

In the last four years, the level of prison overcrowding has been on the rise and efforts have been made to address the problem strategically after the pilot sentence of ECHR in 2013 which determined that Italy was in need of an effective policy to improve prison condition.

According to official data from the penitentiary police,²⁶³ the number of prison officers in the country is 41,130 but only 32,334 are actually on duty creating a situation in which the national rate of presence in the facilities is 78.61%.

There are no official data available on the number of prison educators or psychologists involved in penitentiary treatment at the national level, but it is commonly perceived that their number is insufficient.²⁶⁴

According to the last available report from the Italian Department of Prison Administration (DAP), 55.7% of prisoners declared to be Catholic (32,119 people), and 12.4% –Muslim (that is, 7,194 individuals who comprise 36.1% of the total foreign prison population).

²⁶³ www.poliziapenitenziaria.it

²⁶⁴ Martello, C. P. (2018). "Radicalizzazione e libertà di culto". *Antigone.it*. <http://www.antigone.it/quattordicesimo-rapporto-sulle-condizioni-di-detenzione/radicalizzazione-e-liberta-di-culto/>

Due to an apparent decrease in the number of Muslim prison population, the DAP has considered the number of prisoners from Muslim countries and has found out that around 5,000 foreign prisoners prefer not to declare their faith when entering the prison.

The penitentiary regulation provides that every new prisoner should be asked what their religion is (Art. 26). Despite the fact that inmates' religious beliefs are known, data are seldom up-to-date. The latest such data mentioned above (as of December 31, 2017) show that Catholics were the majority, which is not surprising, but this majority has shrunk compared to a few decades ago when there were few immigrants in prison. In According to the 2017 data, 34.4% of the prison population was made up of foreign nationals (19,859, out of a total of 57,737), the largest group of whom self-reported as Muslims. In comparison, their number in 2016 was 7,646, which is about 500 more. From the available data, however, it appears that many prefer not to disclose their faith for fear of discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs. At the beginning of 2016, Muslims comprised 26.3% of the total number of prisoners (14,235). The DAP, though, decided to double check the data from self-reporting in relation to religion against the number of prisoners coming from Muslim countries and came up with 11,029 people in 2016, and 12,567 –in 2017. The latter number means that 5,373 of Muslim country nationals refrained from disclosing their faith in 2017. The share of those self-reporting as atheist in the same year was 42.9% (as against 500 prisoners less in the previous), which is seemingly a high number. The data, along with a certain consolidated practice within prisons, show a tendency not to declare the religion, presumably for fear of being discriminated against.

The DAP analyses this issue in its annual report in relation to the prevention of radicalisation, which reveals that the prison environment might dent the right to practice one's religion.

Places of worship

The right to profess one's religion involves both the private and the public sphere. In particular, it is necessary to participate in the collective rites led by ministers, and to worship, above all, in appropriate places. The obligation to allocate suitable places for worship rests with the head of the state. In the case of the Catholic, such designated places are present – all penal institutions have at least one chapel, and many have more than one. This is not the case for other confessions – out of 86 institutions visited, only 20 (23%) had non-Catholic spaces for cults. This means that in 77% of the penal institutes, inmates had no other space than their cell to pray, which poses a certain risk, as not having a place for the common prayer is generally considered conducive to radicalisation.²⁶⁵

The organisation of religion inside prisons

The Italian prison law provides for the presence of a spiritual guide inside prison, a role traditionally played by the Catholic chaplain (there are 314 chaplains for 189 prison facilities). All other religions are also entitled to have their own representative serving their spiritual needs in prison. In practice, however, this right can hardly be enforced, as it is difficult to identify recognized Muslim imams. At the end of 2017, only 25 imams were formally present inside Italian prison facilities, following a lengthy authorisation procedure by the Ministry of Interior. In addition, Muslim prisoners can count on 41 volunteers that, as such, are not as free as the imams in providing support for the religious activities for prisoners.²⁶⁶ As far back as

²⁶⁵ Giordano, 2012

²⁶⁶ Giordano, 2012; La Sala, 2012

2015, an agreement was made between the Italian Department of Prison Administration and the Union of the Muslims in Italy (UCOII) to experimentally assign imams to 8 prison facilities and later reproduce the model in all the prison facilities, but so far no part of the agreement has been implemented.

The attitude to 97 self-appointed imams assuming this role while in prison, and the 44 prisoners who converted to Islam while in prison, should be different, as the prevalence of such clerics is generally recognised as a factor that can rise the radicalisation risk.²⁶⁷

Prison regime for radicalised prisoners or prisoners at risk of radicalisation

As it is well syntetised by the Antigone report,²⁶⁸ the Italian prison system identifies three different levels of detention in case of (possible) radicalisation:

- prisoners sentenced for crimes linked to terrorism (high-security);
- prisoners sentenced for common crimes but espousing a violent ideology or considered to be charismatic leaders (medium security);
- prisoners who can be easily radicalised – followers (third level/low security).

A different prison regime (AS2) is associated with each one of these three categories.

Prisoners of the first category are detained under high-security regime which is regulated by circulars of the DAP much more than by the penitentiary law (in 2017, 62 people were detained under this regime, which is 41% less than the previous year). They are detained in different facilities around the Country: Sassari (26), Rossano (19), Nuoro (11), Torino (2), Ferrara (2), Brescia (1) e Lecce (1). Only 4 of them are serving a final sentence, all the others are in cautionary detention.

