



**INTEGRA**

Integrated community, probation and prison services  
radicalisation prevention approach



# INTEGRA

## 01. State of the art and best practices review

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“Integrated approach to the prevention of radicalisation  
by the community, probation, and prison services”



## STATE OF ART



### **Promoting the individual deradicalisation and disengagement of radicalised prisoners and former prisoners in Europe: literature review.**

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## Introduction - Fabien Laffont

### The Integra project

The goal of Integra is to improve the transition between prison and/or probation and community services for individuals regarded as being at risk of radicalisation or who have already been radicalised. This project attempts to achieve this outcome by promoting a holistic prevention of radicalisation and focusing on the development of the skills of radicalised individuals', but also of the organisations and staff at the forefront. Its specific goals are the following:

- Transposing existing at a larger scale and understanding their role from the point of view of the prevention of radicalisation and of disengagement/deradicalisation;
- Developing skill programmes for the teams that work at the forefront with prisoners, from the point of view of reintegration in society, including prison and probation staff, and the organisations who work closely with prison services;
- Establishing a local mentorship model to support radicalised former prisoners and their families;
- Ensuring shared knowledge and collaboration among the relevant authorities and organisations working with individuals who are vulnerable to radicalisation or who have already been radicalised. This is intended to ensure that radicalised individuals are consistently handled during and after their imprisonment, in order to bring radicalisation to an end as soon as possible.

The following work corresponds to one of the first stages of this project, namely describing the existing national and European theories and practices for the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism, deradicalisation, and disengagement within the context of criminal justice. On the basis of the recent literature published in this field (scientific papers, research reports, reviews, etc.), we will review the existing studies on the prevention of radicalisation in prison contexts at the European level and at specific national levels (France, Greece, Portugal,

Italy, and Bulgaria), paying special attention to those strategies that encourage individual deradicalisation and disengagement and the factors that contribute to their effectiveness.

## Radicalisation as a process

To begin with, it is very important to specify what is meant by “radicalisation”. Our approach to radicalisation will be the basis to define the relevant practices and theories regarding prevention and disengagement. The literature review published by the R2PRIS project (Ionescu et al, 2016) brings together the definitions proposed in the last ten years. Examining these definition reveals at least one aspect that is unanimous: regarding radicalisation as a process. This position leads to no longer definitively regarding the phenomenon of radicalisation as an isolated event, an unexplained tipping point, where only its causes would have to be established. The “procedural dimension of action” (Crettiez et al, 2017) tends to regard radicalisation as an individual construction that the sociological concept of “career” will help us to grasp, in accordance with the different times and different key factors involves. The analysis of careers reveals changes in status, the crossing of thresholds, “pivotal moments that are systematically encoded as indices of the progress of a process” (Poussou Plesse in Bessin et al, 2009: 255). Thus, this comprehensive approach makes it possible to define the typical careers of radicalised individuals, to which it will be easier to adapt prevention tools on the basis of their progress in the radicalisation process.

Radicalisation as a process has been considered by the organisations that fight terrorism, as the predictive logic is currently the operating paradigm in countries such as France, despite the obvious cases of injustice that can occur when applying the principle of anticipation. As Claire de Galembert points out: “The predictive goal of the fight against radicalisation causes a non-negligible displacement. While the identification of proselytes involved delimiting a state, the detection of prisoners being radicalised means understanding an ongoing process on the basis of the interpretation of signs regarded as forerunners” (2016: 62). We will examine the implications of this paradigm shift for prison administrations.

Radicalisation as a process thus involves a gradual change in time, in ideology, in beliefs, in conduct, and in motivations. The definition proposed by the sociologist Farad Khosrokarar

(2014) has often been used to define radicalisation: “a process by which an individual or a group takes a violent form of action, directly connected to an extremist ideology which political, social, or religious contents, which challenge the established order at a political, social, or cultural level”. This is also how the ICSR researchers Vidino and Brandon (2012) defined cognitive radicalisation, as well as its highest stage, violent radicalisation. However, the research report for the legal research project published in April 2017, based on qualitative research for a procedural and biographic analysis of violent engagement has resulted in a more precise and fuller definition of radicalisation. This is the definition we will use in this literature review:

*We will define radicalisation as the gradual and evolving adoption of rigid thinking, absolute and non-negotiable truth, whose logic structures the worldview of the agents, who use violent actions to make it understood, most frequently within formalised or virtual clandestine structures, which isolate them from ordinary social references and lead them to have a grandiose projection of themselves. The approach to radicalisation is thus based on three factors: its evolving dimension; the adoption of sectarian thinking; the use of armed violence. (Crettiez et al, 2017: 10)*

This definition has the advantage that it does not consider the notion of “questioning of the established order”, which theoretically could apply both to terrorist actions and to social movements and forms of political opposition. This distinction is also important within a prison context, in which forms of violent protest by certain social groups can take place, without them being the result of radicalisation, but rather a reaction to unequal or discriminating prison conditions. Thus, we can see how the term “radicalisation” and its definition have a non-negligible political weight.

This definition also has the advantage of encompassing the process of cognitive radicalisation and that of violent radicalisation. However, it is important not to regard the commission of violent acts as automatic. Violent activism is a further step in radicalisation, the result of changes that take place during radicalisation, driving individuals to support or to become involved in violent, even terrorist, practices. Given the way in which we consider radicalisation as a process with several stages, this means that it is possible to act against violent engagement if

it is not possible to quickly act against cognitive radicalisation. This distinction is also important in a prison context, if we believe that a radicalised individual can be reintegrated in society once he abandoned violent engagement. For this reason, it is important to distinguish between radicalism and extremism, the latter being directly linked to terrorist acts according to the RAN report (2016).

By choosing to think of radicalisation as a process, as a sociological careers, with its own pathways and stages, we must consider this career in its pure temporal dimension (namely, where the individual is in this radicalisation career), but also the contextual opportunities that have made the development of the career possible, that is, the multiple factors involved in the process, bearing in mind that certain factors have greater weight at certain points and in accordance with the underlying logic of each individual's radical engagement (multiple involvement mechanisms). This explains by radicalised individuals' profiles are so heterogeneous and thus so hard to evaluate and manage. The recommendations in CRESAM (2018) give us the key factors to identify the problem in an individual regarded as radicalised: “identifying a specific time in the process when the individual became engaged”, “analysing the consistency of the various factors and what links them”, and finally “identifying the potential weak points in the process”.

### **Prison as a relevant place for intervention**

Several factors and several timelines are thus involved in the construction of a radicalised individual's career. Of these, imprisonment has been identified as crucial in the radicalisation process by the media, politicians, and researchers. Political scientist Gilles Kepel has gone so far as to compare prison to a “jihadist university”. It should be mentioned that the murders committed by Mohamed Merah in 2012 “brought prison under fire from the media and from public criticism” (Galembert, 2016: 63). Recent literature tends however to add nuances to this view. Prison as a place where crime or terrorists are created is nothing new. Moreover, the proportion of radicalised individuals or violent extremists in prison can give rise to disproportionate alarm, as Belkaïd & Vidal (2017) point out: “In a paper based on a five-year survey, Farhad Khosrokhavar estimates “40 % to 60 % of prisoners are Muslims”. He specifies that there are several types of religious practices behind bars, with “*jihadist Islam*” being practised only by a minority”. For Mourad Benchellali, a former prisoner at Guantanamo, the

way in which the role of prison in radicalisation is currently depicted is disproportionate. Certain individuals become radicalised, but prison is not the antechamber to radicalism. In a paper for OIP, Sarah Dindo also highlights this trend towards euphemism on the part of the Minister of Justice and the Head of Prisons, who “say that, of the 172 individuals arrested for crimes connected to radical Islam, only 21 had already been imprisoned”. The former deduces that “we must work on the 86% who become radicalised elsewhere, in particular on the Internet and in social media”. The latter concludes that “there is no direct causal link between imprisonment and terrorism”.

This way of qualifying the role of prison is not necessarily inconsistent, as ultimately most research shows that prison is not the main site for radicalisation. Obviously, financial and human resources should be proportionally allocated. However, as sociologist Ouisa Kies highlights, actually 86% of individuals accused or convicted for terrorist acts are radicalised outside prison, “but those who will actually commit attacks are those who were in prison”. Emmanuel Jovelin confirms it in his paper *De la délinquance à la radicalisation* (From delinquency to radicalisation): “From Khaled Kelkal in 1995 to those of Mohamed Merah in 2012, from Mehdi Nemmouche in 2014, from the Kouachi brothers and from Amedy Coulibaly in 2015 to Mohammed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel in 2016, the authors of recent attacks in France and Belgium share certain common traits: delinquency, educational institutions, and prison” (Jovelin, 2016: 59). This means that prison plays a structuring role in radicalisation processes, and particularly in the construction of the passage to the violent radicalisation stage. Consequently, prison appears as a relevant site for intervention, whose importance was grasped by Dominique Vidal and Akram Belkaïd (2017), “hindering radicalisation in prison will require the prevention of a total and definitive convergence between Salafism and Jihadism”. This challenge is all the more important in the current situation - that of the return of radicalised individuals who left for Syria and of individuals under arrest on the basis of the principle of anticipation applied by the organisations in charge of the fight against terrorism. Jihadism weights on the judicial and prison authorities. The IFRI report published in April 2018 warns about this situation, particularly due to individuals who have re-offended despite having served a sentence for terrorist acts. The issue of the recidivism of violent extremists in France “is all the more burning given that about sixty individuals convicted for terrorist acts should be released in the next two years” (Hecker, 2018:


7). Developing these systems for prevention and handling in prison, in addition to being a significant challenge, is an urgent mission to fight radicalisation in prison.

## Radicalisation in prison

After having established that radicalisation should be regarded as a process, and after having established that prison is a relevant place to carry out prevention actions, we must establish what we understand by radicalisation in prison, which is the purpose of this paper. As Peter Neumann says in the ICSR report (2010), prisons are vulnerability sites, which generate individuals who seek their own identities, who seek protection, or else rebels, in a higher number than in other environments. Prisons provide almost perfect conditions for the development of radicalisation, particularly religious radicalisation. Radicalisation in prison has its own characteristics: a prison sentence tends to worsen violence, social exclusion, and radicalisation in general for everyone. Mulcahy et al. (2013) have rightly pointed out that this time of vulnerability is a trigger for the radicalisation process. These authors propose a definition of radicalisation in prison given by the Office of the Inspector General of the US Department of Justice, defining it: “the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes”. The R2PRIS is also based on the definition proposed by Goldman: “the term *prison radicalisation* usually refers to individuals being radicalised in prison, not that terrorist plots are being formulated in prison” (Ionescu et al., 2016: 11).

Thus there is no real need to propose a definition of radicalisation in prison that is different from general radicalisation. It is always process of gradual adoption of rigid, sectarian thinking. Unless this process takes place in a delimited location in which we are able to grasp the temporal context in which radicalisation takes place, and to act on the factors that may contribute to its construction. Focusing on prison, after having considered radicalisation as a process leads us to restricting our field of action in a specific place at a specific time of the process. Thus, we are dealing with a context in which we can develop systems or intervene on already existing systems in order to improve prevention and handling. In order for prevention to be effective, we must know on which individuals to act, at what time to act, and on which factors. On the basis of

research done in US prisons, Sinai (2014) has developed a seven-stage timeline for violent radicalisation.



**Figure 1.** The stages of radicalisation in prison (Source: Sinai, 2014)

Many models have appeared to break the radicalisation process into explanatory stages. Sinai's adapts these models to the prison context. He shows that we face two types of population: we are dealing with individuals convicted for their involvement in terrorist acts, and whose engagement in terrorist acts is proven (radicalised individuals), who form social groups within prison in order to “recruit” (they take part in the second stage, becoming part of the context of a given prison). Or else we are dealing with individuals who have been convicted for common offences, who, due to their life stories and socialisation are susceptible to radicalisation processes (vulnerable individuals). It is precisely because prison brings these two populations together and forces them to co-exist that prison constitutes a major challenge in the fight against radicalisation. Crettiez et al. say that the experience of imprisonment can take part in radicalisation through the affinity groupings of prisoners, the influence of opportunistic imams, or, in certain countries, traumatic experiences. The importance of relationship networks in prison, and the staff's ability to distinguish and categorise them can help to define key agents (contacts, spiritual guides) and relational contexts favourable to radicalisation. This is way the problem of radicalisation in prison does not correspond only to prevention among accused or convicted individuals who are in a vulnerable position and receptive to the radical discourse. It also corresponds to the handling of radicalised prisoners within prison so that their influence on the other prisoners is not decisive.

## The goals of this literature review

This literature review focuses on the recent reports and research that have been published to fight radicalisation. Radical Islam is not the only sector of violent radicalisation, but most recent publications take it as its reference. However, focusing in radical Islam in no way prevents the development of tools and systems that can be transposed to any kind of radicalisation.

The goal of this work is to make a list of the approaches and practices in the field of prevention strategies to promote individual deradicalisation and disengagement of radicalised prisoners and former prisoners in Europe. Prevention is a key factor: it is crucial to invest in intervention systems in the sites that foster radicalisation, such as prison, in order to act as soon as possible in radicalisation processes. The best way to make prevention effective is to train the staff and professionals working at the forefront, in direct contact with prisoners engaged in a radicalisation process. Bad prison distribution, bad categorisation, bad deradicalisation can have the opposite effects to those sought. For this reason, prevention and management of risks in prison can be located at three levels - three challenges which must be properly delimited in order to allocate the required resources.

The first challenge is that of the evaluation of radicalisation. It is crucial to know what we are dealing with, what radicalisation profile we are facing, the stage of the process at which the assessed individual is, and his evolution. This assessment determines the way in which the radicalised individual will be handled and the systems in which he or she will be included. However, the still high level of confusion between the various profiles and categories of individuals who have been or are being radicalised is a hindrance to proper assessment. After having delimited the location of the problem in this confusion, we will return to what already exists as regards the detection and assessment of radicalised prisoners and will propose solutions to improve existing systems.

After the assessment stage comes the risk management stage and the handling of prisoners who have been or are being radicalised. This is the second challenge for prevention, particular because the problem of contagion is inherent to prison. We will see how the prison system manages its radicalised population in certain European countries, and the proposed ways to fight radicalisation.