In addition to the 62 prisoners in high security, there are 444 prisoners monitored with different level of security. Thus, the total of monitored prisoners is 506, which 72% more than in 2016 when there were only 365 such prisoners. Among these, 62 individuals are held for terrorism, and 180 are held for common crimes but considered to be radicalised while in prison (as against 165 in 2016). For both of these categories the highest level of security was activated and the prisoners were held separately from the other inmates. Another 150 prisoners were held in under medium-security regime (compared to 76 in 2016), and 114 prisoners were held under low-level security (as against 126 in 2016).

The monitoring that is used to classify prisoners and to locate them in the different security regime is implemented by the Central Investigative Unit (NIC) and the Antiterrorism Strategic Analysis Committee (CASA). CASA is housed at the Ministry of Interior and led by the Central Directorate of the Preventive Police; the committee is also competent on online monitoring as a measure to prevent acts of terrorism.

²⁶⁷ On this issue see: Liebeling, A., Armstrong, R., Ryan, J. W., and Bramwell, R. (2015). *Locating Trust in a Climate of Fear: Religion, Moral Status, Prisoner Leadership, and Risk in Maximum Security Prisons*. Prison Research Centre, Institute of Criminology. University of Cambridge; Weber, M. (1968). *On Charisma and Institution Building*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 48.; Campbell, C., and Connolly, I. (2008). "A model for 'The war against terrorism'? Military Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew". *Journal of Law and Society*, 33, 3.

²⁶⁸ Martello, C. P. (2018). "Radicalizzazione e libertà di culto". *Antigone.it*. <http://www.antigone.it/quattordicesimo-rapporto-sulle-condizioni-di-detenzione/radicalizzazione-e-liberta-di-culto/>

The data that concern the relations between prisoners and the outside world are analysed once a month for prisoners under highest security, every two months for those under medium-security regime, and only when considered necessary for all other prisoners.

The procedure under which prisoners are identified as radicalised involves both subjective and objective elements: prison staff take notice of changes in the religious practice or in the personal outlook or daily life, they share information with CASA officers, who, in their turn, have complement the information coming from prisons with specific occurrences in society at large for which it is monitored. What mostly hinders the identification process, however, is the language barrier – in 2017, for instance, a mere 10 prison staff members attended courses in the Arabic language, too disproportionate to the actual radicalisation risk.

With regard to radicalisation awareness training for prison officers, in 2017 DAP offered training opportunities to 758 staff members. Such ad hoc continuous training remains a primary need for the Italian prison administration.

As using the Integra tools to evaluate the existing risk of radicalisation in prison is not authorised in Italian prison administration, it could be useful to refer to a previous research developed by the University of Brescia²⁶⁹ with the approval of the former head of the DAP and published in its complete version in the Italian Journal of Criminology. The data collected during the study are fully available and can be freely used for scholarly purposes.

The mentioned research was carried out by the Office of the Guarantor of Brescia has carried out in collaboration with the Office of the Guarantor of Reggio Calabria and the University of Brescia along the lines of the project *FORII - Freedom of Religion* designed to produce an adequate scientific framework for preventive actions in Italian prisons suitable for use by the DAP and compliant to the recent guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers on March 2-3, 2016 (Section IV, items d, e, Para. VII) and to the prevention and training expertise gathered and disseminated by the European Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). The effort also aimed to provide adequate knowledge of the conditions and situations in which the Islamic faith is professed inside prisons and to detect any distortions in the exercise of this right. The aforementioned objectives and intentions are now considered a priority in view of the wide-ranging cognitive effort that European countries have been pursuing for some time.

The present paper discusses the issues strictly related to religion, avoiding comments on all the other collected data. The research was carried out using an anonymous questionnaire administered to Islamic prisoners.

Thanks to the collaboration of the Imam of the Islamic Community of Verona, the questionnaire was translated into Arabic to facilitate the understanding of the questions by prisoners who do not possess full command of the Italian language. The linguistic problem emerged very clearly during the administration: very often the authors needed to explain the correct meaning of the questions and the objective of the research, basically met with suspicion by prisoners.

To allow a conscious and meaningful interlocution with the prisoners, who use extremely heterogeneous linguistic registers, explanatory support in English, French and Spanish was

²⁶⁹ Ravagnani L., Romano, C. A. (2017). Il radicalismo estremo in carcere: una ricerca empirica. *Rassegna Italiana di Criminologia*, vol. IV.

used, as in almost all cases the interviewees were in better command of these language compared to Italian. In about ten cases the detainees answered the questions using Arabic.

A second problem was related to the conceptual understanding of the questionnaire, developed in collaboration with the University of Milan, but not easily understood by foreigners.

It should be noted that, having overcome the reported and initial diffidence, the interviews with the Islamic prisoners were for many of them a rare occasion of exchange with people from the outside world. This is why it triggered a multiplicity of requests on their part ranging from purely material ones to more complicated ones, of spiritual and intellectual nature.

The inmates who participated in the research were recruited on the basis of a free and spontaneous accession to the proposal, and the full awareness of the initiative and the underlying objectives were guaranteed by an adequate and precise explanation provided by the researchers to the prisoners during the interview.

An given equal guarantee of respect for anonymity was also given and it was explained that the data obtained, after being treated with appropriate confidentiality, would be merged into a national collector. Despite such explanations and reassurance, one of the inmates refused to answer and asked permission to return to his cell.

In total, 175 inmates were interviewed, of which 165 professed Islam and 10 had other religious convictions or were non-believers. The facilities where the questionnaires were distributed are located in the north, central and south parts of Italy.

The last three questions posed by the questionnaire represented the most important part of the survey. Naturally, these were the questions that led to more diffidence and, always, the answers to these items were preceded by reassurance on the respect of anonymity and the guarantee of confidentiality. Some prisoners, however, wanted to affirm their ideas on the specific problem in an open way, even asking to sign the questionnaire in and thus openly assert their convictions and views.

The possibility that in prison a risk of adherence to fundamentalist teachings is generated with the consequent danger of radicalisation of Islamic prisoners has been assessed as follows:

Table 12. Risk of radicalisation in prison according to prisoners

Risk of radicalisation in prison: prisoners' point of view	No	Yes	No answer
	66.2	17.7	16.1

It is interesting to note that within the small control group made up of non-Muslim prisoners who received the same questionnaire, the NO value exceeded 90%. Two-thirds of the surveyed Muslim prisoners deemed the danger of radicalisation in prison to be non-existent or overestimated. The remaining one third either considered such risk was present, or did not respond.

For a series of reasons, among which the observed fear or reticence in speaking about the specific topic (due first of all to the perception of being immediately put under strict observation for taking any position on the risk of radicalisation or linked topics), it is plausible to believe that even those who did not respond are to be traced back to the group that

considers the risk probable. This means that two thirds of the prisoners do not consider the risk of radicalisation to exist, while one third considers it to be substantial.

The concept of fundamentalism arouses a great definitional uncertainty in the doctrine and is reported by the prisoners with a heterogeneous and composite series of meanings, so an aggregative effort was necessary in order to identify some categories. The following definitions emerged from the questionnaires:

Table 11. Meanings of fundamentalism according to interviewed inmates

Fanaticism
Lack of knowledge of the real values of Islam
Manipulation of real Islamic Values
Political instruments to acquire power
Individual problem linked with mental health and psychopathology

The last item of the questionnaire (Table 14) tried to investigate the perception of the interviewed sample of how prisoners could be "at risk of radicalisation". This question in practice has also highlighted the needs felt as most urgent by the respondents themselves.

The subject of foreign prisoners' needs would require a specific treatment²⁷⁰ above all with reference to the protection of the right to profess one's faith, it is not by chance that most of the suggestions expressed concern for the religious sphere. Analysing what has been suggested by the prisoners in terms of prevention, it should be noted that they are well aware of the best strategies (excluding the death penalty for terrorists) to reduce the spread of radical ideas on the one hand, and the risk of internal conflicts on the other hand.

Seemingly, there is now a strong agreement among prison system experts and practitioners about radicalisation factors such as the availability places of prayer and suitable religious teachings, and the access of imams to facilities. Factors such as listening to foreigners, confrontation between groups of Islamic faith, and inter-religious exchange, however, remain less explored. In relation to the latter, though, European guidelines are decidedly clear – facilitating dialogue as well as using intervention strategies based on the alternative narratives are fundamental in terms of prevention. As suggested by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (the European network of professionals that is part of the European Commission and deals with the prevention of radicalisation), this role can be managed with better results if organised by the non-governmental sector. In fact, in most cases NGOs are much more recognised by stakeholders as interlocutors of trust, better equipped to provide practical help for the management of their daily difficulties.

The suggestion that this preventive task is not carried out by government agencies is well motivated in the scheme prepared for the RAN prevention document, and the opportunity to bring to the attention of the detainees examples of daily life managed while respecting the fundamental rights of every human being cannot be disregarded.

²⁷⁰ Ravagnani, L., Romano, C. A. (2010). "Sistema carcerario e trattamenti inumani o degradanti". *Rassegna Italiana di Criminologia*, IV, 1

Table 12. Perception about ways to help prisoners at risk of Islamic radicalisation

Perception about how to help prisoners at risk of Islamic radicalisation
To prepare adequate place for prayer inside the prison
To offer adequate religious teaching
To allow Imam to enter inside the prison facility
To offer listening services to foreigners
To organise discussion group through Islamic prisoners
To enlarge the possibility to work, to study and to meet family inside the prison
To sentence to death terrorists
To watch to suspects inside prison
To offer discussion group with prisoners of different faiths

Source: RAN Issue Paper 01/10/2015, Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives.

Listening should follow a path based on narratives that offer readings of the Western world in terms of values and positive principles. The use of alternative narratives and/or counter narratives (based on the systematic demolition of radical thought in a perspective of opposition summarised in the truth/lie approach) can be very effective in the approaches to deradicalisation and disengagement. Of course, the alternative narratives are able to offer to the interlocutors a way to connect, rather than to divide cultures, but this would be possible only through the human rights lenses. Such a dialogue can hardly be carried out by the agencies that represent the government – it would be difficult to imagine an empathic relationship between someone who has deprived a person of his/her freedom and the person who suffers such deprivation. Resistance to the systems of government perceived as antagonistic, racist, discriminating would indeed undermine any attempt at constructive dialogue.

The use of alternative and counter narratives is very widespread in contrasting online radicalisation and in school contexts, while it is less used in prison terms. However, the few scientific studies on the subject are in agreement that these instruments must be central in the fight against violent extremism. In fact, former extremists themselves have formulated the ways of distancing from violent ideologies – from exposure to alternative sources of information, through the dismantling of hypocrisies on which fundamentalist thinking is based, to terrorist propaganda's excitement and exaltation sold as an escape from boredom.