The third challenge which we will propose is that of probation and the reintegration of radicalised prisoners in society. Most individuals who have been or are being radicalised will leave prison, and it is impossible not to support them in this stage. Therefore, the problem of deradicalisation and/or disengagement arises, which is one of the main topics of the INTEGRA project. Reintegration systems already exist. Our goal will be to improve and adapt them to the problem of radicalisation on the basis of the local context, training professionals and social workers on the field, ensuring that they are sufficient to develop an approach for each case.

Finally, we will briefly review the recommendations on good practices and the systems to implements or to adopt, in order to achieve an integral and operational approach to the fight against radicalisation.

## I/ First challenge: the assessment – Fabien Laffont

The identification of individuals being radicalised and the assessment of prisoners convicted for association with criminals for terrorist purposes is the first challenge which must be dealt with in the fight against radicalisation in prison, given the extent to which it determines their handling in the prison system as well as the conditions for their reintegration after imprisonment. But this assessment is a difficult task. There is a need to undo the confusions that blur assessment work and to consider existing practices in order to give the relevant recommendations.

### 1/ The gist of the problem: confusion

#### *Confusion regarding the signs of religiosity*

It is often the staff at the forefront that are required to conduct the assessment. However, assessments tend to focus on signs of religiosity, in particular Islam, and prison staff tend to display a serious level of ignorance regarding this religion and its subtleties. As Mourad Benchellali, a former Guantanamo prisoner who is now involved in reintegration and the fight against radicalisation, points out: “in France no distinction is made between someone who has a rigorous view of Islam and a violent extremist. There is a high level of confusion between them” (OIP, 2016). Observers tend to focus on individuals who have a religious practice of Islam that they perceive as rigorous, and so “any form of religious intensification exposes practitioners to

reinforced surveillance (more sustained observation, potential phone tapping, opening their letters, monitoring their reading, exchanges with information professionals, etc.) and may justify preventive measures, e.g. isolation, or sanctions such as transfer to the punishment block” (Galembert, 2016: 68). Thus, it must be ensured that these stigmatising practices do not have the effect of reinforcing the process which they are supposed to fight, as Farhad Khrosrokhavar points out: “by extending suspicion to all Muslims, and in particular to Fundamentalists, a stigmatisation is generated that may contribute to creating the radicalisation effect that it was sought to prevent”. Claire de Galembert confirms in her paper that there are mechanisms for the reversal of stigma by individuals who are constantly under surveillance, which are mainly expressed by the assumed display of an ostentatious, provoking, and protesting ‘Islamicity’. These attitudes can fuel the reasons for prison staff to believe in terrorist motivations, when nothing proves it empirically.

The practice of religious conversion in prison brings to light this confusion that can prevail among staff members. Conversion to a religion is not the same thing as radicalisation. It has already been repeatedly proven that imprisonment is a time in the life of an individual that encourages a return to religion, as the practice of a religion has a structuring effect in the experience of imprisonment. However, in the current context in prison, this practice can be perceived in a completely different way, as conversion can be the expression of radicalisation rather than evolution towards faith. This link is not automatically established, but, according to certain researchers, conversion is not necessarily an early sign of extremism, but it is necessary in the development of extremist thinking. But a doubt regarding this interpretation persists. The R2PRIS report (2016) highlights that other researchers consider religious conversions differently: for them, Islam restructures prisoners’ lives and its practice occupies their days in such a way that they become targets that are less easy for terrorists to recruit. Again, regarding radicalisation as an individual process enables us to settle the debate more easily. The point is not to know what conversion represents in prison, but rather to analyse it in terms of the meaning that a convert attributes to it and to connect it with his history.

And it is precisely there that the entire problem of confusion faced by all the agents in the fight against radicalisation lies. There is no one single explanatory factor, there is no one single profile, there is no one single type of history. Radicalised individuals do not constitute a

homogeneous group and the research conducted until now are not still able to establish one definitively. The plurality of profiles makes assessment difficult: the goal is to identify signs of radicalisation, and this goes beyond the boundaries of religion. Moreover, because profiles change, as Khosrokhavar points out, we are witnessing the emergence of a new paradigm for radicalisation in prison. The population is no longer the same: “Now, jihadists are often uneducated in religious terms. They have a very selective reading of the Koran,” he says. “Often, they go from practising Muslims to jihadists without going through the “radical religious” stage”. (...) Radicalisation precedes Islamisation” (cited in OIP, 2016: 2). Khosrokhavar (2015) bears witness to the diversification of the register of radical Islam in prison. From an extroverted model of the jihadist attributed to the classic religious fundamentalist whose traits are the following:

- Growing a beard, which distinguishes islamists from others;
- Participation in collective prayers not authorised in prison, led by someone who is not an imam authorised by the prison;
- The adoption of an aggressive behaviour towards guards, but also towards prisoners who do not follow the version of Islam advocated by the prisoner in question;
- The questioning of the imam approved by the prison;
- Dressing like Salafists, who believe they dress like the Prophet (djellaba, qamis, siwak);
- Among converts, the adoption of an ultra-orthodox attitude;
- Development of a type of proselytism;
- The creation of groups of several individuals in order to promote an ostentatious view of Islam, in defiance of prison authorities and rules. This group also serves to protect its members;
- The promotion of religious activities;
- The appropriation of minimal religious knowledge.

To an introverted model of jihadist who conceals his faith and whose characteristics are the following:

- Short beard;
- Refusal to create large networks;
- Refusal to contact the prison imam in any way;

- Introverted attitude, no proselytism, invisibility;
- New type of relationship between the radicalising individual (strong personality) and the radicalised individual (an individual who can be influenced);
- Refusal to display aggressiveness towards the guards and concealment of religious practice;
- Rejection of any religious marker during Ramadan;
- Establishment of duos.

We can now see how paying attention to signs of religiosity can lead to confusion and make detection methods inoperative.

### *Confusion regarding labelling*

In prison, two population categories must be distinguished when talking about the fight against radicalisation. On the one hand, there are those individuals who have been convicted for association with criminals preparing a terrorist act (AMT), who are thus regarded as radicalised individuals who fall within the framework of tertiary prevention. And on the other hand, there are those individuals who have been convicted for common offences, imprisoned for crimes not linked to terrorism, but certain of whom are susceptible to start or continue the process of radicalisation in prison, and who thus constitute a vulnerable population falling within the framework of secondary prevention. The assessment method and the detection signs obviously cannot be the same for these two categories.

The AMT category includes very different profiles and charges, so that this group, which might seem homogeneous, comprises very complex facts. Predictive logic, described in the introduction, as the paradigm for the fight against radicalisation can in no way be found in the heterogeneity of the profiles of those imprisoned for terrorist acts. As Antonie Garapon remarks, “Watching videos and committing attacks are conflated, threats and actions are conflated. This is found in the idea of dangerousness: our system is finding it increasingly difficult to distinguish the material from the virtual. Currently, someone can go to Syria for various reasons, and they are strongly condemned: we do not know what they wanted to do and they certainly do not know it.

This poses a real problem: motives are impugned” (Garapon et al., 2016: 69). This confusion is generated by the legal system, but is consequently also found in the prison system. Ouisa Kies makes exactly the same argument: "I am astonished that a combatant who clearly states that he has fought for Al-Nosra and a ‘quietist’ Salafist who has been in Syria for some weeks with his family are handed exactly the same sentence (nine year’s imprisonment) (in Garapon et al., 2016: 68). The example of individuals who are back from war zones is eloquent. As Crettiez et al. argue, there is a variety of reasons to leave to Islamic lands which cannot be reduced to an intention to fight, which may often appear later, on the basis of experience and opportunities (adventure, humanitarian reasons, learning Arabic, sentimental flight, boredom with the local, lack of prospects of social ascent, adherence to Islam, etc.) Any assessment system and assessment screening must thus consider this plurality of profiles. Researchers like Khosrokhavar have already tried to establish a finer-grained categorisation of the jihadists who travelled to Syria. He classifies them into three groups:

- Those who returned as hardened jihadists liable to kill in society;
- Those who returned in disillusionment, and who should be handled in order to be deindoctrinated;
- Those who have been traumatised and who come back in a damaged psychological state. The two latter categories cannot be in contact with the first one, due to the risk of relapsing into blind Jihadism.

In addition to these individuals who are labelled as radicals on the basis of legal criteria, there are “radicalised” individuals who are not under investigation by justice or prosecuted for facts connected to their radicalisation. They may be individuals who have already undergone a radicalisation process, whose imprisonment may pose the risk of encouraging this process. We also have a category of individuals who are susceptible to engagement in a radicalisation process during their time in prison. The profile is no more homogeneous in this case: there are “those who adhere to this discourse in order to place themselves under the protection of a leader so as to escape pressure by bullies or other individuals who seek to exploit their weakness; their adherence to radicalism is sometimes a strategy, initially, but group dynamics can turn them into individuals who have been actually radicalised. Finally, those who believe that claiming membership in the Islamist movement will increase their prestige or their capacity for action: for

prisons who experience being “less than nothing”, staying out of the fray is important. Close surveillance by the administration has mostly reduced the latter category” (Khosrokhavar,2014). We can see how the heterogeneity of the profiles which observers have to deal with results in considerable confusion when making an assessment.

This confusion, associated with the confusion regarding the signs of religiosity, turns the most visible individuals, such as fundamentalists, into targets, labelling them as dangerous without justification, as they make no calls to violence. But this labelling in prisons has effects that have already been remarked on. Galembert shows that there is “a discursive distinction between *those who have been radicalised* and *the others*”, and thus it becomes a figure for public action in the prison system. The systems for the assessment and the detection of deviant behaviours have well-known effects and problems identified by the labelling theory. Howard Becker estimates that labelling an individual as deviant has negative effects on the individual's surroundings and identity, which tend to increasingly reinforce the behaviours regarded as deviant. This may be all the more true to the extent that the criteria for the selection of individuals regarded as radicalised are opaque, as the French Controller-General of prisons recalled: “For example, the Prison Department had initially classified one of our clients at Fresnes as “non-recoverable” and intended to have him transferred to Lille, while his radicality had in no way been established and he is still under court monitoring. The judge's intervention was required for the transfer not to take place”, say the lawyers, who highlight that this is not the only example “in the hazardous work of categorisation carried out by the Prison Department” (2016: 44). Thus, we see that there is a legal confusion in this intention to detect radicalised profiles and deal with them differently (sanctions, searches, placement), at risk of generating statuses for specific prisoners which may play a role on their development. An injustice against an individual regarded as radicalised when this is not the case may cause them to actually engage in a radicalisation process. In this way it is crucial to define finer-grained categories in the categorisation process in order to make assessment more operative in the fight against radicalisation.

### *Confusion regarding the goals*

There may also be confusion regarding the level of the goals of these assessment systems. If the goals are not clearly established, there is the risk of making too general observations, so

that the staff in charge of observation find themselves lost in their mission. The field of observation and the field of action in which assessment takes place must be clearly defined. For the detection of individuals may simply serve to maintain social peace in a given prison. But it can give rise to a more specific assessment of individual needs as regards their inclusion in a system. In one case, we find ourselves within the logic of surveillance; in the other, within the logic of prevention.

### *Confusion regarding the staff in charge of assessment*

Another confusion emerges in the implementation of these detection or assessment systems. For example, in France, there are many professionals or services in charge of this implementation: the prison information service and its local offices, assessment units, new psychologist-educator pairings being recruited within the Plan for the Fight Against Terrorism (PLAT), not including the mission for the assessment of integration and probation prison services (SPIP). OIP says: “a terrible confusion emerges regarding their attributions in the assessment of radicalism. Not only do identification systems seem to be based on different logics, but there also seems to be a chaotic system for the collection and analysis of information” (OPI, 2016: 4). Confusion among the staff in charge of assessment, regarding collection and interpretation, and it should be added that there is still no real theory of radicalisation that even establishes typical profiles to refer to. There is a real interdisciplinary effort in the assessment systems in order to exchange views on the histories of individuals regarded as engaged in a radicalisation process.

## **2/ What already exists**

### *Screening & Assessment*

In order to prevent radicalisation, screening and alert procedures have been created. In France, the inter-ministry guide for the prevention of radicalisation published in March 2016 is a useful tool to facilitate radicalisation flagging. It is intended to help local agents to structure an offer to support families and handle individuals flagged as radicalised. This kind of tool already existed in prison, as screening for other kinds of criminals already existed. However, new ones had to be developed in order to fit the phenomena to be assessed. As the OPI (2016) report points out, it was after 2004 and 2005 that detection axes emphasising the observation of proselytism

and ostentatious Islamist behaviour were developed. The French Prison Department Information Office was thus asked to create “a tool for the detection of radicalisation phenomena”, in order to “quantify the political and religious phenomenon”, “identify the structures most affected”, and “establish quarterly statistical monitoring”. Handling was never involved (OIP, 2016). These detection practices are linked to the information services (Galembert, 2016), which is a real problem for the definition of the goals for the parties involved. Assessment is required to deal with the problem, not only from a security point of view.

However, these detection tools focus on the intensity and visibility of religious practice. Under the form of a screening comprising 21 questions that can be answered “yes”, “no”, or “do not know” (OIP, 2016), or of the assignation of a colour code (Galembert, 2016), observers must identify signs of food, dress, cultural, discursive, or religious practices such as: wearing a beard, a djellaba, consumption of pork-free meals or hallal products, reading certain works, calls to collective prayer, planning of prayer areas, cell isolation, refusal of television, etc. The predictive logic - whose adverse effects have been mentioned - that is then followed in the fight against radicalisation has tried to redefine these tools for detection. Claire de Galembert has not found “a real break with the initial screening for the detection of proselytes. True, the emphasis now placed on the transformation of prisoners and ‘changes in appearance’, but the assessment continued to be conducted in terms of religious practice, even if the object of the alert is no longer movement towards increased religiosity but towards decreased religiosity, with the decrease being interpreted as a concealment strategy” (2016: 62). Moreover, this screening must consider both categories of prisoners: those who are already engaged in a radicalisation process, and ordinary prisoners who were not radicalised up until their imprisonment, but who are susceptible, vulnerable to adherence to the radicalisation discourse. The factors that may be decisive are not the same.