This is exactly what alternatives and counter narratives can offer this to individuals in prison. To be effective, however, a prevention campaign cannot be sporadic, but must become an integral part of a treatment path and must be based on strong and cherished emotions rather than data and theories. If structured in these terms, a strategy can also be effective in the prevention of recidivism and serve as an instrument facilitating the return of inmates into society after serving their term.

Regarding the pathways activated at European level in the penitentiary area for the prevention of radicalisation and the management of terrorists in prison, it is useful to refer to the collection of good practices published by RAN. The available documents show that the majority of good practices concern the training of prison and probation staff in terms of identifying possible signs of risk, understanding the methods of alternative communication of the different cultures present in prisons (with particular attention to the Islamic one) and management of conflict/emergency situations within institutions. Among the good practices

reported, reference is also made to the training offered to prison staff in Italy, promoted by the DAP.

On the other hand, the approaches aimed at taking charge of the subject deemed to be at risk or already radicalised are much lower and have been activated for example by Sweden and the Netherlands.

The approach proposed by the Office of the Guarantor of Brescia is in line with what has already been implemented in all the mentioned projects. In particular, considering the structure of the Swedish model, it is easy to see how the third module deals with the reconstruction of the identity of the person involved through alternative models of conflict management. The module is based, in fact, on nine categories of cognitive behavioral exercises (addressed to subjects who have shown that they can use the so-called "language of change"), among which there are those related to impulsivity, management of anxiety and frustration, the understanding of universal values, religious meanings and the development of social skills.

The first two modules concern practical help (management of the main problems of the person in question by penitentiary operators) and social networking (contribution in the reconstruction of social relationships with people specifically identified by the interested party or with the community in general).

With this in mind, the experience started for the second year in Verziano Prison with a group of inmates who, through debates, testimonies, elaboration of their own and others' experiences in terms of respect for human rights, is trying to give them alternative ways of managing the difficulties of everyday life.

Perception among prison officers

To better understand the dynamics that operate inside prisons in terms of radicalisation risks, a training on these topics was delivered from February to June 2018 to the penitentiary police, with an anonymous questionnaire distributed at the beginning and the end of the training. The questionnaire aimed to investigate the needs and concerns of the penitentiary police in relation to the treatment of (mostly foreign) prisoners with extremist oriented behavior. The two questionnaires were composed of five questions, of which only the last two of the entry one and the last of the exit one are relevant to the topic. All in all, 33 questionnaires were filled in, leading to the following conclusions and the results could be summarised as follows.

The question "What kind of resources would you like your facility to use to manage foreigners in prison, especially the ones at risk of radicalisation?" received the following answers:

- 73.1% of respondents state there would be the need of a broader knowledge among prison staff of the principal elements of the different cultures represented in prison;
- 22.4% claimed it would be necessary to assign specific places of worship, always and easily available for the common prayers during the day (to show a greater respect of the religious needs of every culture);
- 85.5% replied there should be a higher presence of cultural mediators inside the facilities;
- 84% stated there should be a higher presence of recognised imams coming from the wider society and selected by the DAP;

- 65.3% of respondents thought there linguistic support inside the facilities was needed in order to better understand the real needs of foreign prisoners.

The last question of the entry questionnaires asked “What kind of personal support/information/training you feel is necessary to implement preventive strategies against radicalisation?” 96% of respondents agreed with the need to receive training about cultural, religious and linguistic aspects related to foreigners held in prison in Italy.

The last question of the exit questionnaires was about the need of periodical trainings on related topics and 92% of respondents agreed that knowledge of some elements of the Islamic culture, religion and law, as approached in the training, would be very relevant to the future management of possible situations of radicalisation in prison.

Perception among the Muslim community

The same questionnaire was used to also make a survey among the Muslims of the community of Brescia to investigate, among other issues, the perception of the wider society in regard of the risk of radicalisation in prison. A total of 68 respondents answered the 40 questions distributed to prisoners earlier, with the most relevant questions for this paper are the last two (the total number of question was of 40).

The question “Do you believe that people in prison are at risk of radicalisation?” was positively answered by 48.5% of respondents who agreed this was a real risk, while 17.6% preferred not to answer. The high share of people that did not reply to this question is due to the same reticence displayed by prisoners.

To the last question “Would you be willing to help someone coming out of prison to avoid radicalisation risks?” (implying that if someone is left alone after release from prison, there could be a real risk for them to meet dangerous people who can determine radicalisation paths), 39.7% of respondents prefer not to take any position by replying “I don’t know”.

The collected data, even if they are not representative of a large sample, support the conclusions made from the prisoners’ sample:

- Muslim in general are very uncomfortable speaking about radicalisation and extremism probably because they fear some kind of negative consequences in term of over-exposure to public opinion and to police.
- The dynamics of radicalisation continue to be linked to the contact with self-proclaimed imams inside prison, rather than to direct contacts with traditional extremist organisations.
- The prisoners at risk could be managed in a positive way with some specific programmes that take care of their specific cultural background.

Conclusion and recommendations

Without any doubt, the terrorist threat is one of the main challenges of the contemporary era and the strategies to counter it are based on conflicting positions, uncertainty, doubts, and few objective data.

In this framework, the search for effective solutions for the prevention of hard-to-quantify risk of radicalisation in prison is only apparently discouraging.

Academic literature on the issue agrees on one point – that the use of de-radicalisation strategies is the only effective method to attempt activating a reverse path, able to guarantee the permanent removal from terrorist circuits.²⁷¹

On the prevention front, however, it seems that a correct use of the positive effects that religion can exercise in the penitentiary context thanks to the intermediation of spiritual guides (imams), selected and adequately trained, is the only effective weapon available.²⁷² Of course, the respect for the human rights of prisoners, in whatever context and condition they are going to serve the penalty, is a fundamental prerequisite for activating any disengagement policy that could produce positive results.