The R2PRIS report partly summarises the different ways to approach detection, including the work of researchers like Horgan (2008) to establish the risk factors for engagement with terrorism, or the works of Borum (2014) regarding engagement with violent extremism; but also more specific kinds of screening, such as those used in the United Kingdom, called the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+) or that used in Australia, called the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA-2). A new kind of screening to assist assessment of the risk of Islamist

radicalisation has become widespread in France since 2015. It too involves factors regarded as decisive that are linked to the prisoner's conviction, background, behaviour disorders, social environment, radical discourses, and everyday life in prison.

When examining these different kinds of detection, we quickly have the impression that many factors are piled up, mixed together, added, multiplied... Galembert (2016) warns that these assessment tools refer to “statistical forms of assessment of radical risk that follow the lines of actuarial tools, that is, tools based on mathematical models for the calculation of risk that follow a probabilistic reasoning”. Here we have the premises for a drift into the management ideology of the detection of radicalisation, while being aware that on the field observers undergo pressure to identify radicals. Antoine Garapon (2016) alerts about this phenomenon in prisons: “Cognitivists are in power, and their theology is made up of algorithms”. When it is known that detection focuses disproportionately on religious practice, is based on predictive logic, and does not have the adequate categories to correspond to the profiles observed, we can understand why Khrosrokhavar found this approach to be completely unsuitable. The fight against radicalisation in prison must be adapted in order to better detect and frame the profiles at risk. This involves the analysis of biographies and careers to the detriment of the identification of a pile of decontextualised signs. Rather than approaching detection as a mere statistical apparatus that would be solved by adding factors, researchers like Ouisa Kies and Edouardo Valenzuela propose a detection method different from mere screening, which would take the form of specific structures: the radicalisation assessment areas.

### **The radicalisation assessment areas (*quartiers d'évaluation de la radicalisation, QERs*)**

In January 2015, the teams in charge of detection in France became known as UPRAs (units for the prevention of radicalisation). They were been created in French prisons, with some units being in charge of reception and others of assessment (Fleury-Mérogis and Fresnes). UPRAs were composed of older male prisoners. Inclusion in an UPRA ensured having a single cell. Prisoners were handled in compliance with the ordinary imprisonment system, with the relevant rights and obligations, and each unit proposes different handling methods, adapted to individual profiles. There were support pairings (trained educators and psychologists) who were

assigned to monitor radicalised individuals by means of individual interviews. In October 2016, a change in strategy took place, placing assessment at the heart of the prison system following the submission of a plan for prison security and action against violent radicalisation by the Ministry of Justice. UPRAs were replaced by six radicalisation assessment areas (QERs).

There are three assessment areas in France. They employ observers specially recruited to intervene in the field of radicalisation. Individuals are imprisoned in QERs on a temporary basis only, for four months - the time it takes to assess their degree of adherence to Jihadist ideology and dangerousness. As of the writing of this document in early 2018, there are 505 men and women imprisoned in France for terrorist acts. They must pass through QERs in order for prison authorities to establish their radicalisation level and adapt their monitoring in prison. One third of the prisoners in QERs were returning from Syria, Iraq, or Chechnya. The others were radicalised in France, often online, and some of them had tried to join ISIS. Some of them were imprisoned for terrorist acts, others are in prison because of different crimes but were flagged due to their radical practice of Islam. The various prison agents try to establish their risk of committing violent acts. Assessment periods last in principle eight weeks. This exceeds the times in national assessment centres. Assessment is conducted by interdisciplinary teams, including educators, psychologists, and integration, probation, and surveillance prison service staff).

In this system, emphasis is not placed on collective monitoring but rather on individual assessment. The goal is to establish “the existence of a risk of committing violent acts based on a religious extremist reasons, as well as the level of radicality, religious indoctrination, and influence, in order to find the risk of disturbance in ordinary imprisonment in terms of proselytism and coercion of other prisoners” (CGLPL, 2016). Prisoners in QERs go through 18 individual interviews lasting several hours. Every fifteen days, the professionals meet to examine each case in detail, sharing their skills to identify radicalised prisoners and detect those hiding behind false repentance. A specific trait of QERs is detecting potential “weak” signs, less obvious than sudden changes, which may indicate concealed radicalisation. A stereotyped discourse, the intention to move away from the laws of the Republic, an asocial behaviour, or a certain degree of nervousness, among others, can raise alarm bells. The synthesis of the assessments is regarded as “administrative” in nature. It is intended to be sent to the interregional prison department (DISP). After going through an assessment unit, a prisoner may be sent to a handling unit, sent

for ordinary imprisonment, or placed in isolation in a high-security prison environment (CGLPL, 2016).

### 3/ Prospects for improvement

On the basis of the observations described above, we make the following general recommendations to better deal with the challenge of assessment in the fight against radicalisation in prison.

1. **Assessing the potential for radicalisation of a given prison:** overcrowding and the presence of charismatic leaders are two particularly significant factors in the rise in cases of radicalisation in prison
2. **Training observers at the forefront:** it is crucial to convey the methodology to the professional team in these prisons.
3. **Not focusing on religious signs:** there is a preponderance of religion and religious signs in the assessment of radicalisation in prison, whereas researchers say that violent engagement may take place before religious engagement. Training for protection against religious confusion is required.
4. **Locating assessment in a longitudinal analysis of biographies and radicalisation careers:** purely quantitative data, analysed outside their context and outside any aetiology of radicalisation do not enable us to grasp the complexity of radical engagement and emphasise a simple management ideology aimed at close monitoring of prisoners.
5. **Assessing on a case-by-case basis:** as Jovelin (2016) points out, “there are several interrelated factors that lead these young people to join the jihad, beyond the explanations taken from sociological (or other) theories, none of which can be generalised. To better grasp the reasons for tipping over, the individual's biography must be reconstructed in order to *understand the chain of interactions and events that marked them and predisposed them to the transgression in question*”.
6. **Establishing handling and reintegration as the goals of assessment:** not only repression and surveillance. Having a shared vision enables professionals to develop handling systems that are as adapted to prisoners' profiles as possible.

7. **The assessment requires offenders' cooperation:** volunteering is indispensable to take part in this programme, according to researchers. Farhad Khosrokhavar also finds that “in a democracy, jihadists can only be handled if they consent to it. No one should be included in a deradicalisation programme against their will”.
8. **Following an interdisciplinary method for screening analysis:** an interdisciplinary view of carers is required rather than a single interpretation. This is already the case of the interdisciplinary committees in QERs in France.
9. **A finer-grained categorisation of prisoners who have been or are being radicalised:** labelling on the basis of finer-grained categories makes it possible to handle individuals in accordance with their needs, which will make it more effective
10. **Conducting an ongoing assessment:** not limiting assessment to an initial stage. The assessment of prisoners should be conducted upon arrival in prison, during their handling or during their imprisonment, and upon leaving prison, during their reintegration.
11. **Assessing the handling and reintegration systems:** in addition to individuals, the systems themselves should be assessed in order to correct problematic elements. The goal is to assess the involved parties' needs and the measures already implemented.
12. **Providing the financial means required:** human, material, and legal means must be implemented in accordance with the systems and the effects sought.

## II/ Second challenge: management of the risks of radicalisation in prison. – Rasha Nagem

The management of the risks and handling of prisoners who have been or are being radicalised is the second challenge for the prevention of radicalisation in prison. In many European countries, prison authorities implement specific measures to improve all aspects of prison management and deal with the spread of ideological violence, in particular because the problem of contagion is inherent to prison.

## 1/ The gist of the problem: contagion?

EU Member States have at least two approach concerning the management of the risk of spread of violent extremist ideology as well as of violent radicalisation in prison and during probation:

- **The general approach**, which is not particularly suited to management of the specific risks of violent extremism and radicalisation leading to prisoner violence. For example, the general approach to reintegration in Italy does not propose a special risk management programme for extremist or violent radicalised prisoners<sup>1</sup>.

- **The specialised approach**, which assess on an ongoing basis the prison procedures and practices specific to violent extremism and radicalisation leading to prisoner violence. For example, in the United Kingdom the Heath Identity programme is intended to manage the risks of violent radicalisation in prison<sup>2</sup>.

## Prison as a crime-generating environment?

In Europe, the fight against violent radicalisation has become crucial for public policies. In prison, there is significant concern regarding the spread of radical and extremist ideologies that may lead to the engagement of radicalised prisoners in terrorist activities upon their release. Management of radicalised and violent extremist prisoners is crucial for prison services, which must follow procedures and apply methods in compliance with international standards and human rights, ensuring the rehabilitation, reintegration, security, and safety of all prisoners<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/index_en.htm)

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons." (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2016). Global Counterterrorism Forum, "Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders" (Rome 2012).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons."

**All prisoners shall be treated with the respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings. No prisoner shall be subjected to, and all prisoners shall be protected from, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, for which no circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification. The safety and security of prisoners, staff, service providers and visitors shall be ensured at all times.**

*The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), rule 1.*

**Preventing and tackling radicalisation and violent extremism shall always be based on the rule of law and shall comply with international human rights standards because respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of a successful counter-radicalisation effort. Failure to comply with these is one of the factors which may contribute to increased radicalisation.**

*Council of Europe (2016): Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism, principle 1*

The recent terrorist attacks in Europe were committed by individuals who had a criminal past<sup>4</sup>. In fact, the Council of Europe Council of Ministers has published as number of “*Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism*”.<sup>5</sup> The guidelines are a management tool for prison and probation services to prevent radicalisation leading to violence in prison and during probation.

Many European states (e.g., Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) have implemented specific programmes and specialised interventions to prevent radicalisation leading to violent in prison and the tipping over of other prisoners convicted of crimes unrelated to violent extremism or terrorism into violent extremist ideology<sup>6</sup>. According to the working document for practitioners in the Radicalisation Awareness Network, “Approaches to violent extremist offenders and countering radicalisation in prisons and probation”, European States do not continually disclose the number of individuals monitored due to risk of potential adherence to violent extremisms. The figures reported show that 600 individuals are monitored in England and Wales, while the number of prisoners in Italy is 124.<sup>7</sup> However, the risk posed by prison as both the trigger and the facilitator for the violent radicalisation process is identified and recognised by prison authorities. Considering the increase in the number of violent extremist prisoners currently jailed, prison no longer only punishes and reintegrates individuals, but also fights violent radicalisation and the spread of violent extremist ideology in prison.

In Europe, research has shown that adherence to violent radicalisation in prisons is the outcome of several factors, such as overcrowding, inadequate imprisonment conditions, racial discrimination and Islamophobia, excessive disciplinary measures, psychological instability, and social non-adaptation. For example, in prisons, violent extremist ideologies can easily attract

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<sup>4</sup> Simon Cottee, “Reborn into Terrorism: Why Are So Many Isis Recruits Ex-Cons and Converts”, The Atlantic, 25 Janvier 2016.

<sup>5</sup> Council of Europe guidelines for prison and probation services regarding radicalisation and violent extremism (adopted by the CM on 2 March 2016 in the 1249 meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).

<sup>6</sup>[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/index_en.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

vulnerable and fragile prisoners through weaknesses such as frustration and the feeling of injustice with respect to society and their imprisonment<sup>8</sup>.

Even though prisons seem to be a fertile soil for the reproduction of radicalisation through the recruitment of other prisoners, support from extremist groups inside and outside prison, hostility against staff, and to a slide into radicalisation due to psychological and social factors, some researchers have shown that the propagation of violent radicalisation is not frequent in prisons. Recent research has challenged the idea that the spread of violent extremism and radicalisation in prisons is due to the ability of violent extremist prisoners or charismatic leaders to easily recruit other prisoners, the appeal of extremist ideologies for prisoners due to their vulnerability or fragility, and to imprisonment or the lack of freedom as a trigger for radicalisation<sup>9</sup>. Several authors have highlighted that the fear of the risk of violent radicalisation of prisoners through the spread of extremist ideologies is exaggerated. Even though research has shown that prisons are not a direct cause of the spread of radicalisation among prisoners, ineffective prison management could be a factor triggering radicalisation<sup>10</sup>.

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8 E. Mulcahy, S. Merrington, P. Bell, 'The Radicalisation of Prison Inmates: Exploring Recruitment, Religion and Prisoner Vulnerability', *Journal of Human Security* (2013), Volume 9, n° 1, p 4 à 14.

9 T. Veldhuis, (2015), *Captivated by fear. An evaluation of terrorism detention policy*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Groningen.

10 See for example Jones, C.R. (2014). Are prisons really schools for terrorism? Challenging rhetoric on prisoner radicalization. *Punishment & Society*, 16, 74-103; G.C. Klein, (2007). An investigation: Have Islamic fundamentalists made contact with white supremacists in the United States? *Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations*, 7, 85–101; B. Useem, (2012). U.S. prisons and the myth of Islamic Terrorism. *Contexts*, 11, 34-39; S. Marsden, (2015) Little evidence to show that prisons have become 'universities of terror'. Available at <https://theconversation.com>; J. Ilardi, (2010). Prison radicalisation: The devil is in the detail. Text presented in the Conference of the ARCLinkage Project on Radicalisation, Understanding Terrorism from an Australian Perspective: Radicalisation, DeRadicalisation and Counter Radicalisation, Monash University, Australia.

## Imprisonment: dispersion or concentration?

The United Nations rules for the treatment of prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) require that prisoners be systematically separated on the basis of their legal status (distinguishing between accused and convicted prisoners), their sex (separating men from women), and their age (separating children from adults).<sup>11</sup> In order to ensure the security and safety of prisons, the classification and categorisation of prisoners are crucial for effective prison management and risk minimisation. The classification of prisoners makes it possible to place them in the prisons that are most suited to their needs, working on their personal and social reintegration. The classification process is a continuous process that starts when the prisoner enters prison and ends when they leave it. This classification is based on the information obtained and the results of the tools for the individual assessment of the risk posed by each prisoner.

As regards the categorisation of prisoners, it is determined by the results of the tools for the assessment of risks associated with security and safety within prisons, as well as to the ability of certain violent extremist prisoners to radicalise other prisoners. Collecting and analysing the information about the legal and personal background and the ideological beliefs of extremist violent prisoners makes it possible to correctly classify and categorise them.<sup>12</sup> However, prisoner classification and categorisation must be thorough, well defined, and assessed, particularly in the case of violent extremist prisoners, given that the wrong interpretation of the results of the assessment of the risks posed by a prisoner may increase the risk of radicalisation in prison.

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11 <https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/GA-RESOLUTION/F-book.pdf>

12 United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons."

Assessments should be based on multiple sources of information to increase reliability.

The sources should consist of:

- *Actuarial data*: about the individual and the offence
- *Dynamic factors*: such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc. Changes in these factors in particular may form triggers to increase risk, or mitigating circumstances that reduce risk.
- *Clinical factors*: professional judgement and experience, using the personal and professional experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading.
- *Information from partners in a multi-agency framework*: information coming from social workers, the police, intelligence services etc. about an individual's case.

*Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context RAN P&P - practitioners working paper, p. 5.*

In Europe, violent extremist prisoners as well as prisoners who are susceptible of radicalisation or of leading other prisoners to radicalisation are placed in three different types of prison<sup>13</sup>. Certain Member States, such as Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, France, and Belgium,

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<sup>13</sup> Roy D. King et Sandra L. Resodihardjo, 'To Max or Not to Max', *Punishment & Society* 12, no. 1 (2010).

place prisoners who have committed terrorist acts in high-security prisons<sup>14</sup>. Obviously, there is a constant assessment and transformation of the different imprisonment systems on the basis of the politics and needs in each country. For example, in France, specific areas were specifically created in 2016 for prisoners convicted of terrorist acts. The prisoners placed in a special area are assessed for four months and then sent to isolation, to areas for violent prisoners, or to standard imprisonment. In 2018, the French Home Office announced that a “coordination unit” would be created to continue to monitor individuals convicted of terrorist acts after their release<sup>15</sup>.

The prison system in Europe follows different imprisonment systems (concentration, dispersion, or both) on the basis of certain factors that depend on the politics, capacities, resources, and priorities in each country. The RAN document (2016), *Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context* explores the drawbacks and advantages of each imprisonment system employed in Europe<sup>16</sup> :

- **Concentration:** the goal of the concentration system is to place radicalised prisoners in special units for significant monitoring together with additional security measures. This system is not only used for prisoners convicted of terrorist acts, but also for all individuals associated with radicalisation leading to violence. This system also makes it possible to separate radicalised prisoners from the rest of the inmates, in order to prevent violent extremist contagion in prisons. Moreover, prison authorities use all their human, technical, and material resources, including the training of prison guards and specialised staff, to manage the specific risks posed by radicalised prisoners. According to studies and research, the concentration system has shown that the grouping of violent extremist prisoners in a single institution has a certain number of drawbacks, including:

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14 Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), *Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context*, RAN Prisons and Probation - practitioners working paper, p. 5.

15 [https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2018/02/23/ce-a-quoi-pourraient-ressembler-les-quartiers-pour-detenus-radicalises-annonces-par-edouard-philippe\\_a\\_23369384/](https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2018/02/23/ce-a-quoi-pourraient-ressembler-les-quartiers-pour-detenus-radicalises-annonces-par-edouard-philippe_a_23369384/)

16 Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), *Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context*, RAN Prisons and Probation - practitioners working paper, pp. 15-19.

- Less radicalised prisoners are driven into violent radicalisation by more radicalised prisoners;
- Links among the various radicalised prisoners are reinforced, and extremist groups or gangs are created which may cause riots and increase the risk of violence;
- Mistrust, hostility, and threats towards the staff worsen;
- The risks of stigmatisation by the public makes the reintegration of prisoners after their release difficult;
- It is difficult to find qualified staff;
- Management of this imprisonment system is expensive.

The various risks posed and the different levels of radicalisation among prisoners in a special unit can increase the spread of violent radicalisation, thus reinforcing the extremist threat (or at least maintaining it)<sup>17</sup>. The goal of ensuring security, safety, and risk management in a concentration system seems hard to achieve.

● **Dispersion:** in certain countries, such as England and Wales, violent extremist prisoners are scattered among various high-security prisons<sup>18</sup>.

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17 T. Veldhuis, Captivated by fear: An evaluation of Terrorism Detention Policy, Ph.D. thesis, Groningen University, 2015.

18 R. Pickering, “Terrorism, Extremism, radicalisation and the offender management system in England and Wales” in A. Silke (ed.) Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 162.

## **ENGLAND AND WALES: Dispersion of violent extremist prisoners**

In England, the “high-security prison estate” currently has eight prisons, which house “category A” prisoners who are regarded as posing the highest potential risks. The system currently comprises a total of about 120 terrorists, little more than twenty of whom are provisionally held [and] imprisoned in English prisons, and most of them are dispersed across the eight high-security prisons. Ninety of them are regarded as influenced by Al Qaida, and the remaining 30 prisoners include animal rights activities, separatists, and other domestic terrorists.

*R. Pickering, “Terrorism, extremism, radicalisation and the offender management system in England and Wales”, in A. Silke (ed.), Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism, Routledge, London, 2014, p. 162.*

In certain Member States, violent extremist prisoners are placed in different ordinary prisons, within the same system, even though the security system can be different in their case. This approach is intended to prevent the stigmatisation of prisoners and to expose them to a positive influence derived from interaction with ordinary inmates. Moreover, the dispersion system requires a lower budget than a concentration system. However, the system for the dispersion of violent extremist prisoners poses problems regarding management and risk

assessment, security and safety maintenance, and logistics<sup>19</sup>. Studies have shown that the dispersion system for violent extremist prisoners has a number of drawbacks:

- the lack of specialised staff able to identify and assess the risks posed by violent extremist prisoners.
- budget restrictions preventing staff from accessing effective training,
- the damaging influence of violent extremist ideologies on ordinary inmates,
- the damaging influence of criminal groups on violent extremist prisoners.

**Mixed system:** certain Member States have opted for a system combining concentration and dispersion on the basis of the results of the tools for the individual assessment of the risks posed by violent extremist prisoners. Prisoners are placed in a concentration or dispersion system depending on their level of radicalisation, individual behaviour, and specific needs for their personal and social readaptation. However, this imprisonment system also has drawbacks<sup>20</sup>:

- the lack of precision of the selection criteria and the results of the risk assessment tools aimed at providing a placement adapted to the prisoners' needs,
- the high financial cost of a mixed system, which requires the staff training and specialist programmes.

The selection of imprisonment systems depends on each State's public policies to maintain security in its prisons. The contagion of violent radicalisation in prison remains a serious question. Whether violent extremist prisoners are separated, dispersed, or concentrated, effective management and a healthy prison environment can reduce the risk of radicalisation during imprisonment and during probation.

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<sup>19</sup> World Forum on the Fight Against Terrorism: Sydney Memorandum on Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent Extremist Offenders (2012), internal challenge 2.

<sup>20</sup> [https://www.dbh-online.de/sites/default/files/prison-and-probation-interventions\\_en.pdf](https://www.dbh-online.de/sites/default/files/prison-and-probation-interventions_en.pdf)

## Contagion and proselytism

The fight against radicalisation and proselytism in prisons is a major challenge. Proselytism is defined as the ardent zeal to recruit adepts and try to impose the recruiter's ideas on them, making an individual discover the recruiter's ideology while seeking their adherence and ultimately their conversion <sup>21</sup>. In general, the legitimacy of proselytism is based on the principle of religious freedom, which allows proselytes to spread their beliefs and ideologies.

Even though proselytism is allowed in most Member States, there are restrictions on ideological and religious freedom. The freedom to follow your religion or beliefs can be subject to restrictions established by law which constitute necessary measures in a democratic society, aimed at ensuring public safety, the protection of public order, health, or morality, or the protection of others' rights and freedoms (article 9.2 of the European Charter of Human Rights).

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In prisons, abusive proselytism could be a risk factors for radicalisation and violent extremism. Management of this risk depends on the competences of prisoners in assessing extremist prisoners, in order to prevent the abuse of proselytism and fight radicalisation better.

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21 V.Fortier, « Le prosélytisme au regard du droit : une liberté sous contrôle » in Cahiers d'études du religieux. Recherches interdisciplinaires, 2014

22 [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention\\_FRA.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_FRA.pdf)

**In prison, radicalisation may be facilitated by the fact that prayer rooms are a popular place to convey message; they are, in fact, among the rare spaces where groups of prisoners can meet, often with no surveillance. Even with surveillance, linguistic obstacles and lack of understanding of the culture may prevent the staff from identifying suspicious behaviours.**

*Handbook on Violent Radicalisation: Recognition and Responses to the Phenomenon by Professional Groups Concerned (2008) Austria – France – Germany*

Given that adherence to radicalisation can take place in religious services, the institutional chaplains seem necessary to deal with the influence of religious leaders who provide these services, using them as a way to spread their violent extremist ideologies.

### *Religion and prison*

However, proselytism and religious freedom should not be conflated. The Committee on Human Rights, for example, has pointed out that prisoners “continue to have the right to follow their religion or their beliefs to the extent that is possible with the nature of the constraints [imposed by imprisonment]”<sup>23</sup>.

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23 [https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal\\_justice/Handbook-on-VEPs-FR.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook-on-VEPs-FR.pdf)

**For religiously inspired extremism, it is very important not to confuse people who might have (re)discovered their faith with people who have developed radical views. Most people who convert or revert, e.g. to Islam, during imprisonment are doing so for peaceful individual motives or to bond with a group of other prisoners. However, prejudices around the linkage between religion and extremism remain very present and may hamper good risk assessment.**

*Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context RAN P&P - practitioners working paper.*

Several authors have studied the institutionalisation of chaplains and the role of majority religious organisations in the inclusion of minorities (Bickford, Gilliat, 1998)<sup>24</sup>, as well as the effect of religiosity on conflictive behaviour (Kerley *et al.*, 2005)<sup>25</sup>, on Muslims (Khosrokhavar, 2005 et 2006<sup>26</sup>; Beckford *et al.*, 2005) and on inter-ethnic relations (Phillips, 2007)<sup>27</sup>. Research has shown that prison chaplains are useful partners in education and religious support. The chaplain's role is not only restricted to religious education, but can also provide a counter-

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24 Lamine, Anne-Sophie. « James A. Beckford, Sophie Gilliat, Religion in prison. Equal rites in a multifaith society. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 232 p. (bibliogr., index, tablx.) », Archives de sciences sociales des religions, vol. 128, no. 4, 2004, pp. 7-7.

25 Kent R. Kerley, Todd L. Matthews and Troy C. Blanchard, "Religiosity, Religious Participation, and Negative Prison Behaviors" in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 44, no. 4, 2005, pp. 443-457

26 KHOSROKHAVAR, Farhad. Les prisonniers musulmans en France In : Musulmans de France et d'Europe [online]. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2005 (retrieved on 22 July 2018). Available online: <<http://books.openedition.org/editions-cnrs/2879>>. ISBN: 9782271077899. DOI: 10.4000/books.editions-cnrs.2879.

27 Phillips, Anne. Multiculturalism without culture Princeton: University Press, Princeton, USA, 2007.

discourse against extremist ideologies and help prisoners to develop critical thinking regarding different religious questions. However, the authorisation and need for chaplains in prisons depend on the resources and needs in each prison and on the position of each Member State regarding religion. For example, the secular nature of the French State prevents the official recognition of chaplains as part of the prison system, while in England and Wales chaplains are public servants and take part in risk assessments.<sup>28</sup>

Studies and research show that religious interventions in prisons participate in the readaptation of prisoners<sup>29</sup>. The chaplain's role is not only limited to providing prisoners with spiritual assistance, conducting religious services, and running cultural meetings, but also includes countering the violent extremist interpretation of a religious ideology and providing religious arguments against the interpretations of religious leaders who encourage the use of violence in the name of religion. However, religious interventions in prisons depend strongly on the State's policy and position regarding religion.

### *Express radicalisation*

“Express radicalisation” can be defined as rapid adherence to a violent extremist ideology. Certain ordinary prisoners can quickly tip over into violent radicalisation. Pierre Botton, an ex-convict and the founder of the association “Ensemble contre la récidive” said in an interview on the Europe 1 radio station: “These days petty criminals are imprisoned for consumption of cannabis or small deals and leave prison like wild beasts with Kalashnikov guns”<sup>30</sup>. According to several studies, these prisoners’ vulnerability to adherence to radicalisation depends on demographic variables (e.g. age, sex, ethnic or racial origin)<sup>31</sup> as well as on psychological

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28 James Beckford, Daniele Joy, and Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Muslims in Prison: Challenges and Change in Britain and France* (Basingstoke, England & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).

29 United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons."

30 <http://www.europe1.fr/emissions/l-interview-verite/pierre-botton-pas-un-seul-candidat-nest-venu-voir-ce-quil-se-passe-en-prison-3215867>

31 S. Gerwehr et S. Daley (2006) *Al-Qaida: Terrorist selection and recruitment* (chapter 5 of *The homeland security handbook*. New York, United States; McGraw-Hill; p. 73 à 89

variables (behaviour, intentions, preconceived ideas, emotional instability)<sup>32</sup>. Moreover, a legal and criminal history can also a factor to “drive” prisoners into radicalisation.

**After fifteen years, the causes of violent extremism are the object of research work, but there are no reliable statistical data that would cast light on which leads certain individuals to become radicalised. Trends and scenarios emerge. However, researchers do not agree on certain points. The qualitative work done, based mainly on interviews, show that two main categories of factors can be distinguished: those which push towards violent extremism (the structural and circumstantial situation in which radicalisation takes place) and those which attract individuals (individual history and personal motivations), both of which play a crucial role in the passage from abstract ideas and discontent to violent action.**

*Action plan for the prevention of violent extremism – Secretary General’s report A/70/674 (2015), paragraph 23*

Researchers have identified several factors that “encourage” violent radicalisation in prisons:

- Ideology: prisoners’ adherence to a violent extremist ideology enables them to legitimise use of violence in the name of a cause that they believe to be just and persuasive.
- Grievances: certain prisoners find in a violent extremist ideology the answer to all their real or false individual problems (identity, socio-economic, psychological, etc.)