And if the hypothesis that a subject profile more at risk does not make much sense because the variables found in the few cases analysed in the literature are not always overlapping but, rather, often contrasting²⁷³ is true, it is also true that feelings of humiliation, discrimination and abuse have been the cause of identity crises resulting in radicalisation and/or terrorism.

Khosrokhavar²⁷⁴ (2005) insists on the sense of humiliation experienced by young Muslims in the West, considered as different and inferior. Even those relatively well integrated and economically affluent can, in his opinion, live this kind of victimising experience. His theory can be supported by the words of Omar Bakri Mohammed, the radical religious leader exiled from the United Kingdom for his proximity to the Islamic State, as quoted by Lebor:²⁷⁵ “People are looking for an Islamic identity. You find someone called Muhammad, who grew up in the western society, he concedes a lot so people accept him. He changes his name to Mike, he has a girlfriend, he drinks alcohol, he dances, he has sex, raves, rock and roll, then they say, “You are a Paki. After everything he gave they are a bloody Arab, or a Paki.”

Although coming from a leader considered radical, these words clearly identify a need of the West: to motivate the generalised intolerance towards the “different” through the equally generalised vision of Islam as coinciding with terrorism. Unless we are able to abandon stereotypes and prejudices, the difficult task of preventing radicalisation, in prison or elsewhere, will not be fulfilled with any reasonable optimism.

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²⁷² Ajouaou, M. (2014). *mam Behind Bars: A Case Study of Islamic Spiritual Care in Dutch Prisons towards the Development of a Professional Profile*. South Carolina: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform; Awan, I. (2013). “Muslim Prisoners, Radicalisation and rehabilitation in British Prisons”. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33: 3.

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²⁷⁵ Lebor, A. (1997). *A Heart Turned East: among the Muslim of Europe and America*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

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Portugal

Introduction

Although Portugal has so far been spared with regard to the occurrence of terrorist attacks, this does not mean that the concern with the phenomena of terrorism and, more specifically, radicalisation, is non-existent. On the contrary, in view of international guidelines, Portugal has been adapting its strategy to combat terrorism and has begun to look more closely at this phenomenon in recent years. This concern has manifested itself, among other areas, in terms of legislation, the most important being the approval of a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (ENCT)²⁷⁶ in February 2015, as well as the *Law to Combat Terrorism (Law No. 52/2003)* and its amendments. The creation and the current strengthening of the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit (UCAT)²⁷⁷ are also important developments in this field.

As it is widely known, the terrorist attacks that have taken place over the last 5-year period in the EU countries (e.g., France, Belgium), as well as the growing concern regarding the increase in the radical Islamic population in Europe and the departure of European citizens towards Syria and Iraq, has led to an increased awareness by local government agencies, institutions and organisations about the need of tackling radicalisation.

Hence, it is worth highlighting not only the fact that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has the repossession of Al-Andalus (Southern Iberian Peninsula) as an objective, but also the socially-perceived inherent threat posed by Islamic State on our daily, westernised routines. In fact, Portugal is on the Islamic State jihadists' "sanguinary" map. As an example, a jihadist uploaded a map of the Lisbon underground on a social network in December 2011.²⁷⁸ However, Portuguese authorities have stated that the threat of attacks in Portugal is lower than in other parts of Europe, since most jihadists with a Portuguese passport actually reside in other European countries, mainly in the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. Thus, most of these individuals appear to be second and third-generation descendants of families that migrated to other European countries in search of work. Others seem to be the descendants of immigrants from former Portuguese colonies, such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.²⁷⁹ Therefore, violent radicalisation in Portugal cannot be compared to other national contexts within the EU. The Portuguese Minister of Justice, Francisca Van Dunem, has even stated that the country does not have terrorist-related problems (Cerqueiro, 2017).²⁸⁰

In view with the above, the current Portuguese case is not an example of social pressure, as seen, for instance, in the French or German cases. However, the latest Internal Security Annual Report (RASI),²⁸¹ alerts to the recent developments on right-wing movements, whose "identity-focused discourse develops a rhetoric that is essentially oriented to rejecting migrants and Islamists, in the name of the preservation of European population's culture,

²⁷⁶ *Estratégia Nacional de Combate ao Terrorismo – ENCT.*

²⁷⁷ *Unidade de Coordenação Anti-Terrorismo –UCAT.*

²⁷⁸ Silva, T. (2015). *A ameaça terrorista em Portugal* (Doctoral thesis in International Relations, at Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa). Accessed 9 July 2018. Retrieved from <https://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/16264>

²⁷⁹ Soeren, K. (2014). "Portugal's jihadists", *Gatestone Institute*, 14 September 2014. Available at: <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4697/portugal-jihadists>

²⁸⁰ Cerqueiro, P. (2017). "La ministra de Justicia de Portugal: 'Crear guetos es lo peor que le puede pasar a Europa'", *El Español*, 18 June 2017. Accessed 9 July 2018. Retrieved from https://www.elespanol.com/mundo/europa/20170616/224228374_0.html

²⁸¹ *Relatório Anual de Segurança Interna – RASI. Sistema de Segurança Interna (SSI) (2017). Relatório Anual da Segurança Interna*, p. 69. Available at: <https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=9f0d7743-7d45-40f3-8cf2-e448600f3af6>

lifestyle, security and economic wellbeing. In its most radical formulations, (the right-wing) proposes to rehabilitate national-socialism and fascism as valid and alternative politics, with evident repercussions on violent militancy”.