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32 S. Ash ‘Cult-induced psychopathology, part one: Clinical picture’. *Cultic Studies Journal*. 1985; 2(1):31-90.

- Imprisonment conditions: creating a violent extremist group enables certain prisoners to guarantee their protection against enemies, meet their needs, and be on the side of “the powerful” to escape an enemy's pressure.

- A charismatic leader: a charismatic leader, a dominating personality, can exploit a prisoner's vulnerability, a weak personality, providing an ideology that brings them out of marginalisation and being “less than nothing”.

Even though researchers, experts, and decision makers have shown that violent radicalisation is a long process, certain studies and analyses suggest that there is an “express” kind of radicalisation in prisons associated with external factors (socio-economic problems, discrimination, marginalisation, victimisation, etc.) and with individual factors (the prisoner's background, psychological fragility, and personal motivations). For example, a prisoner with a difficult personal background risks quickly tipping over into violent radicalisation. “Express radicalisation” can confirm that the timing of the radicalisation process varies depending on each individual's personal history.

## 2/ What already exists: Security and support

### Prison information

In Europe, there are many systems to fight radicalisation in prison. In order to detect the risks of violent radicalisation, prisons use two methods<sup>33</sup> :

- the collection and analysis of information;
- the use of risk assessment tools to identify individuals who are being radicalised or vulnerable individuals who may fall under the influence of violent extremist ideologies.

In order for prison staff to be able to identify and flag the risks of violent radicalisation, prisons collect and analyse the information required to assess the risks connected to violent radicalisation and prison security. Some Member States (e.g. Sweden) have an information service exclusively

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<sup>33</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context, RAN Prisons and Probation - practitioners working paper, p 11.

intended for prisons<sup>34</sup>. In France, the goal of the central prison information office is to share the information to create a real information community and cooperate with the other information services in order to fight terrorism and organised crime and reinforce prison security<sup>35</sup>. In 2016, a network of prison information on violent extremist prisoners was created by the Ministry of Justice in Germany to create a centre for the collection of information and share information with other institutions. Many Member States have considered the usefulness and need of creating prison information services to facilitate the sharing of information about prisoners who have been or are being radicalised.

However, the results of the information analysis as well as the information collected should not be regarded as exhaustive and must be constantly assessed to ensure their effectiveness.

### *Approaches and risk assessment tools*

During these last ten years, the analysis of information, the approaches taken and the risk assessment tools have enabled more accurate identification and flagging of the risks and needs of prisoners who have been or are being radicalised. For example, the structured professional judgement (SPJ) approach provides non-clinical staff with guidelines to assess the risks of violence among prisoners on the basis of identification and flagging factors. This approach provides recommendations on the collection and analysis of information by means of specific methods and sources. Studies have shown that the SPJ method is the most effective one in prisons<sup>36</sup>.

Moreover, tools for the assessment of the risks of violent extremism associated with the security and safety of populations inside and outside prisons seem to be crucial. In several Member States (such as Sweden, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, etc.), procedures for the collection of information, assessment protocols and tools are implemented to assess the levels and risks of radicalisation leading to violence among violent extremist prisoners, namely:

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34 Ibid.

35 <https://www.cf2r.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/P%C3%A9nitentiaire.pdf>

36 J. Monahan, The individual risk assessment of terrorism, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 2012, 34; R. Borum, Assessing Risk for Terrorist Involvement, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2015, vol. 2, n° 2, pp. 63 to 87.

- the crime of which the prisoner was convicted;
- the prisoner's criminal background;
- the risks which the prisoner is liable to pose to other prisoners and staff;
- the risk posed by the prisoner for the external population through their links to adapts outside;
- the prisoner's behaviour before imprisonment;
- the risk of influencing and leading other prisoners into violent radicalisation;
- the risk of spreading violent extremist ideologies in prison;
- the risk of causing riots and violence in the prison;
- the risk of escape.

The goal of the assessment of these risks is to minimise the danger particularly linked to the security and safety of prisons, meet the needs of extremist prisoners in accordance with the degree of radicalisation, and fighting the spread of radicalisation leading to violence.

### Examples of risk assesments tools

#### Questionnaire on the Perception of Islamist Radicalism in Prisons

Throughout a field research in 25 Spanish prisons, Trujillo and colleagues (2009) developed the Questionnaire on the Perception of Islamist Radicalism in Prisons, a five-dimension tool designed to assess *i)* horizontal cohesion, *ii)* vertical cohesion, *iii)* identity, *iv)* legitimisation of terrorism, and *v)* vigilance. Nevertheless, despite showing good psychometric validity, it is purely centred - as its name implies - in Islamic radicalisation, neglecting all the other radicalisation typologies (e.g., right-winged; left-winged) by solely focusing on one very specific radicalisation output.

### ERG 22+: Extremist Risk Guidance 22+

Comprising a three different dimension – namely, *i*) engagement factors; *ii*) intent factors; and *iii*) capability factors – and a total of twenty-two factors, this non-published tool was developed by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) Operational Intervention Services Group (Rehabilitation Services Group, 2011) and is used by themselves (i.e., NOMS) in the United Kingdom. However, due to its “restricted access to trained forensic psychologists or probation officers, on the hypothesis that disseminating their guidelines to the general public would be detrimental to their use” (Scarcella, Page, & Furtado, 2016), no more information is currently publicly available.

### VERA-2: Violent Extremist Risk Assessment 2

The most popular tool for the assessment of violent terrorism risk in correctional institutions is currently the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment 2 (VERA-2; Pressman & Flockton, 2010; 2012a; 2012b). Comprising five dimensions that have been largely supported by scientific literature (i.e., *i*) beliefs and attitudes; *ii*) context and intent; *iii*) history and capability; *iv*) commitment and motivations; *v*) protective dimensions), VERA-2 “being used in high-security prison settings in several countries with convicted terrorists” (Pressman & Flockton, 2014, p. 122). The first version of VERA (Pressman, 2009) incorporates demographic items, which - although quite abandoned - could be important aspects to assess, especially since age, gender and marital status are some of the few variables that are consensually associated with engaging in a radicalisation process (e.g., Horgan, 2008; Monahan, 2012).

However, the major downside associated with VERA-2 lies on the fact that it was only developed to assess the risk of radicalisation among inmates who are convicted terrorists, more precisely “offenders of violent acts carried out in furtherance of ideological objectives” (Pressman & Flockton, 2014, p. 122). Therefore, it does not suit those who are not convicted for terrorism, even despite a possible suspicion of becoming radicalised or starting to adopt violent extremist views while incarcerated.

### *ARIS: Activism-Radicalism Intention Scales*

Aiming a thoughtful understanding of the political mobilisation and analysis on the “increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviour in support of inter-group conflict” (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009, p. 239) and by building on the research to date at that particular time, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009), introduced a bi-dimensional type of approach by developing the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS). In particular, the Activism Intention Scale assesses the “readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action”, whilst the Radicalism Intention Scale measures the “readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action” (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009, p. 240). Overall, ARIS is comprised by 10-items, with each item rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely), being 4 the neutral scale point. In sum, ARIS may be particularly useful to understand “how individuals move from political attitudes and beliefs to political action, including political violence and terrorism” (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009, p. 239). However, while assessing activism and radicalism in the prison context, findings were not supportive of ARIS restrictive 10-item model, since “levels of activism and radicalisation among 802 prison inmates who have been arrested 10,000 times and served 2,000 incarceration stints are equal to that of students at elite American universities” (Decker & Pyrozz, 2018).

### *ERS: Extremism Risk Screen*

The Extremism Risk Screen (ERS) was created as a shortened version of the first ERG version, focusing on key questions under the three heading of engagement, intent and capability. Specifically, the ERS “is used with offenders with no previous convictions for extremist offences”, directing “the attention of security staff, police liaison officers and offender managers to the dimensions that are deemed to bear on risk” (Lloyd & Dean, 2015, p. 43). Therefore, it is “designed to assist prison and probation officials (on assessing) information about an offender’s possible involvement or interest in extremist groups, causes or ideas (Lloyd & Dean, 2015, p. 43).

Besides these five risk assessment instruments, you can still find some information about other tools, such as the Extremism Monitoring Instrument (EMI-20), the Intra-Textual Fundamentalism Scale (ITFS) or the Islamic Fundamentalism Scale (IFS).

### *R2PRIS Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons Toolset*

It was by having not only the strengths and weaknesses of aforementioned developed assessment tools into consideration, but also the research findings of Horgan (2008), Silke (2014a; 2014b), Borum (2014) and Sinai (2014), as well as the radicalisation-related guidelines and recommendations provided by the Council of Europe (2016a; 2016b), RAN (RAN P&P, 2016a; Williams, 2017) and UNODC (2016), that the R2PRIS “Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons” project<sup>37</sup> provided a breakthrough development within the field of radicalisation screening and assessment. In fact, R2PRIS multi-level approach to radicalisation risk assessment in prison settings builds on top of RAN guidelines (RAN P&P, 2016a; Williams, 2017), which recommends a two-step approach by involving, at first, frontline staff screening skills to identify signs and symbols of radicalisation and, secondly, once a certain level of awareness is achieved, inmates assessment by specialised staff (i.e., regular officers working on a specialised terrorist unit or psychologists, social workers and other related professionals).

In particular, the Radicalisation Risk Assessment in Prisons (RRAP) Toolset was developed during the R2PRIS project, soughing to reduce radicalisation and extremism inside prisons by enhancing the competences of frontline staff (correctional officers, educational staff, and psychologists, social workers) on identifying, reporting, interpreting, and responding appropriately to signals of radicalisation. The R2PRIS consortium brought together international experts in the field of radicalisation and national prison administrations, offering innovative training programmes for prison staff on how to recognise and prevent the process of radicalisation inside prisons.

More specifically, the RRAP Toolset follows a multi-level radicalisation prevention approach comprising three risk assessment tools, targeting all types of extremism. The toolset

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<sup>37</sup> For more information on this EU-funded project, please visit R2PRIS official website: [www.r2pris.org](http://www.r2pris.org) (R2PRIS, 2018)

focuses on signalling risk and vulnerability in the general population rather than in charged or convicted terrorist offenders and comprises tools directed at prison governors/administrators (Helicopter View), frontline staff (Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines), and technical staff (Individual Radicalisation Screening). It is also part of a Multi-level in-Prison Radicalisation Prevention Certification training, a capacity building programme developed as the result of concerted transnational cooperation between academia, private sector research, correctional sector representatives and practitioners, that aims both to certify professionals at different levels of the prison administration (prison governors, frontline officers and technical staff, internal trainers and facilitators) in the use of the tools that will enable them to identify risks, and screen and assess inmates that may be at risk of becoming radicalised, but also to train other colleagues in the use of these tools.

### *HV: Helicopter View*

The Helicopter View is a top-level assessment instrument aiming to support prison governors/prison system administrators to reflect and assess the first two situational dimensions, which consists in factors related to the prison service and the ones present among inmates. In sum, it aims to identify the available strategies and action plans in place.

More specifically, in order to prevent radicalisation in prisons, it is important to evaluate the extent to which prisons in each country are potential breeding grounds for radicalisation. There are at least six important factors pertaining to each prison system that have the potential to affect the efforts to prevent radicalisation in prisons, namely: *i*) prison policies regarding the assessment at entrance, the management and the placement of violent extremist prisoners; *ii*) degree of cooperation between prison service, police and intelligence services; *iii*) degree of internal cooperation; *iv*) prison staff ability to recognise and deal with signals of radicalisation; *v*) degree of over-crowding; and *vi*) the presence of cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions of confinement.

The presence of one or more factors among inmates can aggravate the weaknesses of the prison/prison system. Therefore, prison governors and administrators should reflect on the importance and urgency of the following items:

1. Presence of individuals or groups who have extremist opinions or views; or even individuals or groups that actively aim to recruit inmates to this kind of activities or networks;
2. Presence of extremist prison chaplains (or equivalent/similar persons);
3. “Virtual” presence by terrorist organisations.

The application of the Helicopter View has – as a pre-requisite – a training /e-learning course in order to guarantee that the instrument is used in a proper way. Then, when the prison administration/prison management decides to start the assessment, it is foreseen a preparation stage, in which the management team decides who should be part of the self-assessment. During the self-assessment, the prison management team will collect data based on the measure and will reflect upon the risk level that is presented at the organisational level and the among inmate’s level. After filling in the assessment, the risk level needs to be assessed. Then, according to the risk level, different actions need to be carried out. If the risk level is low, a report must be made and the team should decide the frequency of the assessment, that is, when they will review the prison risk level. On the other hand, if the risk is moderate or high, the team must design an action plan, evaluate readiness and implement the plan.



**Figure 2** Helicopter View - Assessment flow.


### *FBOG: Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines*

This second instrument is targeted at frontline staff and aims to raise awareness regarding significant changes in important domains, namely, physical appearance, decoration of cell and personal objects, daily routines, way of relating to other inmates, prison staff, relatives and others

and speech. It describes examples of behaviours that can represent the externalisation of cognitive radicalisation in inmates. This qualitative checklist-type of approach was developed through a conjoint effort with prison staff (e.g., correctional officers, psychologists, social workers) during R2PRIS’ short-term joint staff training events.

This tool was developed to be used on a daily basis by **prison officers**, but its adoption and contextual development should comprise various professionals. By that, it is directed towards **trainers** and **prison service facilitators** in **workshops** or **training sessions with frontline staff**, in which participants are asked to develop “their own” behavioural observation guidelines (as inmate’s behaviours may be different from country to country, or between different prisons in the same country, according to the prison population profile and prison dynamics).

In order to guarantee the correct use of the FBOG, frontline staff professionals are obligated to be enrolled in a training/e-learning course, which will raise their awareness of radicalisation and how to report through their daily, direct and frequent contact with possibly radicalised inmates. If some significant changes in behaviours are identified, staff need to decide whether these behaviours are suspicious or not. Therefore, if these changes put the inmate at risk, staff must document evidence and report. If the collected evidence is confirmed by other staff, an Individual Radicalisation Screening must be requested. Otherwise, they should keep attentive to inmates’ behavioural changes.



**Figure 3** Frontline Behavioural Observation Guidelines - Assessment flow.

### IRS: Individual Radicalisation Screening

As the name implies, the IRS is a screening tool targeted at technical staff and encompassing previously identified dimensions of inmates’ radicalisation vulnerability, such as the need to belong, emotional uncertainty and the perceived in-group superiority, amongst others.


Comprising dimensions ranging from the pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and militancy phases, it allows the technical staff to assess inmates' vulnerability and radical belief system through a thoughtful, careful appreciation of a wide range subset of those dimensions.

More specifically, dimensions were divided – in the coding and conversion phases – into two different subsets. First, four personal dimensions that define a pre-radicalisation phase, according to Sinai's (2014) model, are addressed. These dimensions are the need to belong, activism, emotional uncertainty and self-esteem, which are considered to be at a pre-stage of radicalisation, creating the necessary (but not enough) conditions for radicalisation to occur. Therefore, it sets the ground for radicalisation, considering that the most vulnerable inmates can proceed to the next phases if the environmental conditions are favourable.

The second subset of dimensions encompass the distance and societal disconnection, identity fusion and identification, radicalism, perceived in-group superiority and legitimisation of terrorism. These individual variables relate to a radical belief system that is characterised by the self-identification, indoctrination and militancy. Therefore, at these different stages, inmates can start to explore extremist ideologies, reinforcing their radical beliefs and adopting extremist ideologies, accepting violent terrorism as a mean to achieve political and/or religious goals.

In sum, the IRS addresses 10 different dimensions. Adding up to the nine that we have just mentioned, protective items will also be under consideration by the technician responsible for the assessment. The dimensions will be assessed through 46 questions by the following order: *i*) need to belong; *ii*) activism; *iii*) emotional uncertainty; *iv*) perceived self-esteem; *v*) legitimisation of terrorism; *vi*) radicalism; *vii*) perceived in-group superiority; *viii*) identity fusion and identification; *ix*) distance and societal disconnection; and *x*) protective items.

To avoid the misuse of the IRS, technical staff in prisons should receive adequate training to be able to correctly apply and interpret it. After going through the individual assessment of inmates, according to the level of vulnerability, staff must document evidence and produce a technical report (when the level is moderate or high) or inform the other staff, otherwise, to keep attentive. During the reporting stage, technical staff can report upwards or propose an intervention, depending on the organisational characteristics.



**Figure 4** Individual Radicalisation Screening - Assessment flow.

Moreover, the three instruments are complementary in the following points: The Helicopter View, while providing a macro approach, will depend on an implementation plan that encompasses the individual assessment provided by the FBOG and the IRS, thus connecting the prison service level and the among inmate’s level with the individual level. The FBOG, while providing evidence of changes in inmates’ behaviour, will help to refer the inmate to the IRS, where individual domains of radicalisation vulnerability can be assessed in a more structured way. Finally, the IRS is connected to the FBOG, because the technical staff need to ask the frontline staff to keep attentive in order to correctly flag inmates at higher vulnerability. Overall, the three instruments are designed to provide different but complementary views on the complex and multifaceted phenomenon of inmates/individual radicalisation.

Furthermore, at the end of the assessment phases, a fourth step should take place in order to aggregate data from the different assessment levels and be able to analyse the coexistence of – and interaction between – factors within a specific prison. At this stage, the professional judgement of the person responsible for the assessment will be key, in order to integrate the results from the current battery of instruments, as well as taking into consideration the different risk assessments and how can they be related to the inmate’s vulnerability of becoming radicalised, or the prison system’s vulnerability to the grown of radicalisation.

### Staff training

Even though prison information as well as assessment tools are necessary for the fight against violent radicalisation in prisons, staff continue to be the key factor for effective and secure operation of any prison system.

Under international standards, prison staff must be trained before starting to work in prisons, as well as throughout their careers<sup>38</sup>. The goal of the training is to enable prison staff to acquire technical skills as well as personal qualities for good management of violent extremist prisoners.

As society in general has become more diverse, complex and interconnected, prison society has come to reflect this. This changes the requirements for staff skills and competences, especially with regard to radicalisation and extremism, in which identity often plays a key role. Sensitivity and understanding of other cultural and religious norms, values and expressions has become increasingly important for the building of good staff-offender relationships. Prejudices and fear of staff members, leading to overreporting and negative interactions with detainees, can undermine deradicalisation/disengagement efforts. Staff dealing directly with convicted terrorists need specific skill sets and not all staff members will be suitable. It is a challenge to select and train staff to deal with radicalisation and violent extremism.

*Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context RAN P&P - practitioners working paper.*

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<sup>38</sup> See the Standard Minimum Rules adopted by the United Nations, rules 75 and 76; United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures (Bangkok Rules), rules 29 and 33.

All over Europe, prison authorities have provided the staff in prisons in which violent extremists are held with training on the management of violent extremists in prisons and on the identification of violent radicalisation in prisons.

The document “Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and to violent extremism” published by RAN provides a list of good practices existing in EU Member States<sup>39</sup>. This document is the result of the work conducted within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) to explore the various approaches, types of training, and good practices associated with the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism. Within this broad range, we would like to highlight that the goal of the training of prison staff is to help the staff to understand the radicalisation process, identify the signs and indicators of radicalisation among prisoners, and provide the tools and instruments for the prevention of radicalisation.

In Belgium, for example, the CoPPRA training project has been used as a tool to fight radicalisation and terrorism. In fact, the project comprises a handbook that helps police staff at the forefront to identify the signs of violent radicalisation. In 2015, the CoPPRA module was included in the training of all prison staff<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>39</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran\\_collection\\_approaches\\_and\\_practices\\_fr.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection_approaches_and_practices_fr.pdf)

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.coppra.eu/>

## **BELGIUM: The staff training module of the Prevention of radicalisation and terrorism by proximity policy project (COPPRa)**

The CoPPRa training project was initially aimed at Belgian police officers, but it has been used to train prison staff and other criminal justice professionals. It is intended to reinforce the ability of criminal justice staff at the forefront to prevent violent radicalisation. It is based on the idea that, while staff at the forefront play a key role in prevention, it does not always have good knowledge of the violent radicalisation process, does not always know how to recognise the early warning signs or the reaction to take. The project has thus been conceived to remedy this situation while ensuring the spread of relevant knowledge and the training of the concerned individuals.

To this end, a handbook for staff at the forefront, a CoPPRa handbook for the training of trainers, CoPPRa online learning programmes, available on the project website, and a CD-ROM providing PowerPoint slides corresponding to different training modules have been prepared. These materials are freely available to the criminal justice organisations involved. They can also be freely adapted to local needs and situations. It takes a total of about eight hours to go through these materials.

In 2015, the CoPPRa module has been adapted in order to be integrated in the basic training provided to all prison staff members in Belgium, specially emphasising the way to help the staff to detect signs of violent radicalisation among prisoners. Its goal is to raise awareness among the staff regarding these signs and limit false alarms and useless concerns.

Available at <https://www.coppra.eu/resources.php>

In Italy, the Training Office at the Prison Department of the Ministry of Justice developed in 2010 staff training on the management of Islamist violent extremist prisoners<sup>41</sup>.

### **ITALY: Training for staff working with violent extremist prisoners**

The Training Office of the Prisons Department of the Italian Ministry of Justice saw the need to create, in 2010, a training for existing staff on the way to manage Muslim violent extremist prisoners. The goal of this training was twofold: firstly, helping the staff to avoid behaviours which might hurt the religious sensitivities of Muslim prisoners, and, secondly, providing them with sufficient knowledge of Islam to ensure that prisoners do not benefit from their ignorance. This three-day training involved several sessions focusing on the cultural and religious aspects of Islam, its religious practices, international terrorism, its ideological context and spread, proselytism and radicalisation, management of international terrorists in prisons, and operating techniques.

A monitoring assessment after six months showed that 80% of the staff benefited from this training, found significant improvement of the quality of execution of their everyday tasks in prison, thought they had better knowledge of the elements of the culture and religious practice of Muslim prisoners, and thus found it easier to establish constructive relationships with them.

*Training Office, Prisons Department, Ministry of Justice,  
Italy.*

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<sup>41</sup> United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons."

*Radicalisation Prevention in Prisons (R2PRIS) project established a series of training programmes and tools for all staff within a prison to respond appropriately to potential vulnerable individuals at risk of radicalisation.*

The R2PRIS certification is a capacity building programme developed with the support of the European Commission and built as the result of concerted transnational cooperation between academia, private sector research, correctional sector representatives and practitioners, that aims both to certify professionals at different levels of the prison administration (prison governors, frontline officers and technical staff, internal trainers and facilitators) in the use of the tools that will enable them to identify risks, and screen and assess inmates that may at risk of becoming radicalised, but also to train other colleagues in the use of these tools.

The R2PRIS approach and individual screening tools have been developed to be used with inmates that are suspected of being vulnerable or in a radicalisation path and not the inmates that have been convicted of extremism related violence or terrorism crimes or for being part of a terrorist organisation. The certification process consists of:

- an online and classroom training;
- follow-up coaching sessions after implementing the tools.

Even though it is important and useful to analyse existing good practices in training in the various Member States, training must be adapted to the local situation in each country and to the needs, responsibilities, and competences of each of the parties involved, in order to make it effective and operative.

### *Support in prisons*

In Europe, support and reintegration programmes in prisons are determined by the risk of violence, the prisoner's needs, and the prison policies and resources. Support programmes include several interventions such as mentorship, cognitive-behavioural therapies, general work on attitudes and behaviour, chaplaincy, work with support networks, the treatment of the prisoner's physical or mental problem, etc. For example, research has shown that “cognitive and behavioural” interventions can not only help the prisoner's social and personal reintegration, but also to calm down the prison environment<sup>42</sup>. In France, the State implemented in 2015 an Antiterrorist Fight Plan (PLAT), followed by Anti-Terrorist Radicalisation Plan (PART) in 2016, to support the work of the Integration and Probation Prison Services (SPIP). Its goal is to provide support to prisoners after their integration, with the help and expertise of specialised educators and psychologists (the support pairings).

## **3/ Prospects for improvement**

Studies have shown that violent radicalisation in prison is not frequent but the prevention systems implemented can clearly reduce risks. In order to prevent and fight violent radicalisation in prison, the following prospects for improvement should be considered:

**1- Good prison management:** a well-managed prison is crucial for the implementation of interventions and programmes for the prevention of violent radicalisation and for the integration of violent extremist prisoners

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42 D. Andrews et J. Bonta (2010), *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct*, 5th ed., New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis.

**2- The handling of vulnerable prisoners:** to prevent the contagion of a violent extremist ideology in prison, vulnerable prisoners should be specifically handled to prevent their sliding into violent radicalisation in prison.

**3- The needs of the most vulnerable prisoners:** it is particularly crucial to meet the needs of vulnerable prisoners to prevent them from joining an extremist group to obtain protection or meet their physical needs.

**4- Conditions in prison:** prison conditions should be improved and overcrowding should be reduced to prevent prisons from becoming a fertile soil for extremism and violent radicalisation.

**5- The choice of prison system:** violent extremist prisoners should be a) separated by sex, legal status, and age; b) classified on the basis of the results of the risk assessment and their needs; and c) categorised in accordance with their degree of radicalisation and the risks which they pose to prison security and safety. Otherwise put, the prison system should be selected so that violent extremist prisoners are imprisoned in a secure manner.

**6- Prison information:** a network of prison information from different services and agencies should be reinforced and properly structured to share information concerning violent extremist prisoners. The prison information system should follow the rules of the national legislation as well as European and international standards.

**7- Risk reassessment:** the risks posed by prisoners who have been or are being radicalised should be assessed on a regular basis, as well as the likelihood of potential engagement in violent extremism actions. During imprisonment, prisoners' behaviour can evolve and/or change, which confirms the importance of reassessing their placement, their degree of radicalisation, and their need for intervention. According to experts, the risks posed by prisoners should be reassessed every six months as a good practice.

**8- The structured professional judgement method:** it is advisable to emphasise and encourage the use of the structured professional judgement (SPJ) method for the assessment of violent extremist prisoners. This method is based on the structured and rigorous identification of the indicators and signs of violent extremism signs in prisoners who have been or are being radicalised.

**9- Individualised intervention programmes:** the implementation of individualised intervention programmes that are effective against radicalisation and violent extremisms should be a priority for prison authorities. Intervention programmes should help prisoners to disengage from the violent extremist ideology as well as to be reintegrated in society upon their release.

**10- A multidisciplinary intervention team:** the prison authorities should install and/or cooperate with a multidisciplinary intervention team (psychologists, psychiatrists, chaplains, mentors, social workers, career guidance counsellors, healthcare professionals, researchers and experts) to assess the risks of radicalisation, identify cognitive-behavioural problems, and identify the needs of each violent extremist prisoner.

**11- Staff recruitment:** sufficient staff should be recruited and sufficient manpower should be available to ensure proper prison operation, management, security, and safety.

**12- Staff training:** specialised training should be provided to the prison staff working with violent extremist prisoners. Training should be adapted to local conditions and to the needs of each prison.

### III Third challenge: Probation and reintegration - Rasha Nagem

Prisoners’ disengagement and personal and social readaptation is a process that begins at the start of imprisonment. This process is intended to prevent the risks of violent radicalisation among prisoners and enable them to reintegrate in society upon their release.

European rules on probation were adopted by the Council of Europe in 2010. They propose 108 basic principles and recommendations to guide the implementation of the measures and penalties in the community.<sup>43</sup> Through these rules, Europe provides a definition of probation: “ the implementation in the community of sanctions and measures, defined by law and imposed on an offender. It includes a range of activities and interventions, which involve supervision, guidance and assistance aiming at the social inclusion of an offender, as well as at contributing to community safety.” Otherwise put, monitoring prisoners upon their release and during their probation is crucial to prevent recidivism.

These rules must be supported by individual and collective work to enable *deradicalisation*, *disengagement*, or *desistance*. However, the probation services in charge of prisoners after their release have a difficult responsibility, as they must manage the risks associated with violent extremism while ensuring that former offenders benefit from support in reintegration after their release.