Historically, social problems in which radicalised individuals are mentioned are twofold: *i)* first, at the beginning of the 20th-century on the so-called Lisbon Regicide²⁸² that actually led, two years later, to a monarchy-overthrowing revolution; and *ii)*, in the 1970s, when the Carnation Revolution²⁸³ took place, putting an end to an authoritarian regime that had ruled for over 40 years.

Portugal’s population is currently 10,839,514 people. Concerning some possible social and political cleavages amid Portuguese society (as far as ethnic groups are concerned), it is worth noting that the number of citizens of African origin who have migrated to the continent after decolonisation was less than 100,000. Since 1990, a number of Eastern Europeans have also entered the country. As for religions, Catholics represent 81% of the population, being the dominant religion in the country, other Christian denominations comprise 3.3%, while other religions (including Jewish, Muslims, etc.) – 0.6%; non-denominational account for 6.8%, while 8.3% of the population does not specify their religion (data for population aged fifteen and above). The figure for Muslims is quite insignificant, and one of the lowest in Europe.²⁸⁴ The Muslim population, in February 2017, stood at 0.3% of the total population.²⁸⁵ The overall unemployment rate in 2016 was 11%, and more specifically 28% for the 15-22 age group.²⁸⁶ In a report published by Eurostat on October 16, 2017, a downward trend in the share of persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU makes it evident that in Portugal 25.1% of the population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion.²⁸⁷

Radicalisation dynamics

Currently, the Portuguese prison population only counts one inmate convicted for terrorism amongst almost 13,000 other inmates. In addition, it is also worth mentioning that 37 inmates²⁸⁸ are currently imprisoned due to supporting illegal immigration.²⁸⁹

Radicalisation risks in prisons

As of July 1, 2018, the Portuguese prison population comprises a total of 12,934 inmates, of which 2,161 are currently on remand, 837 are females,²⁹⁰ 175 are juveniles, and 2,069

²⁸² The murder of King Carlos I of Portugal and his heir-apparent, Luís Filipe, Prince Royal of Portugal, by sympathisers of Republican interests and aided by elements within the Portuguese Carbonária, disenchanted politicians and anti-monarchists. The events occurred on 1 February 1908 at the Commerce Square (i.e., *Terreiro do Paço*) along the banks of the Tagus River, in Lisbon.

²⁸³ *Revolução dos Cravos*.

²⁸⁴ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2017). *The World Factbook*. Accessed 10 July 2018. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_po.html

²⁸⁵ Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) (2017). *Porcentaje de la población musulmana en la UE*. Retrieved from http://www.larazon.es/documents/10165/0/video_content_6096690_20170214033150.pdf

²⁸⁶ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2017).

²⁸⁷ Eurostat (2017). *Downward trend in the share of persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU* (Newsrelease No. 155/2017). Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8314163/3-16102017-BP-EN.pdf/d31fad66-a284-47f3-ae1c-8212a581b0c1>

²⁸⁸ 12 convicted / 25 on remand.

²⁸⁹ Monteiro, J. (2018). *Raising awareness on radicalisation: Prison and probation*. Paper presented at the R2PRIS Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons International Conference, Lisbon.

²⁹⁰ General Directorate of Reintegration and Prison Services/Direção Geral de Reinserção e Serviços Prisonais (DGRSP) (2018). *População prisional por tipo de estabelecimento, segundo a situação penal em 15 de junho e 1 de julho de 2018*. Accessed 16 July 2018. Retrieved from http://www.dgsp.mj.pt/backoffice/uploads/quinzenais/20180702050745sit_pen_15-06_01-07-2018.pdf

(approx.) are foreigners.²⁹¹ They are distributed amongst a total of 49 prison establishments with different types of security and management complexity (i.e., 1 special security prison with a high level of management complexity; 20 high security prisons with a high level of management complexity; 23 high security prisons with a medium level of management complexity; and 5 medium security prisons with a medium level of management complexity).²⁹²

The level of overcrowding is steadily decreasing over the last 6 years.²⁹³ In fact, there has been a decrease at the Portuguese prisons occupancy level²⁹⁴ of 16.7% compared to 2012, standing currently at 100.7%. The problem of understaffing is also being addressed by the DGRSP, which, as of December 31, 2017 had 4,401 prison guards on duty,²⁹⁵ a number that has surely risen to 4,787 (approx.) since 386 newly-trained prison guards successfully concluded a 9-month training course and took position on April 23, 2018.²⁹⁶ Therefore, considering that, according to the Radicalisation Awareness Network, both overcrowding and lack of staff are two “deregulating factors (that) have a negative influence on flagging and dealing with radicalisation”, such numbers – and DGRSP policy concerns – should not be overlooked.

Response and institutional needs

Setting the governmental agenda and inherent dynamics

Several legislative instruments, at both the community and the national levels, have been developed and implemented with the purpose (solely or amongst others) of fighting terrorism and anticipating/preventing the occurrence of incidents of this nature.²⁹⁷

The ENCT is a policy document, adopted through *Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7-A/2015* (19 February 2015), laying out the mobilisation, coordination and cooperation guidelines for all its national structures with direct or indirect responsibility in the field of counter-terrorism.²⁹⁸ In other words, the ENCT is the national level embodiment of imperative demands at the domestic, European, and international level in the fight against terrorism.²⁹⁹

It references within, as a pillar of the strategy in the preventive sphere, the adoption of an action plan for the prevention of radicalisation and terrorist recruitment that will promote the monitoring of those conditions most likely to lead individuals to terrorist activity (*Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7-A/2015*). This is the grounds to claim that the topic of radicalisation enters the government agenda in 2015.