#### 1/ The gist of the problem: Deradicalisation in prisons and social integration during probation

##### *The deradicalisation process in prisons*

*Deradicalisation* is defined as an “action aimed at transforming ideology and radicalised individuals”<sup>44</sup>. It is intended to intervene on behaviour through change in beliefs. *Disengagement* (or *desistance*) is defined as an “action focusing on radical action, in order to achieve a

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43 [http://www.justice.gouv.fr/\\_telechargement/BAT\\_13110140\\_DIRADMPENI\\_Bdef-raster%5B2%5D.pdf](http://www.justice.gouv.fr/_telechargement/BAT_13110140_DIRADMPENI_Bdef-raster%5B2%5D.pdf)

44 Action research “Detection and handling of religious radicalisation of prisoners” - January 2015-March 2016, under the supervision of Ouisa Kies.

*renunciation of use of violence, with no specific work on the ideological dimension*”<sup>45</sup>. It is intended to lead radicalised individuals abandon their violent behaviour without necessarily dealing with their beliefs or their values.

In the various European countries, the interventions conducted by the different agents are intended to “deradicalise” or “disengage” the radicalised individual. In fact, there is a distinction between the deradicalisation programmes (changing violent beliefs and principles) used, e.g., in Germany, and the disengagement programmes (renunciation of use of violence) used in Sweden. The choice between the two institutional strategies - deradicalisation or disengagement - and the conception of programmes depend on the goals and vision of each state.

In general, the four main stages of the deradicalisation process in prisons are the following:

- **Trust:** the first stage is based on the relationship between the staff and the prisoner. The staff create a professional relationship with the radicalised prisoner and establish an atmosphere to trust to engage in constructive discussions. The goal of these discussions is to come to know the prisoner better and work on their needs associated with the risks of violent radicalisation.

- **Risk assessment:** the detailed assessment of the risk posed by the radicalised prisoner is a crucial stage in the deradicalisation process.

- **Definition of needs:** the staff define the needs of the radicalised individual in order to prevent future risk of violent radicalisation.

- **Intervention:** the fourth stage consists in the implementation of interventions to prevent risks and meet the prisoner’s needs in order to successfully conduct the deradicalisation process in prison. Deradicalisation interventions are based on the principle of leading an already radicalised individual and help them to renounce their beliefs and violent behaviour.

As stated, the deradicalisation process starts in prison through the implementation of interventions aimed at preparing prisoners for social and professional reintegration upon their release. These interventions are particularly important and crucial as they help prisoners to become deradicalised or disengage from violent radicalisation. However, the complexity of these

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45 Ibid.

interventions lies in their adaptation to the risks and needs of each prisoner. According to Bjorgo and Horgan, the deradicalisation process depend on each individual’s personal history, as well as on their physical and psychological aspects and needs, which makes the process complex.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, in some European countries, deradicalisation programmes have proven not to be suitable for violent extremist individuals due to methods that do not focus enough on “*individualised support*”, the “*work on reintegration*” or the “*development of prevention*”. According to different criticisms, these radicalisation or disengagement programmes have failed due to ineffective methods that do not consider the importance of an individualised assessment of the risks and needs of each radicalised prisoner, as well as the training of the staff in charge of these key factors for the operation of management of violent extremist prisoners.

Studies have shown that during the probation and reintegration period, certain obstacles such as former violent extremist prisoners’ facing significant difficulties for social adaptation after their release<sup>47</sup>. For example:

- **Conditions of release:** former extremist prisoners suffer strict and heaving conditions of release that place obstacles to their reintegration and push them strongly to recidivism.
- **Stigmatisation and ostracism:** most former violent extremist prisoners face stigmatisation and ostracism in their families and in society, which weakens their ability to find employment and accommodation, to be reintegrated in the social system, and to rebuild a possible identity. If professionals do no offer the support required for a former prisoner's reintegration, the former prisoner will easily fall into recidivism due to a new condemnation and rejection from society.
- **Staff training:** the work of probation staff with former violent extremist prisoners is a difficult task and a heavy responsibility. Probation staff experience a high level of socio-political pressure, which could influence their personal judgement regarding the assessment of the risks associated with the recidivism of a former violent extremist prisoner.

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<sup>46</sup> T. Bjorgo et J. Horgan (2009) *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*, London: Routledge, p. 27.

<sup>47</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network (2016), *Dealing with radicalisation in a prison and probation context*, RAN Prisons and Probation - practitioners working paper.

## 2/ What already exists

### Deradicalisation, probation, and reintegration

International standards and rules confirm that the readaptation and reintegration of former prisoners in society are two of the main goals of the criminal justice system. They highlight that interventions that help in the reintegration of prisoners or former prisoners are significant tools to prevent the risk of recidivism and protect society.<sup>48</sup>

As was previously pointed out, prisoners must be able to benefit from support throughout their imprisonment and up to their release. Currently, Member States recognise the importance of investing in prisoner reintegration programmes and of managing prisoners' return to society to prevent recidivism and contribute to public security. The reintegration programme consists in different interventions such as readaptation, education, and programmes to prepare for release, as well as interventions for conditional freedom and assistance after release. In general, there are two main social reintegration programmes<sup>49</sup> :

a) the programmes and interventions carried out during imprisonment to prepare the prisoner for their release and their return to society, in order to reduce the risk of recidivism. For example:

→ The **Pathfinder** programme in England, which seeks the collaboration of different agents in the fight against terrorism in prisons. Assessment meetings among experts, psychologists, religious representatives, and agents from the Ministry for Employment and Equality are held in each prison to monitor each prisoner during their imprisonment.

→ The new **IBAANA** programme in England, which uses theology to fight violent Islamist ideology in prisons. Its goal is to enable violent Islamist prisoner to meet Muslim chaplains who have religious references which they can use in their arguments against violent Islamist discourse.

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<sup>48</sup> United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons."

<sup>49</sup>[https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC\\_SocialReintegration\\_FRE\\_180313.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_SocialReintegration_FRE_180313.pdf)

b) the programmes based on cooperation with other organisations and partners, such as community organisations, social services, relatives, mentors (religious representatives, former violent extremist prisoners, educators, etc.) For example:

→ the **Offender Resettlement** programme. The Association of Probation Officers of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland define a “resettlement programme” as:

*“A systematic, evidence-based process which performs actions to work with the offence while they are imprisoned and upon their release, in order to better protect the community against violence and significantly reduce the risk of recidivism. This process will cover all the work with prisoners, with their families and others, in partnership with public organisations and charities.”<sup>50</sup>*

→ the **Research and Intervention on Extremist Violence (RIVE)** programme in France is implemented by prison authorities. The goal is to disengage radicalised individuals in order to enable their reintegration in society. The RIVE team - members of the APCARS (Association of Applied Criminal Policy and Social Reintegration) association - starts its monitoring by establishing a link of trust with the individual in question, in order to identify the factors that drove them to violent radicalisation but also the risks which they pose.

→ **mentorship** programmes designed to provide support to radicalised offenders who are involved in deradicalisation activities have made it possible to show the importance and effectiveness of establishing a link of trust between mentors and offenders in the reintegration process. For example, Denmark launched in 2011 a mentorship training programme,

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50 Ibid.

"**Deradicalisation - back on track**", aimed at supporting prisoners convicted of violent radicalisation actions who wish to leave radicalisation<sup>51</sup>.

### *Mentoring Programme – Norway*

In August 2014, the Norwegian Government announced an Action Plan Against Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, which included the development and implementation of a mentoring scheme<sup>52</sup> in the Norwegian Correctional Services.

The scheme focuses on identified inmates convicted of hate crime, who are understood to be vulnerable to violent extremism, especially young inmates. Individuals with the following risk factors are considered vulnerable: *i*) lack of education; *ii*) lack of work experience; *iii*) criminal record; *iv*) lack of affiliation; *v*) lack of social networks; *vi*) little or no contact with family; *vii*) drug and alcohol abuse; *viii*) gang belonging; *vi*) others. Despite not being compulsory, prison staff must work in order to motivate inmate's participation.

The main objectives of the Mentoring Programme are: *1*) to prevent prisoners from using or encouraging others to use violence to achieve their political and religious goals; *2*) to prevent inmates from making contact or developing networks with people in violent extremist groups; and *3*) to intervene in the processes in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence.

### *VPN: Violence Prevention Network – Germany*

The Violence Prevention Network (VPN)<sup>53</sup> is a German project funded by the Federal Agency for Civil Education, which is part of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, but the project is currently running on an entirely independent basis.

VPN works with inmates convicted of violent crimes linked to far-right extremism, in order for them to reject their past (i.e., move away from extremism) and forge new lives.

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<sup>51</sup> United Nations, "Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons." p130.

<sup>52</sup> For more information, please see Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security (2014).

<sup>53</sup> For more information, please see Butt and Tuck (2014).

Recently, VPN enlarged its focus and started working with individuals who are religiously radicalised. Additionally, this programme works with the individual's family and social networks not only to prepare them for his/her release, but also to better understand the context into which the individual will return.

Therefore, VPN's approach brings together social work with civic education in order to *i*) disentangle the individual's sense of anger and hatred from their political view of the world, *ii*) help in tackling the factors driving their anger, and *iii*) re-educate them in the sense of democratic society and alternative ways of expressing and answering their concerns.

### EXIT-Germany – Germany

The initiative EXIT-Germany<sup>54</sup> was founded in 2000 by the criminologist/former police detective Bernd Wagner and by the former neo-Nazi leader Ingo Hasselbach, becoming the first non-governmental organisation (NGO) to start such an endeavour in Germany. Nowadays, it is one of the most experienced and successful programmes in deradicalisation and exit-assistance worldwide.

EXIT-Germany focuses on assisting individuals who want to leave extreme right-wing movements and start a new life. Despite being originally designed for an application in the community context, this programme has also been applied in prison settings.

Specifically, EXIT-Germany aims not only to disengage but also to deradicalise individuals, so 'EXIT' means more to them than just simply, for instance, leaving a party or a group. This, 'EXIT' is only successful after the basic ideologies and purposes of the previous actions were resolved. To achieve its purpose, this initiative offers right-wing extremists different forms of help, namely: *i*) showing an alternative world view and outlook on life, by providing new perspectives on right-wing extremist movements and ideologies; *ii*) promoting critical reflections, by addressing societal questions; and *iii*) providing security and safety to the dropout (e.g., ability to move nationally/internationally, changing identity or receiving police protection), especially as most of the 'clients' come from long term involvement and high positions within the hierarchy.

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<sup>54</sup> For more information, please see EXIT-Germany (2018).

In order to really 'EXIT', dropouts have to cut all connections to their former group and a successful challenge of the old ideology has to actually take place. EXIT-Germany also organises roundtable discussions within inmates with a right-wing extremist orientation on their respective world views. In addition, this programme works with case managers who help dropouts going through the process of starting a new life. Despite that the duration of this process varies and depends on each individual, on average it takes about 2-3 years. Hence, every case is specifically tailored to the individual but follows the general guidelines of the following model: 1) making the decision; 2) leaving the scene; 3) restructuring; and 4) family counselling.

Furthermore, EXIT-Germany is based on the idea that training of prison staff increases the sensibility, awareness and self-reflection regarding political extremism. Thus, it offers training for prison staff and shares significant knowledge on how to deal with right-wing extremism in concrete practice. It also provides counselling to families affected by right-wing extremism and analyses critical situations, being available to talk with teachers, police officers, institutions, individuals and anyone who is in need of advice.

### *HII: Healthy Identity Intervention – United Kingdom*

In the United Kingdom, NOMS is the section responsible for extremism offending interventions, being established since the London attacks on the 7<sup>th</sup> of July, 2005. It was initially set up by psychologists to help prison staff dealing with those convicted under the terrorism legislation of 2008. Understandably, due to security purposes, much of NOMS' National Security Framework document is not publicly available. However, NOMS' programme of work to counter extremism was summarised by the then minister, Lord Bach, in February 2009, who mentioned that this work should include *i*) improved intelligence gathering; *ii*) staff training/awareness raising; *iii*) support for chaplaincy teams; and *iv*) work to research and develop appropriate interventions.

Hence, various types of interventions are being implemented, namely the Health Identity Intervention (HII)<sup>55</sup> and the Al Furqan programme (please see 2.6.1.5). Similar to some abovementioned programmes, HII's aim is threefold: 1) facilitate circumstances that promote disengagement and desistance; 2) increase people's personal agency; and 3) increase emotional

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<sup>55</sup> For more information, please see Dean (2014) and RAN P&P (2016b).

tolerance and acceptance. Additionally, HII is a psychologically-informed intervention which incorporates three broad approaches drawn from current models of offender rehabilitation: *a)* the risk-need-responsivity model; *b)* facilitate those circumstances which are believed to contribute to desistance; and *c)* good lives model.

This intervention is delivered on a one-to-one approach (or two facilitators – psychologists or experienced probation staff to one participant), being quite flexible considering that HII is more tailored on the individual itself rather than on his/her level of risk. Also, HII's intervention team creates an overview of the inmate through information from decentralised prisons, and facilitators can decide which sessions they want to complete for each individual. The relationship between the facilitator(s) and the participant is viewed as crucial to facilitating change and enhance disengagement.

### *Al-Furqan programme – United Kingdom*

The Al Furqan programme<sup>56</sup> is another intervention implemented in United Kingdom by the NOMS. However, there is not much information available about it, since it is only known that it is being applied to inmates who have been convicted of terrorism related offences, and that it uses prison imams to challenge the views of extremist Islamic individuals through the teaching of the religion.

### *Saladino project – Spain*

The Saladino project<sup>57</sup>, originally called *Programa Marco de Intervención en Radicalización Violenta con Internos Islamistas*, was set up in 2016 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This Spanish initiative is based on the concern that inmates convicted of Jihadist terrorist crimes can influence others within the prison context, leading them to join radical Islamist groups once released. Therefore, its aim is threefold (i.e., *i)* prevention; *ii)* disengagement; and *iii)* deradicalisation) and is intended for three different groups of prisoners included in the Archive of

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<sup>56</sup> For more information, please see Grimwood (2016) and Silke (2014c).