²⁹¹ Monteiro, J. (2018). *Raising awareness on radicalisation*. Foreigners represent approximately 16% of the prison population, of which many are Luso-Africans (i.e., with roots in a Portuguese speaking African country). There are also several of immigrant-descent (Portuguese-born or naturalised), besides the Roma contingency transversal to many prison systems. The precise number is unknown, since the Portuguese government does not collect statistics on ethnicity and race – see: Dores, A., Pontes, N., & Loureiro, R. (2013). *Prison conditions in Portugal*. Available at: <http://www.prisonobservatory.org/upload/PrisonconditioninPortugal.pdf>

²⁹² Monteiro, J. (2018). *Raising awareness on radicalisation*.

²⁹³ Aebi, M., Tiago, M., Berger-Kolopp, L., & Burkhardt, C. (2017). *SPACE I – Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics: Prison populations. Survey 2016*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe; World Prison Brief (WPB) 2018.

²⁹⁴ I.e., prison density per 100 places.

²⁹⁵ DGRSP (2017). *Total de trabalhadores da DGRSP em 31 de dezembro, nas unidades orgânicas desconcentradas e serviços centrais*. Accessed 16 July 2018. Retrieved from http://www.dgsp.mj.pt/backoffice/uploads/annuals/2018042010040702Q-tot-trab-UO_dsc-SC.pdf

²⁹⁶ Lusa (2018). “Cerca de 400 guardas prisionais tomam posse numa cerimónia com protesto na Carregueira”, *Diário de Notícias*, 23 April 2018. Available at: <https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/cerca-de-400-guardas-prisionais-tomam-posse-numa-cerimonia-com-protesto-na-carregueira-9279132.html>

²⁹⁷ Folgado, P. (2016). “Portugal e o combate ao terrorismo: A estratégia nacional”. *Proelium*, 7(11), pp. 335-347.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

In addition, the *Law to Combat Terrorism (Law No. 52/2003 of August 22)* transposes the *Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of the European Council*, with the objective of forecasting and punishment of terrorist acts and organisations.

Given the continuous development of the phenomenon and its empirical understanding, this law has been the subject of a number of changes in order to frame all the behaviours that fall within the definition of terrorism, namely:

- *Law No. 17/2011* criminalises public incitement to commit terrorist offences, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism;
- *Law No. 60/2015* criminalises the public apology (even if it occurs on the Internet) and the movements to commit the crime of terrorism.

The issue of radicalisation lies within the ENCT document, whose purpose is to draw the guidelines for "mobilisation, coordination and cooperation of all national structures with direct and indirect responsibility in the field of combating the terrorist threat and it is an achievement at the national level of internal, European and international imperatives to combat terrorism" (p. 2).

It is divided into five pillars where we can observe what its associations are:

- **detecting**, which is the action of promptly identifying a possible terrorist threat by acquiring the knowledge essential to combating it efficiently;
- **preventing**, which consists in knowing and identifying the causes leading to the rise in radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist attacks;
- **protecting**, represented by reinforcing priority and objective security, reducing both vulnerability and the impact of possible terrorist attacks;
- **tracking down**, which is the dismantling or neutralisation of terrorist activity, planned or ongoing, and its networks of support.; preventing movement, communications, and access to funding and to the material used in terrorist attacks, and bringing the ones responsible for terrorism to justice;
- **responding**, which consists in the operational management of all the means used in the reaction to terrorist attacks; the ability to react lowers the consequences of an act of terrorism, both at human and infrastructure levels.

As we see, it is in pillar 2 – preventing – that the issue of the prevention of radicalisation is addressed, emphasising the importance of "knowing and identifying the causes that determine the emergence of processes of radicalisation, recruitment and terrorist acts", since "the domain of the facts that enhance its expansion allows the adoption of measures which prevent its emergence and development".³⁰⁰

Among other lines of action, within the framework of this objective, ENCT envisages the adoption of an Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation and Recruitment for Terrorism which will indicate concrete measures. However, as in other areas, such a plan remains non-existent to date.

³⁰⁰ Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7-A/2015. Diário da República, 1st issue – N.º 36, 1º Supplement – 20 February 2015, p.3. Available at: <https://dre.pt/web/guest/pesquisa/-/search/66567251/details/maximized>

Policy-making process

Organisational positioning of the radicalisation issue within the government

Counter-terrorism responsibilities lie primarily with the state,³⁰¹ more specifically with the Prime Minister, who runs the Internal Security System (SSI), and who can delegate tasks to a Secretary-General.

Ministry of Internal Affairs

The UCAT is the top entity responsible for the cooperation and information flow in this field. It manages cooperation within the SSI, acting as a means conduit of information amongst the entities that compose it.³⁰²

At the national level, the UCAT is the organism responsible for coordinating and sharing information in the context of the threat and fight against terrorism among the entities that comprise it, namely:

- Secretary-General of the SSI
- Secretary-General of the Portuguese Republic Information System (SIRP)
- National Republican Guard (GNR)
- Public Security Police (PSP)
- Judiciary Police (PJ)
- Foreign and Borders Service (SEF)
- Strategic Defence Information Service (SIED)
- Security Information Service (SI)
- Maritime Police
- Other entities, upon invitation of the Secretary-General of the SSI

Therefore, UCAT is responsible for:

- coordinating the execution plans of the actions foreseen in the ENCT; and
- in the sphere of international cooperation, facilitating the coordination between various contact points for the areas of intervention in the field of terrorism.

This unit, created in 2003, has its powers laid down in *the Internal Security Law (Law No. 53/2008)*, and a consolidation of its function has taken place.

In addition, it is also worth mentioning that the *Internal Security Law* stipulates the establishment of a High Council of Internal Security. Among other duties, the High Council defines the standard principles on the functioning, organisation and discipline amongst the security services and forces, as well as the delimitation of each of these entities' competences; it also provides guidelines on their specialisation and continuous training. The Council is presided by the Prime-Minister (PM) and is composed of: the Vice PMs (if existent); the Ministers of the State and Presidency (if existent); the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Justice, National Defence and Finance; the Minister of Public Works, Transport and Communications; the Presidents of the Regional Governments of the Azores and Madeira; the Secretary-General of the SSI; the Secretary-General of the SIRP; the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces;

³⁰¹ Silva, T. (2015). *A ameaça terrorista em Portugal* (Doctoral thesis in International Relations, at Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa). Available at: <https://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/16264>

³⁰² Prata, B. (2016). "Luta contra o terrorismo em Portugal: Da estratégia nacional à unidade de coordenação antiterrorismo". In V. Viana (Ed.), *IDN Cadernos: I Seminário IDN Jovem*. Lisbon: Instituto de Defesa Nacional, pp. 43-61.

two deputies designed by the National Assembly; the Commander General of the GNR; the National Directors of the PSP, PJ and SEF; the Directors of the SIED and SIS; the National Maritime Authority; the responsible persons for the Aeronautic Authority System and for the Integrated System on Protection and Rescue Operations; and the Director-General of the DGRSP.

Furthermore, regarding the SIS, it should be noted that it contributes to reducing the risk of terrorist attacks in Portugal and has exclusive competence to evaluate this threat within the country's territory. Within its field of legal competence, the SIS aims to detect and mitigate the risk factors of this type of threat, namely: violent radicalisation processes and individuals and platforms related to the recruitment of elements destined to terrorist organisations' international hubs. According to Silva,³⁰³ the SIS has been developing awareness-raising activities in order to maintain the positive integration of Muslim communities, which at this time do not show signs of radicalism.

Ministry of Justice

The Portuguese General Directorate of Reintegration and Prison Services (DGRSP) is an integral part of the Ministry of Justice. It is responsible for prevention policy development, criminal sanctions and social reintegration measures implementation, the articulated and complementary management of protection systems in-prison, education, ensuring that conditions are compatible with human dignity, and safeguarding order and social peace in prison facilities.

Public policy tools and guidelines towards tackling radicalisation

The current training programme for law enforcement officers aims to provide a variety of tools that will allow them to detect, identify, and prevent both extremism and radicalisation phenomena. This objective will be achieved through close contact with minority communities and regular assessment of the way in which terrorists operate. Several security departments take part in the course: SIS, Strategic Information Defence Service, Tax and Customs Authority, Maritime Police, GNR, PSP, PJ, foreign agencies and border services, and the DGRSP. This training programme is a joint initiative between the Ministry of Justice and the Internal Administration, being also one of the strategic guidelines for 2017 that was considered in the previous year's RASI.

While in 2015, with the ENCT publication (*Council of Ministers Resolution No. 7-A/2015*), a reference was made to developing plans of action for the detection and prevention of radicalisation processes, the 2016 RASI set twelve strategic guidelines for 2017 concerning both the prevention of radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Three of these guidelines specifically refer to radicalisation,³⁰⁴ namely:

- "prepare strategies and plans of action stemming from the ENCT;
- strengthen specific training for the security services and forces on matters such as the detection, identification, and prevention of extremism and radicalisation phenomena, such as approaching minority communities and updating information on the terrorists' modus operandi;

³⁰³ Silva, T. (2015). *A ameaça terrorista em Portugal*.

³⁰⁴ Sistema de Segurança Interna (SSI) (2016). *Relatório Anual da Segurança Interna*, p. 227. Available at: [http://www.ansr.pt/InstrumentosDeGestao/Documents/Relat%C3%B3rio%20Anual%20de%20Seguran%C3%A7a%20Interna%20\(RASI\)/RASI%202016.pdf](http://www.ansr.pt/InstrumentosDeGestao/Documents/Relat%C3%B3rio%20Anual%20de%20Seguran%C3%A7a%20Interna%20(RASI)/RASI%202016.pdf)

- strengthen monitoring and surveillance of extremism, radicalisation and recruitment phenomena for terrorist activity, particularly in cyber, prison and school environments”.

However, the last RASI (i.e., the report of 2017) only mentioned two additional and complementary guidelines to the preceding years’ RASI, of which one refers to radicalisation, aiming to “strengthen the articulation and information sharing between all the criminal police organisations, information services, as well as public and private entities, with the purpose to prevent recruitment, radicalisation and terrorism financing”.³⁰⁵

Table 13. List of respondents (Portugal)

Respondent code	Position/Department	Institution/Role
PT-C1	<i>Example 1</i>	General Directorate of Probation and Prison Services
PT-P1	<i>Example 2</i>	General Directorate of Probation and Prison Services

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³⁰⁵ Sistema de Segurança Interna (SSI) (2017). *Relatório Anual da Segurança Interna*, p. 232.

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