<sup>57</sup> For more information, please see Secretaría General de Instituciones Penitenciarias – Ministerio del Interior (2016).

Special Monitoring Inmates<sup>58</sup>: *a)* inmates convicted of membership or collaboration with Islamist terrorist groups; *b)* inmates who, on the one hand, have a leadership, recruitment and proselytising force that facilitates their task of indoctrination and diffusion of radical ideas among the remaining prisoners (functioning as recruiters); *c)* inmates who are radicalised or in the process of radicalisation, being considered as vulnerable to be recruited to terrorist groups.

Saladino's project main focus is the permanent vigilance of those prisoners who are capable of recruiting or being recruited in order to detect any change that indicates a process of radicalisation. Hence, all information resulting from the monitoring of prisoners is analysed and, in addition, every contact the prisoner may have on the outside is also placed under surveillance, along with the imams who visit the prison on pastoral duty.

### *Disengagement and deradicalisation pilot programme – Turkey*

The Disengagement and Deradicalisation pilot programme<sup>59</sup> was conducted by the Adana Police Department, in Turkey, between 2009 and 2015. This programme was designed to reach out to individuals who joined activities of left-wing, faith-based or nationalist/separatist extremist groups, as well as their families.

Its purpose was to persuade these individuals to disengage from their groups, changing their radical mindsets while helping on their social reintegration. This pilot programme reached out to suspected individuals not only in detention facilities or in prisons, but also at the early stages of their engagement process.

In prison, extremist inmates were informed that if they compromise with the law enforcement personnel and accept the idea of disengaging from the group, they would have benefits, such as: *i)* the opportunity to benefit from an amnesty depending on their situation; *ii)* even if they were not included in the scope of an amnesty, they would be more likely to obtain a concession from the prosecutor; *iii)* receive some material and nonmaterial supports, including assistance for their families, and social aids.

Hence, if they chose to disengage from the group, they entered into the rehabilitation programme, acquiring vocational training, employment, housing, healthcare, social and financial

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<sup>58</sup> Originally, *Fichero de Internos de Especial Seguimiento – FIES* (i.e., a database containing information on certain groups of highly dangerous inmates).

<sup>59</sup> For more information, please see Bastug & Evlek (2016).

aids, counselling, as well as psychological support and treatment. In addition, they were monitored for a 6-month period after accepting the offer, in order to ensure whether they have broken all their attachments with the group, and actually remain disengaged.

### *Deradicalisation – Back on the right track - Denmark*

#### **DENMARK – A mentorship training programme**

The main goal of the “Deradicalisation – Back on the right track” mentorship training programme is to propose mentorship aimed at individuals with extremist tendencies convicted of criminal offences, thus providing them with the help and support which they need to go back on the right track and leave radical groups, both during their imprisonment and during their reintegration into society.

The mentor training programme consisted of three two-day seminars and two two-day follow-up seminars. In addition, the Danish Ministry for Children, Sex Equality, Integration, and Social Affairs, and the Danish Information and Security Services provided a supplementary two-day adapted course on extremism and radicalisation. “Networking” days were also held for mentors. Effective framing is a complex task, the success of which lies in the ability to establish a relationship of trust and training mentors who have a large range of competences and can take inspiration from their own and from others’ experience. Mentors must also be able to reflect on their own practice in order to adapt it so that it better serves beneficiaries.

*Danish Prisons and Probation Service and Danish Ministry for Children, Sex Equality, Integration, and Social Affairs (2014), Deradicalisation – Back on the right track: Framework for the mentor training programme, specifically targeting extremism and radicalisation.*

Several cognitive-behavioural programmes aimed at violent offenders are offered during the imprisonment period or upon parole or conditional freedom<sup>60</sup>. Unfortunately, there are not enough studies on the effectiveness of these programmes to establish the factors involved in the success or failure of a reintegration programme. However, certain good practices can be identified:

- **Reintegration programmes:** reintegration programmes must be used from the start of the imprisonment of prisoners have been or are being radicalised. The main goals of reintegration programmes are to provide offenders with the assistance and monitoring required to learn how to renounce violence, be reintegrated in society, and avoid recidivism.

- **Risk management:** Reintegration programmes vary depending on the risk factors associated with recidivism, the offender's needs, and the obstacles faced after release. The importance of the involvement of a multidisciplinary team in the assessment of the offender's risk of recidivism and needs must be considered. It is preferable that the probation service is involved in the assessment of the offender's risks and needs from the last stage of their imprisonment.

- **Trust:** the role of the probation agent is important as they are the main person in charge of monitoring the former prisoner and providing support in their reintegration process. In fact, it is crucial to establish a link of trust between the probation agent and the former prisoner for successful reintegration.

- **Support and collaboration between several partners:** Given the complexity of the deradicalisation process, several Member States employ a multidisciplinary network of professionals (psychologists, psychiatrists, educators, religious representatives, mentors, etc.) in order to implement the interventions adapted to the radicalised offender during imprisonment. Upon release, the prisoner must benefit from extended support to prevent recidivism and help

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<sup>60</sup> See D. Joliffe et D. P. Farrington, "A systematic review of the national and international evidence on the effectiveness of interventions with violent offenders", Ministry of Justice Research Series 16/07 (United Kingdom, Ministry of Justice, 2007)

them in their social reintegration. During the probation and reintegration period, it is recommended to collaborate with other organisations and partners, such as social services, accommodation organisations, employment agencies, family service centres, family members, religious representatives, former violent extremist prisoners, etc. in order to help former prisoners in their renunciation of violent extremism and the adoption of a non-violent, positive behaviour. Collaboration between the different services is necessary to meet former prisoners' material and social needs.

### 3/ Prospects for improvement

On the basis of the observations described above, we make the following general recommendations to better deal with the challenge of the process of deradicalisation and reintegration during probation:

1. **Deradicalisation or disengagement:** whatever the institutional strategy selected is, the process of deradicalisation or disengagement of violent extremist prisoners should begin at the start of imprisonment in order to work on the behaviour of violent extremist prisoners and help them to renounce the use of violence to achieve their goals.
2. **Specialised intervention:** interventions must be specifically designed and adapted to the risks and needs of extremist prisoners before and after their release.
3. **Reintegration plans:** reintegration plans should consider the social and material problems and difficulties faced by prisoners in their reintegration in order to decrease the risk of recidivism;
4. **Ongoing support:** support and mentorship programmes should continue during the reintegration period. The mentor or counsellor should work with the prisoner during their imprisonment and after their release.
5. **Cooperation between different partners:** collaboration between different services, partners, and agents is crucial for successful social and professional reintegration of former prisoners.

6. **Use of a multidisciplinary team:** the involvement of a multidisciplinary team in the assessment of prisoners' risks and needs before and after their release reinforces the deradicalisation process and facilitates the passage from prison to society.
7. **Training for probation staff:** probation staff should have access to specific risk management training associated with the recidivism of violent extremist prisoners and stress management to enable their work to be more effective.
8. **Research on probation and reintegration:** more work is required, as well as investing in research on the probation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders in order to assess, develop, and improve the programmes, practices, and tools used, and spread good practices.
9. **Expert and professional competences:** in order for the prevention of radicalisation in prisons and probation to be effective, experts and professionals who are competent in the field must be employed to prevent the funding of incompetent structures that are merely the stooges of public powers.

## IV. Recommendations

### I. First challenge: assessment

1. **Assessing the potential for radicalisation of a given prison:** overcrowding and the presence of charismatic leaders are two particularly significant factors in the rise in cases of radicalisation in prison.
2. **Training observers at the forefront:** it is crucial to convey the methodology to the professional team in these prisons.
3. **Not focusing on religious signs:** there is a preponderance of religion and religious signs in the assessment of radicalisation in prison, whereas researchers say that violent engagement may take place before religious engagement. Training for protection against religious confusion is required.
4. **Locating assessment in a longitudinal analysis of biographies and radicalisation careers:** purely quantitative data, analysed outside their context and outside any aetiology of

radicalisation do not enable us to grasp the complexity of radical engagement and emphasise a simple management ideology aimed at close monitoring of prisoners.

5. **Assessing on a case-by-case basis:** as Jovelin (2016) points out, “there are several interrelated factors that lead these young people to join the jihad, beyond the explanations taken from sociological (or other) theories, none of which can be generalised. To better grasp the reasons for tipping over, the individual's biography must be reconstructed in order to *understand the chain of interactions and events that marked them and predisposed them to the transgression in question*”.
6. **Establishing handling and reintegration as the goals of assessment:** not only repression and surveillance. Having a shared vision enables professionals to develop handling systems that are as adapted to prisoners' profiles as possible.
7. **The assessment requires offenders' cooperation:** volunteering is indispensable to take part in this programme, according to researchers. Farhad Khosrokhavar also finds that “in a democracy, jihadists can only be handled if they consent to it. No one should be included in a deradicalisation programme against their will”.
8. **Following an interdisciplinary method for screening analysis:** an interdisciplinary view of carers is required rather than a single interpretation. This is already the case of the interdisciplinary committees in QERs in France
9. **A finer-grained categorisation of prisoners who have been or are being radicalised:** labelling on the basis of finer-grained categories makes it possible to handle individuals in accordance with their needs, which will make it more effective.
10. **Conducting an ongoing assessment:** not limiting assessment to an initial stage. The assessment of prisoners should be conducted upon arrival in prison, during their handling or during their imprisonment, and upon leaving prison, during their reintegration.
11. **Assessing the handling and reintegration systems:** in addition to individuals, the systems themselves should be assessed in order to correct problematic elements. The goal is to assess the involved parties' needs and the measures already implemented.
12. **Providing the financial means required:** human, material, and legal means must be implemented in accordance with the systems and the effects sought.

## II. Second challenge: management of the risks of radicalisation in prison.

1. **Good prison management:** a well-managed prison is crucial for the implementation of interventions and programmes for the prevention of violent radicalisation and for the integration of violent extremist prisoners
2. **The handling of vulnerable prisoners:** to prevent the contagion of a violent extremist ideology in prison, vulnerable prisoners should be specifically handled to prevent their sliding into violent radicalisation in prison.
3. **The needs of the most vulnerable prisoners:** it is particularly crucial to meet the needs of vulnerable prisoners to prevent them from joining an extremist group to obtain protection or meet their physical needs.
4. **Conditions in prison:** prison conditions should be improved and overcrowding should be reduced to prevent prisons from becoming a fertile soil for extremism and violent radicalisation.
5. **The choice of prison system:** violent extremist prisoners should be a) separated by sex, legal status, and age; b) classified on the basis of the results of the risk assessment and their needs; and c) categorised in accordance with their degree of radicalisation and the risks which they pose to prison security and safety. Otherwise put, the prison system should be selected so that violent extremist prisoners are imprisoned in a secure manner.
6. **Prison information:** a network of prison information from different services and agencies should be reinforced and properly structured to share information concerning violent extremist prisoners. The prison information system should follow the rules of the national legislation as well as European and international standards.
7. **Risk reassessment:** the risks posed by prisoners who have been or are being radicalised should be assessed on a regular basis, as well as the likelihood of potential engagement in violent extremism actions. During imprisonment, prisoners' behaviour can evolve and/or change, which confirms the importance of reassessing their placement, their degree of radicalisation, and their need for intervention. According to experts, the risks posed by prisoners should be reassessed every six months as a good practice.

8. **The structured professional judgement method:** it is advisable to emphasise and encourage the use of the structured professional judgement (SPJ) method for the assessment of violent extremist prisoners. This method is based on the structured and rigorous identification of the indicators and signs of violent extremism signs in prisoners who have been or are being radicalised.
9. **Individualised intervention programmes:** the implementation of individualised intervention programmes that are effective against radicalisation and violent extremisms should be a priority for prison authorities. Intervention programmes should help prisoners to disengage from the violent extremist ideology as well as to be reintegrated in society upon their release.
10. **A multidisciplinary intervention team:** the prison authorities should install and/or cooperate with a multidisciplinary intervention team (psychologists, psychiatrists, chaplains, mentors, social workers, career guidance counsellors, healthcare professionals, researchers and experts) to assess the risks of radicalisation, identify cognitive-behavioural problems, and identify the needs of each violent extremist prisoner.
11. **Staff recruitment:** sufficient staff should be recruited and sufficient manpower should be available to ensure proper prison operation, management, security, and safety.
12. **Staff training:** specialised training should be provided to the prison staff working with violent extremist prisoners. Training should be adapted to local conditions and to the needs of each prison.

### **III. Third challenge: Probation and reintegration**

1. **Deradicalisation or disengagement:** whatever the institutional strategy selected is, the process of deradicalisation or disengagement of violent extremist prisoners should begin at the start of imprisonment in order to work on the behaviour of violent extremist prisoners and help them to renounce the use of violence to achieve their goals.
2. **Specialised intervention:** interventions must be specifically designed and adapted to the risks and needs of extremist prisoners before and after their release.
3. **Reintegration plans:** reintegration plans should consider the social and material problems and difficulties faced by prisoners in their reintegration in order to decrease the risk of recidivism.

4. **Ongoing support:** support and mentorship programmes should continue during the reintegration period. The mentor or counsellor should work with the prisoner during their imprisonment and after their release.
5. **Cooperation between different partners:** collaboration between different services, partners, and agents is crucial for successful social and professional reintegration of former prisoners.
6. **Use of a multidisciplinary team:** the involvement of a multidisciplinary team in the assessment of prisoners' risks and needs before and after their release reinforces the deradicalisation process and facilitates the passage from prison to society.
7. **Training for probation staff:** probation staff should have access to specific risk management training associated with the recidivism of violent extremist prisoners and stress management to enable their work to be more effective.
8. **Research on probation and reintegration:** more work is required, as well as investing in research on the probation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders in order to assess, develop, and improve the programmes, practices, and tools used, and spread good practices.
9. **Expert and professional competences:** in order for the prevention of radicalisation in prisons and probation to be effective, experts and professionals who are competent in the field must be employed to prevent the funding of incompetent structures that are merely the stooges of public powers.



# INTEGRA

Integrated community, probation and prison  
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